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Technical Assessment Report 
1.0 Notification and Authorization 
In coordination with the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) and the respective 
Center Pressure System Managers (PSMs), the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) 
was requested to formulate a consensus draft proposal for the development of additional testing 
and analysis methods to establish the technical validity, and any limitation thereof, for the 
continued safe operation of facility non-code (i.e., not in compliance with the American Society 
of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Division 1, in effect at 
the time of construction) layered pressure vessels.   
The NESC Review Board approved the assessment plan on April 18, 2013.  Dr. William H. 
Prosser was assigned to lead this assessment.  The primary stakeholders for this assessment were 
the OSMA, as represented by Owen Greulich, Technical Discipline Manager for Pressure 
Systems, and the respective Centers responsible for the safe operation of these vessels, as 
represented by the PSMs.  The PSMs from each NASA Center were asked to participate as part 
of the assessment team by providing, collecting, and reviewing data regarding current operations 
of these vessels.   
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4.0 Executive Summary 
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was asked to perform an assessment related 
to the approximately 300 older, layered pressure vessels (LPVs) that are in service at a number 
of NASA facilities.  Although NASA has not experienced a catastrophic failure of an LPV, the 
high pressures and large volumes of these vessels could produce severe consequences in the 
event of a failure.  These vessels were fabricated prior to the adoption of layered fabrication 
techniques as an acceptable construction methodology in the American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC) [ref. 1].  Additionally, there are 
variances in the materials, fabrication, and inspection techniques used in these vessels with 
respect to the BPVC at the time of construction, as well as the later adopted BPVC that provided 
for LPV construction.  Thus, these vessels are non-code and, consequently, are not compliant 
with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations [ref. 2] as required for 
federal agencies [ref. 3].  Further, these vessels are typically more than 50 years old and, as such, 
are at additional risk for age-related degradation, including fatigue, corrosion, and embrittlement, 
which can lead to fracture. 
The scope of the assessment was to formulate a consensus draft proposal for the development of 
additional testing and analysis methods to establish the technical validity, and any limitation 
thereof, of these vessels for continued safe operation.  It should be made clear that the 
establishment of the current safety of these vessels, or their safety for continued operations for 
any period into the future, was not within the scope of this assessment.  In performance of this 
assessment, three tasks were executed.  The first was to review the inventory, usage conditions, 
and ongoing and proposed risk mitigation methods for LPVs at all NASA Centers and for select 
locations at other Government facilities and in private industry.  The second task was to conduct 
limited scope testing and analysis necessary to formulate final recommendations.  Major 
activities for this task were defined based on the results of the first task.  The third and final task 
was to coordinate a consensus draft proposal for the development of additional testing and 
analysis methods to establish the technical validity, and any limitation thereof, of LPVs for 
continued safe operation.  The output of this task forms the basis for the recommendations 
contained in this report. 
The assessment team found that the operation of these non-code LPVs does present an elevated 
level of risk compared with conventional code-compliant vessels.  However, insufficient 
information is available to quantify that level of increased risk within the scope of this effort.  
The assessment team found that the Agency lacks a consensus approach to addressing the risks 
associated with the operation of these vessels.  Also, although near-term actions are available and 
identified to reduce the risk of and consequences from catastrophic failure of LPVs, the level of 
risk reduction for many of these actions cannot be quantified.  Longer-term efforts are required 
and are identified for characterizing and mitigating the risk for LPVs, and these should be 
focused on the highest risk operating conditions and regions of these vessels identified by the 
assessment team.  Several additional discipline-specific findings are provided specific to 
materials testing, structural analysis, and nondestructive evaluation (NDE) technique 
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developments that are applicable to better characterizing and reducing of LPV risks.  The 
assessment team also observed that the Center Pressure Systems Managers (PSMs) who 
participated on the assessment team demonstrated understanding of the technical issues and 
concerns associated with non-code LPVs and a willingness to engage across Centers to develop 
improved approaches to mitigating risks associated with the continued use of these vessels.  The 
assessment team also observed that significant efforts are underway outside this assessment that 
directly relate to the understanding of and continued safe use of LPVs at Centers. 
The assessment team identified two sets of recommendations.  The first set of recommendations 
consists of near-term actions that if enacted could reduce either the risk of or consequences from 
catastrophic LPV failure resulting from their continued use.  Because of the lack of adequate 
materials property data, inspection methodologies, and analyses methods, the risks associated 
with the continued use of these vessels and the degree to which these recommendations would 
reduce that risk cannot be accurately estimated at this time.  In addition, it is recommended that 
the Agency formulate and support an Agency-wide team to continue efforts to assess and reduce 
risks associated with LPVs and to develop a centralized database of information on the design, 
fabrication, materials, operation, inspection, maintenance, and repair of LPVs. 
The second set of recommendations comprises the longer-term activities proposed to improve 
understanding of the risks associated with continued use of LPVs and to develop Agency 
processes to mitigate these risks.  The assessment team recommends that the Agency expand 
efforts to gather LPV materials property data.  In doing so, it is recommended first that a 
statistical analysis be performed to determine the number of LPVs and associated materials 
testing specimens needed to provide adequate bounding materials property data.  To address a 
high-risk operating condition, notably the potential operation of these vessels at temperatures 
where brittle fracture is possible, it is recommended that measurements of the temperatures 
associated with ductile to brittle fracture behavior (initiated in Task 2) be completed.  These 
measurements are necessary to establish appropriate minimum design metal temperatures 
(MDMTs) for future operation of LPVs.  Additionally, it is recommended that additional 
materials property data be gathered to support analysis methods to evaluate and utilize proof test 
methodologies and to establish critical crack sizes for NDE detection criteria.  
It is further recommended that the Agency expand efforts to develop and validate analysis 
methods to address the identified highest risk conditions and regions of LPVs.  Using these 
analysis methods, it is necessary to assess the sensitivity of any results to uncertainties in the 
input variables, such as material properties, structural configurations, and weld residual stress 
conditions.  It is recommended that analysis predictions of weld residual stresses for LPVs 
(initiated in Task 2) be completed and measurements made to validate these results.  It is 
recommended that an analytical framework be established to evaluate proof test logic for these 
vessels and, where proof testing cannot be applied, to analyze the leak-before-break (LBB) 
capability of the LPV system.  To aid in NDE development and validation and remaining safe 
life determination, it is recommended that an analytical framework be established to evaluate 
critical initial flaw sizes.  
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It is also recommended that the Agency develop and, where possible, validate a number of NDE 
techniques to address the highest risk conditions and regions of LPVs.  These include the phased 
array ultrasonic technique (PAUT), which has shown promise for inspecting the critical full 
penetration circumferential welds in LPVs.  Other techniques recommended for development and 
validation include photogrammetry, both for validation of analysis methods and potential flaw 
detection in shell sections; acoustic emission (AE) techniques for detection of flaw growth in 
welds, heads, and shell sections; and radiographic and low-frequency electromagnetic methods 
for potential flaw detection in welds, heads, and shell sections. 
Lastly, the assessment team entertained significant discussion regarding whether to make any 
recommendations regarding the need for consideration of plans for replacement of these vessels, 
which would cost an estimated $1–2M per vessel and would result in ancillary cost and schedule 
impacts while a vessel undergoing replacement is off-line.  In the end, the assessment team 
stopped short of such a recommendation for a variety of reasons.  However, all team members 
were in agreement with the obvious fact that replacement of these vessels would eliminate the 
additional risks associated with their continued use, in comparison with the better understood and 
more easily mitigated risks associated with monolithic code-compliant replacement vessels. 
5.0 Assessment Plan 
NASA has an active inventory at nine of its Centers or facilities of approximately 300 old, non-
code LPVs in high-pressure service.  Many of these are in close proximity to personnel and 
expose personnel and facilities to catastrophic consequences in the event of failure.  The 
fabrication and inspection techniques in use at the time of construction for these older vessels 
were not included in the ASME BPVC; thus, these vessels are not compliant with the then-
current ASME BPVC, or the 1968 ASME BPVC [ref. 4], as is now required by the Federal 
OSHA regulations (29 CFR 1910 and 1960, Occupational Safety and Health Standards)  
[refs. 2 and 3].  OSHA regulations do not provide for “grandfathering” of these older, non-code 
pressure vessels, which would allow these older vessels to be exempt from the existing 
regulations.  Additionally, the layered construction technique makes the application of traditional 
NDE techniques, such as ultrasonic shear and straight-beam, radiography, and magnetic-particle 
inspection of the inner layers of these vessels, difficult if not impossible.  This difficulty in 
detecting defects is further enforced when considering the types of NDE methods available and 
their detection capabilities at the time when these LPVs were constructed. 
Figure 5.0-1 shows examples of typical large facility LPVs.  Figure 5.0-2(a) shows a cross-
sectional diagram of an LPV with a monolithic head, and Figure 5.0-2(b) shows a cross section 
of an actual vessel where the layers, weld, and monolithic head are clearly visible.  The head for 
these vessels can be monolithic, as shown, or composed of multiple layers.  All of the NASA 
LPVs have monolithic heads.   
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Figure 5.0-1.  Typical Large Facility LPVs 
 (a)          (b)   
Figure 5.0-2.  Cross-sectional Diagram of LPV ((a) monolithic head  
and (b) cross section of actual vessel) 
Although there has never been a catastrophic failure of this type of vessel at any NASA Center, 
there have been failures in industry (as described in Section 6.1.4) as recently as 2010, including 
at least one newer LPV that was ASME code-stamped.  These NASA vessels have been in use 
for decades without an established Agency-wide-consensus technical basis for ensuring their safe 
operation. 
Inner
Shell 
Layers 
Head 
Weld Vent hole 
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The assessment team was requested to formulate a consensus draft proposal for the development 
of additional testing and analysis methods that would be required to establish the technical 
validity, and any limitation thereof, of these vessels for continued safe operation.  This 
assessment was to leverage common skills, capabilities, and data from within and outside NASA 
and to consider inspection, analysis, and monitoring techniques that could be applicable to these 
vessels.  To accomplish this task, the assessment team was to evaluate failure risks associated 
with the inner shell, outer layers, heads, nozzles, and welds of these vessels.  It was expected that 
the results of this assessment and the proposed follow-on testing and analysis could subsequently 
be used as a basis for the development of a future NASA standard that would be submitted to 
OSHA for use as an alternate and supplementary standard, as required by 29 CFR 1960 [ref. 3].   
An informational presentation to familiarize OSHA with the suggested approaches was a 
possible product of this assessment, with the understanding that this assessment was only a first 
step and that the resulting proposed testing and analysis method development was outside the 
scope of this assessment.  Likewise, this assessment did not include the generation, review, and 
Agency approval of any NASA alternate and supplementary standard for OSHA.  The tasks for 
this assessment included the following: 
Task 1:  Review inventory, usage conditions, and ongoing and proposed risk mitigation methods 
for LPVs at all NASA Centers and at select locations within other Government facilities, as well 
as in private industry.  Major activities included: 
• Hold virtual technical interchange meetings (TIMs) with Center PSMs to acquire
available data on NASA usage of LPVs, to include inventory, usage conditions, and
ongoing and proposed risk mitigation methods.
• Research locations and points of contact for external, non-NASA sites where similar
vessels are currently in operation.
• Conduct phone interviews with non-NASA users of LPVs.
• Engage multilayer pressure vessel fabricators and additional experts (e.g., ASME or
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) technical committee members) as
needed.
• Conduct a virtual TIM with the assessment team to collate review results and identify
technical areas requiring further studies, opportunities for limited testing and analysis
efforts to be considered, and preliminary initial recommendations.
Task 2:  Conduct limited scope testing and analysis necessary to formulate final 
recommendations and a path forward.  Major activities for this task were to be defined based on 
the results of task 1, for example: 
• Proof of concept of NDE and in situ sensing methods.
• Destructive materials properties testing and associated analysis.
• Structural analysis of LPV response.
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Task 3:  Coordinate development of a consensus draft proposal for the development of 
additional testing and analysis methods required to establish the technical validity, and any 
limitation thereof, of LPVs for continued safe operation.  Major activities for this task included: 
• Conduct final virtual TIM to identify highest priority risk mitigation methodologies and
necessary future testing and/or analyses required to develop, evaluate, and validate these
approaches.
• Develop findings, observations, and NESC recommendations and draft a final report for
peer review and approval.
6.0 Problem Description and Proposed Approach 
6.1 History of LPVs 
6.1.1 Original Patents, Manufacturers, and Benefits and Limitations of Construction 
Technique 
The methods of construction for LPVs were originally described in the United States (U.S.) in 
patents assigned to the A. O. Smith Corporation in the 1930s and 1940s [refs. 5 and 6].  During 
WWII, Krupp in Germany also developed a layered method of constructing high-pressure 
vessels.  Rather than using a single monolithic layer of material, multiple layers are used to 
construct these vessels, as shown in Figure 5.0-2.  Although in principle both the shells and the 
heads of cylindrical vessels can be fabricated with layers, most vessels fabricated in this manner, 
including all within NASA, have monolithic heads and layered shells. 
This fabrication approach originated to address the difficulty at the time in building thick 
monolithic steel shells to withstand very high pressures.  Thick steel products produced by the 
steel mills at that time had considerable variability in chemical composition and material 
properties and suffered from slag inclusions and poor impact properties; thin-plate materials with 
better and more consistent properties were more readily available.  Of course, as stated, NASA’s 
layered vessels still have thick heads and present risks associated with materials variability, 
which is discussed later. 
The advantages of the layered vessel construction method for vessels to be used at high pressures 
included: 
1. The high-strength steel necessary for construction was readily available in thin (typically
¼- to ½-inch) plates, which could be rolled into cylinders for the shell sections.
2. Thin plates could more readily be rolled into cylinders with lighter forming rolls and
without heating.
3. Large overall thicknesses could be fabricated using multiple thin layers.
4. The thin plates generally had superior material properties (e.g., ductility, strength, and
toughness) over equivalent thicker plates.
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5. Vent holes could be drilled through all of the layers except the inner shell of the vessels,
as shown in Figure 5.0-2(a), ensuring that pressure did not build up between layers and
also providing a means of detecting leakage, indicating inner shell failure before
catastrophic rupture of the vessel.  (Note that a similar technology was developed in
parallel in Germany in the coal gasification industry for the war effort, where an inner
layer was used as the pressure seal and the outer shell layers were vented).
6. Welding of the thin longitudinal seam joints in the thin plates was more easily
accomplished versus welding joints in thicker plates.
7. Redundancy of layers ensured that even a crack in a layer at a location near a
circumferential weld could not propagate through the full vessel wall without first
propagating to and through the circumferential weld.
8. The fact that such a crack must propagate through the circumferential weld to get to any
layer other than that immediately adjacent to it (i.e., to which it could propagate through
the longitudinal weld fusing the two layers) also ensured that a crack not extending to the
vicinity of the circumferential weld was essentially harmless (barring other lost layers,
which could result in a simple overstress failure).
Disadvantages included: 
1. The intermediate layers of the shell sections are difficult, if not impossible, to reliably
nondestructively inspect after fabrication.
a. Ultrasonic methods could only be used to inspect the outer layer and, if access to
the interior of the vessel was available, the inner shell.  Ultrasound is not readily
transmitted to the intermediate layers because of the discontinuity between the
layers.
b. Radiographic techniques typically used for inspecting vessel welds do not work
well because of the presence of the multiple layers.  The presence of layers creates
indications in radiographic images that may obscure flaw indications in the
circumferential welds (called layer wash in the ASME BPVC).
c. The flaw sizes detectable using radiography are a function of the total wall
thickness (which is in the 2.5- to 6-inch range for NASA’s vessels), while the
critical flaw size in a layer based on fracture mechanics is a function of the layer
thickness.
d. Ability of radiography to detect cracks is limited if the crack is not closely aligned
with the direction of the radiation (i.e., generally accepted maximum of about
5 degrees).  Reference 7 specifies 4.3 degrees, while NASA-STD-5009 [ref. 8]
requires a maximum of 5 degrees).
e. NDE methods and their detection capabilities available at the time of construction
were more limited than those in use today.
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2. Analytical methods used to predict the structural response of layered vessels are
simplified and generally do not consider, for example, the complexity of the geometry,
including the potential for asymmetric gaps between layers or at layer-to-circumferential-
weld locations, among other issues.
3. It is difficult to achieve contact between layers across the full surface of the rolled plate
layers, which results in a lower strain transfer efficiency to the outer layers.  To ensure
that adequate contact is made, ASME BPVC criteria requires that the measured shell
expansion during an LPV vessel hydrotest for new vessels be at least 50% of that which
would be expected for a monolithic shell of equivalent thickness.
4. The vast majority of NASA’s vessels were manufactured before ASME BPVC rules
existed for such vessels, using high-strength shell layer and nozzle materials that were
never incorporated into the BPVC.  In addition, the A225 Grade B head material, which
was listed in the BPVC at the time of construction, was eliminated from the code in the
Summer 1979 Addenda to the 1977 Section VIII Code [ref. 9] for reasons that are
currently not known.  Consequently, these vessels are generally noncompliant with
OSHA regulations and/or interpretations (which mandate ASME design and fabrication),
and NASA cannot currently prove they are safe for use for any specific period of time.
LPVs have been fabricated by a number of companies.  A. O. Smith fabricated vessels though 
the 1950s under the registered trademark name of “Multilayer Vessels.”  They licensed the 
technology in the 1960s to Chicago Bridge & Iron Company, Inc. (CB&I) and Hahn and Clay.  
The Nooter Corporation began manufacturing vessels in the 1960s under a different patent using 
spirally wound cylindrical sections rather than concentrically wound cylinders and used the 
trademark “Plywall Vessels.”  Struthers Wells also began fabricating layered vessels in the  
1960s under another patented technique, where thicker cylinder sections were shrink-fitted to 
form the shell, under the name “Multiwall Vessels.”  LPVs are also currently manufactured 
overseas, but specifics were not researched for this work.  ASME uses the generic name of 
layered vessels to refer to vessels constructed by these various methods.  NASA has layered 
vessels from a number of different manufacturers.  The greatest portion of NASA vessels were 
fabricated by A. O. Smith, followed by CB&I, with a few by other manufacturers. 
6.1.2 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code 
Section VIII of the ASME BPVC [ref. 1] provides rules for the construction of new pressure 
vessels.  Newly constructed pressure vessels that fully comply with and are stamped in 
accordance with ASME BPVC Section VIII are considered to be “code” vessels.  A new code-
stamped vessel having appropriate safety pressure relief protection is normally accepted as 
having sufficient integrity and minimal risk to serve its intended purpose without further 
mitigations against potential failures for its design service life (i.e., barriers, restricted access, 
etc., are generally not required simply because an ASME vessel is in use).  It is also the standard 
required by OSHA for both industry and federal workplaces.  (In formal letters of interpretation, 
OSHA refers to “nameplate, records, and stamping,”, and concludes that actual ASME BPVC 
stamping, not just “equivalent construction,” is required.)  The BPVC is a code for new 
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construction and does not address any degradation or changes in service that might occur after 
completion of construction of a vessel. 
Most of the NASA-owned LPVs are from the 1950s and 1960s.  The ASME BPVC did not 
provide for the layered method of construction.  Only monolithic vessels were addressed by the 
BPVC.  The layered method of construction was added to the ASME BPVC in the Winter 
Edition of 1978 [ref. 10].  Paragraph A-140 of reference 9 includes the following statement: 
“The rules in Section VIII, Division 1 and Division 2 which cover the construction of 
layered vessels have been developed to parallel each other as far as can be done within 
the parameters of each Division.  The design criteria may influence the selection of the 
Division.” 
Even the first treatment of layered vessels in the ASME BPVC in 1978 included extensive 
requirements beyond what is included in the balance of the BPVC, addressing material 
requirements, design, welding (including heat treatment), NDE, fabrication, inspection and 
testing, and pressure relief devices. 
LPVs constructed prior to 1978 were not ASME “code-stamped” and, thus, are “non-code.”  
Although designed and constructed by reputable companies using documented and formalized 
procedures and generally good practices, these were not consistent with the BPVC at the time of 
manufacture, or with later additions, and generally had lower factors of safety than required by 
ASME for code-stamped vessels.  Appendix A shows an example of a procurement specification 
for a NASA LPV in 1961.  In section 1-5(d) of Appendix A for design conditions, it specifies 
that the design and fabrication of the vessel shall conform to one of the following: 
1) ASME Code for Unfired Pressure Vessels (1956) [ref. 11] with the following exceptions:
(a) the pressure limitations stated therein shall not apply and (b) the provisions covered
by Code Interpretations Case 1205-3 [ref. 12] shall apply.
2) A. O. Smith Corporation’s specification MLS-30A [ref. 13] and A. O. Smith
Corporation’s specification dated August 27, 1957 [ref. 14], for multi-layer construction
of vessels above 3,000 psi.
ASME Code Case 1205-3 [ref. 12] refers to forged pressure vessels without welds.  Since the 
ASME BPVC of 1956 did not allow LPV construction techniques, the resultant pressure vessel, 
in order to meet the terms of the procurement specification, would have to be either a monolithic 
forged vessel complying with the 1956 BPVC and Code Case 1205-3 (which covered such 
forged vessels), or a layered vessel.  If layered, it would have been required to conform to the  
A. O. Smith specifications.    
Further, in section 1-5(e) of Appendix A of the specification, it was specified that a safety factor 
of 3 could be used for the LPV being procured.  The ASME BPVC at the time required a safety 
factor of 4, except for Code Case 1205-3 for forged vessels without welds, which also allowed 
for a safety factor of 3.  Additionally, in section 1-7(a) of Appendix A for materials, it was stated 
that the steel selected for fabrication of the LPV did not necessarily have to be in strict 
accordance with the requirements of the ASME BPVC.  Thus, in addition to the fact that the 
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general layered construction method was not covered by the BPVC at the time of construction of 
the NASA LPVs, additional variances with respect to the BPVC were permitted on materials and 
safety factors.  There is no information available as to any assessments of the safety of the non-
code vessel being procured with respect to these variances from the BPVC at that time.  Note 
that government safety regulations were much less prevalent at this time, and OSHA did not 
exist until created by the OSH Act of 1970. 
When layered methods of construction were added into the BPVC, A. O. Smith, as well as 
competitors Nooter Corporation and Hahn and Clay, were heavily involved in the development 
of the rules.  The different companies had different fabrication procedures, and the resulting 
ASME rules were developed using a consensus process; thus, the rules that resulted allowed for a 
number of fabrication techniques and did not reflect what any one company had done for 
previously constructed vessels.  Thus, it is important also to evaluate how the non-code NASA 
LPVs were constructed relative to the later-introduced versions of the BPVC that permitted their 
construction.  There are two aspects to the discussion of equivalence to code:  (1) do the vessels 
comply with all of the requirements of the BPVC, and (2) if not, can a level of safety and 
reliability essentially the same as compliant vessels be demonstrated?  The following discussion 
relates to the first of these questions; this report as a whole deals with the second. 
Although an exhaustive line-by-line comparison of the fabrication techniques used by the 
different LPV manufacturers was not performed, a review of 21 drawings for vessels constructed 
by A. O. Smith revealed the following discrepancies: 
1. Fifteen drawings showed shell nozzles of 2-inch pipe size or less, six did not.  None of
the 15 nozzles complies with the configuration required in the 1978 BPVC for such
nozzles.
2. Part ULW-20 in reference 10 states, “When the nondestructive examinations outlined in
ULW-50 through ULW-57 have been complied with, the weld joint efficiency (factor to
allow for possible weld defects) for design purposes shall be 100%.”  No alternative to
the 100% joint efficiency is offered, and the requirements in ULW-50 through ULW-57
are all stated as requirements with no alternatives offered.  Therefore, the NDE
requirements on the 21 drawings were compared with the ULW-50 through ULW-57
requirements, revealing the following:
a. Part ULW-51 requires that Category A and B joints (see Figure UW-3 in the
BPVC for category definitions) in the inner shells of layered shell sections and in
the inner heads of layered heads…shall be 100% radiographic tested (RT).  This
was required in all drawings.
b. Part ULW-52(a) requires 100% magnetic particle testing (MT) inspection of the
longitudinal weld joints in layers welded to the previous surface.  Some MT was
specified on every drawing (indicating that any MT specified could be expected to
be found on the drawings rather than in some other associated specification), but
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none of the drawings reviewed met the 100% MT requirement for longitudinal 
joints. 
c. Part ULW-54(a), “Full Thickness Welding of Solid Section to Layered Sections,”
requires 100% RT inspection of weld-category A, B, and D joints attaching a
solid section to a layered section of any thickness given in ULW-52.  Other
radiography was specified on every drawing, while no drawings specified
radiography meeting this requirement.  While this is an inspection that can be
performed after the fact, the vessels as constructed did not meet this requirement;
therefore, it may be expected that the weld quality will not consistently
meet the requirement.
3. Any impact testing performed typically consisted of U-notch or keyhole-notch Charpy
specimens, which have a 5-mm-deep notch that has a 1-mm radius at the base.  These
were not permitted in the BPVC after 1967, after which Charpy V-notch specimens,
which have a 2-mm-deep notch with a 45-degree angle and a 0.25-mm radius at the base,
were required.  The development of the Charpy V-notch specimen occurred as a result of
WW II ship failures caused by high ductile-to-brittle transition temperature steels similar
to A225B.  Earlier Charpy notch geometries were not sensitive to this phenomenon.
(The Department of Transportation (DOT) also made this change related to DOT
requirements for gas storage bottles the same year.)
4. One of the later revisions of the ASME BPVC was in 1989 [ref. 15].  This revision added
the UCS-66 curves for determining MDMT.  At the time these vessels were constructed,
the MDMT was typically based only on material strength and did not take into account
brittle fracture that may occur at lower temperatures, including the nameplate MDMT.
There is evidence that some A. O. Smith vessels were keyhole impact tested at –40°F,
consistent with code procedures of the day, but the keyhole method used was removed
from the BPVC in the early 1967 and is not acceptable in current practice because it was
shown beginning in the 1950s that brittle failure of ship plates could be correlated with
Charpy V notch, but not with Charpy keyhole notch characteristics [ref. 16].  Thus,
operating at or above the nameplate MDMT for these vessels may not ensure safety with
respect to the potential for brittle failure.
5. Proprietary shell and nozzle materials used were not BPVC listed (approved) materials.
These proprietary materials also failed to comply with the BPVC requirements for
unlisted materials.  Thus, complete material fracture characteristics are not readily
available.
6. The head material, ASTM A225B, while included in some prior editions of the BPVC,
was deleted as an acceptable material in the Summer 1979 Addenda of the 1977 Section
VIII, Division 1 Code [ref. 9], and is not currently included in ASME BPVC Section II
(Materials) [ref. 17].
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7. While the allowable stress basis varied by customer and was typically specified in a
procurement document, the design factor of safety (FS) of these vessels is known in at
least one case to be as low as 1.66 on yield strength (which for these steels results in an
FS of about 2.1 on ultimate tensile strength).  Using 60% of yield as the allowable stress
(FS of 1.66) results in overstress at the design pressure based on the BPVC allowable
stresses at the time of construction in 1978 when LPV design was incorporated into the
BPVC, and the current ASME Section VIII, Division 1 [ref. 1] criteria.
It is clear that the NASA LPVs are not only “non-code” with respect to the BPVC in place at the 
time of construction but also “non-code” with the subsequent code that allowed the construction 
method.  While some of these variances can be addressed to reduce risk associated with 
continued use of these vessels, they will always remain “non-code” and present some level of 
elevated risk as compared with code vessels.  Additionally, the use of “non-code” vessels is not 
compliant with the Federal OSHA regulations (29 CFR 1910, Occupational Safety and Health 
Standards) [ref. 2].   
To reduce risk, some but not all NASA LPVs have been derated to pressures lower than their 
original nameplate maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP), some to a pressure low 
enough to comply with ASME equivalent allowable stress criteria.  However, it is noted that 
derating alone does not make them equivalent to ASME vessels due to the many other code 
compliance factors noted above. 
6.1.3 Additional Risk Factors for NASA Non-code LPVs 
In addition to the risks associated with being non-code vessels, there are other elements that 
contribute to increased risk for continued usage of these vessels.  The first is the age of these 
vessels.  Many in use at NASA were fabricated in the 1950s and 1960s.  Primary risks associated 
with aging include fatigue, corrosion, and embrittlement.  As will be discussed below, a number 
of cracks have been detected in NASA LPVs that may be the result of fatigue.  However, it is 
recognized that the NDE techniques available at the time of construction were not as advanced as 
those currently available; therefore, the potential exists that some subsurface defects have existed 
since the time of construction.  Corrosion on the interior of NASA LPVs has been a lesser 
concern since, unlike vessels operated in the petrochemical industry that often contain corrosive 
products at elevated temperatures, NASA vessels are largely operated with nonreactive gases 
(except, in some cases, hydrogen) and at ambient temperatures.  Corrosion on the exterior is 
more of a concern, as many NASA LPVs are located near the coast.  However, exterior corrosion 
is readily detected and can be easily abated.  With respect to embrittlement, other than vessels 
that were in hydrogen service, there is little reason to believe that the vessels have changed in 
properties since their initial fabrication, given the operating environment of NASA LPVs.   
Another factor is that in many cases there is limited information about the usage history of these 
vessels, such as the number of pressure cycles, the ranges of operating pressures, and 
temperatures, etc.  A number of these vessels were not originally constructed for NASA but were 
put in service for other Agencies or organizations and later obtained by NASA.  Service history 
for those vessels prior to arrival at NASA is often nonexistent.  Additionally, even for vessels in 
NESC Request No.: TI-13-00852 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report
Document #: 
NESCP-RP-
13-00852 
Version: 
1.1 
Title:
Evaluation of Agency Non-code LPVs 
Page #: 
24 of 193 
service within NASA for their entire life, there may be limited information on the usage, 
maintenance, and inspection and repair history, or information may be buried in old written files 
that are difficult to access.  This lack of accurate usage information impacts the ability to 
perform an accurate fitness-for-service (FFS) assessment of the vessels.  Another identified area 
of concern regarding these vessels within the Agency is the lack of consistency in how they are 
maintained, inspected, and operated. 
6.1.4 LPV Failure History 
It is estimated that the total number of LPVs, both code and non-code, that have been fabricated 
is less than 24,000.  When A. O. Smith licensed the technology to CB&I in the mid-1960s, they 
estimated 15,000 layered vessels in existence.  Production of layered vessels in the U.S. has 
slowed since then and has been about 20 per year since the mid-1960s.  The rate of production 
for Nooter Corporation was two to three vessels per year, and these appear to be used mostly in 
the chemical process industry, such as for urea manufacturing. 
There have been a number of known catastrophic failures of LPVs, all at chemical process plants 
(none at a NASA facility).  Vessels that failed in the U.S. prior to 1978 were obviously non-code 
vessels.  For some of the more recent failures, as well as failures outside the U.S., it was not 
documented as to whether the vessels were non-code or code.  In one case, however, it was a 
newer, code-compliant vessel that failed.  Thus, it is possible for both code and non-code LPVs 
to fail catastrophically.  Poor maintenance and inspection practices often contributed to missing 
early signs of inner shell failure through the vent holes. 
The following paragraphs describe some of the vessel failures. 
Catastrophic vessel failures: 
1. Clinton, Iowa, fertilizer plant, March 30, 1969 [ref. 18].  Failure started in the heat-
affected zone (HAZ) of a repair weld at a nozzle.  Two-thirds of the vessel blew away.
The report noted that “Not withstanding (sic) the general low fracture toughness of the
vessel, it is doubtful that this failure would have occurred if the nozzle had a well
radiused inside corner and if the flow tube had not been welded to this corner.”
2. Cartagena, Colombia, fertilizer plant, December 8, 1977 [ref. 19].  This lead-lined vessel
was constructed by A. O. Smith and operated at 3,600 psi and 400°F.  The failure
occurred in the vicinity of the shell-to-shell weld.  Indications show that the failure
occurred first longitudinally, then circumferentially, resulting in separation of the vessel
sections.  The vent holes were plugged with carbamate (a compound derived from
carbamic acid) and salt (from seawater), and inner shells were corroded where the failure
is believed to have initiated.
3. Lake Charles, Louisiana, fertilizer plant, July 28, 1992 [ref. 20].  Reported by
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission Docket 93-0628.  Technical details
not included.
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4. Hebei Qianan, China, fertilizer plant, October 7, 1995 [ref. 21].  Layered vessel.  Ten
urea reactors scrapped in inspection and assessment after an explosion of one reactor.
Li et al. report that 15 or more reactors were investigated due to cracking, some from the
outside in, some from the inside out, and some from intermediate layers.  Reason for
cracking is given as stress corrosion cracking (SCC).
5. Pingyin, China, fertilizer plant, March 21, 2005 [ref. 22].  Reported failure due to SCC
caused by forcing steam through vent holes as a leak detection mechanism.
6. Coffeyville Kansas, fertilizer plant, September 30, 2010 [ref. 23].  A 10-year-old ASME
code-stamped vessel constructed by Hahn and Clay.  Radial and transverse weld cracking
in the head-to-shell weld, attributed to “environmental stress cracking” caused by the
boiler feed water that was used inside the vessel jacket, resulting in complete failure of
the circumferential weld at the head-to-shell junction.  Similar cracking but no failure
was reported in the weld to the bottom head.  Both welds were replaced.
7. At least two additional known catastrophic failures, one in Johannesburg, South Africa,
and one in Europe, but no further details were available.
There also have been much larger numbers of vessels that have developed cracks, requiring 
either repair or removal from service.  A number of NASA vessels have developed cracks; some 
of these have been removed from service, and others have remained in service when it has been 
judged they can be adequately monitored for additional crack growth.  Some examples of non-
catastrophic vessel cracking are provided below.  Where available, the published reports are 
referenced.  However, in many cases, formal reports or documentation is not available, and 
reports of the damage observed were obtained from assessment team members who either 
observed the damage or were involved in responding to the cracks.  In these cases, the team 
member who provided the information is identified.  While the specific details of these events 
were not captured in formal reports, the available anecdotal information is still of interest in 
providing insight into the types of damage that can occur in these vessels. 
1. Leakage: Kennedy Space Center (KSC), October 14, 1980, from a helium vessel
constructed by A. O. Smith in March 1958 and procured by the Department of Defense
(DOD) [refs. 10 and 11].  The crack was in the cylindrical shell along the longitudinal
weld, variously reported as propagating from inclusions in the plate adjacent to the weld
or from weld undercut on the inner diameter (ID).  Overall condition of the vessel was
reported as good.
2. Cracking: Ames Research Center (ARC), 1987: ARC salvaged 16 1,750-cubic-foot
A. O. Smith pressure vessels from the DOD Jackass Flats nuclear test site.  Pre-service
NDE (visual testing (VT), MT, and RT) showed most vessels (i.e., 15) having BPVC
rejectable indications, including six with cracks in the circumferential or longitudinal
welds.  Most rejectable indications, including all cracks, were repaired by CB&I in 1986,
and the remainder were accepted as found.  All vessels remain in service to the present.
There have been no subsequent service-related defects discovered in their 26-year
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operational history at ARC.  (Documented in pressure system certification reports at 
ARC.) 
3. Cracking: Langley Research Center (LaRC), 1987(?): 12 vessels removed from service
after extensive cracking in outer shell layer adjacent to the head-to-shell weld of one or
more vessels, as well as internal cracking.  Blowdown temperatures and shocking were
believed to be involved in the internal cracking.  (Witnessed by Greulich.)
4. Cracking: KSC, 2013: Two vessels removed from service with cracks in the center of the
outer shell plate, not adjacent to any welds or other known stress concentrations.
(Observed by Greulich.  Date of removal from service is not known.)
5. Cracking: LaRC, 2014:  Two vessels removed from methane service at B-1265 due to
external cracking.  One vessel had transverse weld cracking in the head-to-shell weld.
One of the three transverse cracks was removed with light grinding, two were reported to
extend 0.87 inches into the weld based on shear wave ultrasonic testing (UT).  The other
vessel had a longitudinal crack in the shell adjacent to the shell-to-shell weld.
Photographic verification of magnetic particle inspection indications.  (Reported by
Christie Swarts of Jacobs Technology.)
6. Cracking: Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) (1990s):  A vertical vessel was removed
from service due to cracks suspected in layers based on AE.  (Reported by Pulley;
detailed records lacking.)
7. Cracking: MSFC (2011/2012):  A large horizontal vessel (V0256) was removed from
service due to a longitudinal crack approximately 2 ¼ inches long in the outer layer near
the head-to-shell weld.  (Viewed by Greulich and Prosser, August 2013.)
8. Cracking: Glenn Research Center (GRC):  GRC reported in the NESC LPV team
teleconference on February 27, 2014, that they have one or more vessels in service with
one or more cracks in an intermediate layer that are being monitored using periodic RT.
(Reported by Wnuk.)
9. Stennis Space Center (SSC) (out of a total of 22 vessels for which history was provided),
reported cracking and other indications in both A. O. Smith and Struthers Wells vessels,
including the following:
a. Four Struthers Wells vessels exhibited a number of cracks that were removed by
grinding at various times.  At least two of these vessels later showed additional
cracking, even though one had been derated (it was later “downmoded,”
i.e., removed from service, but not scrapped).  In 1988, “Assessment concluded
that previous history of cracking due to high residual stress from welding and not
service related.”
b. One CB&I vessel exhibited cracking that was “removed by light grinding.”
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c. Four Struthers Wells and one CB&I vessel were reported to have “leakage at vent
holes,” though it is not clear whether action was taken based on these indications.
In one case it was “determined leaks are from air trapped between vessel layers.”
d. In five cases, indications were not described as cracks were removed by grinding.
e. Numerous vessels showed indications under AE testing.  Further inspection using
UT or RT (through as much as 11 inches of material) was used to accept these
vessels as having no rejectable indications.
10. All A. O. Smith LPVs at Eastman Chemical Company were repaired and finally removed
from service due to cracking of outer layers, according to a verbal report to Greulich from
a representative of Eastman Chemical.
11. Cracked LPVs are found in industry on a regular basis (numerous times per year) and
removed from service; these are usually repaired and returned to service.  (Reported by
Jawad, who is often involved in these repairs due to his association with a company
previously in the business of fabricating layered vessels and now performing repairs and
process industry maintenance.)
Discussion of past failures 
The typical degradation mechanism associated with the six confirmed catastrophic failures of 
LPVs in industry has been SCC, and the service typically involves elevated temperature 
operation.  One case involved a weld repair.  Two cases involved cracking reported to be caused 
by boiler feedwater or steam used external to the vessel and either injected through the vent holes 
for leak detection or through cooling jackets. 
Some vessels at NASA and many in industry have been removed from service due to cracking, 
most often in the vicinity of circumferential welds, usually the head-to-shell welds.  The crack in 
the shell-to-shell weld noted in item 5 above at LaRC is stated by Jawad to be highly unusual: it 
was the first longitudinal crack associated with a shell-to-shell weld that he had seen.  Similarly, 
the cracks reported in item 4, located in the outer layer away from all welds, are reported to be 
unique. 
Service at NASA is typically at ambient temperatures or below, often with cold service due 
either to ambient conditions in wintertime or blowdown service.  A number of vessels have been 
removed from service due to cracking.  The cracking in NASA vessels is generally assumed to 
be caused by pressure cycling.  The cracks that occur in the shell adjacent to circumferential 
welds appear to be emanating from a region that is expected, based on the current weld residual 
stress study, to be in circumferential compression.  While it is possible to repair these cracks, 
which is often done in industry, it is clear that a full understanding of their initiation and growth 
mechanism is lacking.  This lack of understanding, combined with the crack in an intermediate 
layer in the GRC vessel reported in item 8 above, lead to the conclusion that until a reliable 
inspection method for intermediate layers is identified, intermediate shell layer cracks cannot be 
ruled out.  This raises the possibility that multiple shell layers could be compromised without 
anyone being aware of it. 
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Thus far, the authors of this report are not aware of any catastrophic failures outside the fertilizer 
industry.  However, based on the number of cracks identified in shell sections and in the 
circumferential welds, the possibilities of either undetected cracks in multiple layers leading to a 
failure due to overstress or of a crack propagating through a circumferential weld in such a way 
as to result in failure appear to be real, with nontrivial likelihood.  
6.1.5 LPV Reliability Evaluation 
In general, quantitative reliability evaluation is accomplished through reliability prediction and 
reliability demonstration. 
Reliability prediction is the process of quantitatively or qualitatively estimating system 
reliability using both objective and subjective data at the level for which data are available.  
Reliability prediction is performed either to integrate the reliability into the design up front so as 
to satisfy a certain design reliability requirement or to better understand the failure modes and 
causes associated with an existing system.  
Reliability demonstration provides the basis for quantitatively estimating the reliability from 
objective data provided by the demonstration.  It is generally performed after the system/ 
component is qualified and ready for operation.  Reliability demonstration is intended to supply 
additional information for reliability prediction. 
Although no well-documented reliability evaluation exists for pressure vessels, according to 
NASA-STD-8719.17, “NASA Requirements for Ground-Based Pressure Vessels and Pressurized 
Systems (PVS)” [ref. 24], and based on literature, the failure rate per year for ASME code-
stamped pressure vessels constructed after 1988 is expected to be 10–6 or less.  Pressure vessels 
constructed before that time are expected to have a higher failure rate, which NASA assumes to 
be in the 10–3 to 10–6 per year range (i.e., one block more frequent in NASA’s risk assessment 
charts), though at the less-frequent end of that block, based on experience.  The lower failure rate 
for vessels constructed after 1988 is expected because MDMT determination methods have 
improved since that time. 
For LPVs, even though data exist regarding the numbers of vessels constructed and a number of 
known failures, it is not possible to perform a high-confidence reliability evaluation.  Operational 
data for NASA or industry vessels is not well documented in terms of operation time, operation 
cycles, operating environment, current condition, etc.  Without this information, any reliability 
evaluation performed would be speculative.  This is further complicated by the significant age of 
NASA’s vessels, with unknown accumulated degradation and defects.  If the vessels follow a 
notional bathtub curve, as shown Figure 6.1.5-1, which is not certain, then these old vessels may 
also be in the region of escalating failure rate.  In this regime, reliability assessments would 
require the use of conditional failure probabilities to account for the LPV wear.  To maintain the 
lower constant failure rate suggested by the bathtub curve, LPVs with significant aging would 
need to be replaced if their actual condition could not be adequately assessed for high-confidence 
life extension. 
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Figure 6.1.5-1.  Notional Bathtub Curve Illustrating Changes in Failure Rate versus Time/Cycles 
6.2 Problem Statement 
Because of these identified risks and concerns, the NESC, in cooperation with the NASA Office 
of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) and the respective Center PSMs, was requested to 
formulate a consensus draft proposal for the development of additional testing and analysis 
methods that would be required to establish the technical validity, and any limitation thereof,  
of these vessels for continued safe operation.   
6.3 Planned Tasks 
To accomplish the objective of developing a proposal for additional testing and analysis methods 
necessary for continued safe operation of LPVs, the assessment team was to evaluate failure 
risks associated with the inner shell, layers, heads, nozzles, and welds of these vessels.  It is 
expected that the results of this assessment and the proposed follow-on testing and analysis 
subsequently can be used as a basis for the development of a future NASA standard that will be 
submitted to OSHA for use as an alternate and supplementary standard in accordance with  
29 CFR 1960 [ref. 3].  This assessment was to leverage common skills, capabilities, and data 
from within and outside NASA and to consider inspection, analysis, and monitoring techniques 
that could be applicable to these vessels.  The planned tasks for this assessment are listed in 
detail in Section 5.0 and included a review of how LPVs are maintained and operated both 
within and external to NASA as well as some limited scope testing and analysis. 
Instanta ne ous Fail ure  
Run Time/Cycles 
Failure 
Rate 
Constant Failure Rate 
(Design Life) 
Decreasing Failure Rate 
(Infant Mortality) 
Escalating Failure Rate 
(Aging) 
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7.0 Data Analysis 
7.1 Task 1 Summary 
7.1.1 Center Request for Information (RFI) Responses 
To better understand the inventory, usage conditions, and ongoing and proposed risk mitigation 
methods for LPVs at all NASA Centers, the assessment team generated a request for information 
(RFI) that was sent to the PSMs at all Centers.  A full copy of this RFI is included as  
Appendix B.  The RFI requested information in eight general areas.  These included detailed 
information about the inventory of LPVs, NDE used on the vessels, current additional risk 
mitigation approaches, previous risk mitigation approaches no longer used, risk mitigation 
approaches under development, recommendations for any additional risk mitigation methods that 
should be considered, special concerns about continued safe operation, and how the risks were 
being communicated to Center management.  The detailed responses to the RFI and the 
accompanying spreadsheets with vessel information from each Center that has LPVs are also 
included in Appendix B. 
From these responses, it was determined that non-code LPVs were in use at nine NASA Centers 
or facilities.  These included ARC, GRC, Wallops Flight Facility (WFF), White Sands Test 
Facility, KSC, LaRC, Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF), MSFC, and SSC.  A total of 376 
vessels were reported, with 302 of these in active service and the remaining 74 inactive.  There 
was a variety of reasons that vessels were not in active service, ranging from no identified 
current need to the existence of known defects within a given vessel.  Depending on the owner  
of the vessel and the reason it was out of service, it was noted that some of these inactive vessels 
could be made available as specimens for future testing efforts.  MSFC had the largest number of 
vessels of any Center with a total of 199, 173 of which were in current service.  GRC had  
86 with 57 in current service.  ARC, KSC, and SSC all had on the order of 20 vessels, with the 
remaining Centers and facilities having smaller numbers.  The vast majority of these vessels  
(i.e., 308) were manufactured by A. O. Smith; 40 were manufactured by CB&I; 23, by Struthers 
Wells; and the remaining few by other fabricators. 
In reviewing and discussing the RFI responses from the Centers, two important points were 
identified.  The first is that much of the important data that are needed to better characterize the 
risks associated with LPVs is in disparate formats, is difficult to access and retrieve, and in some 
cases, has been lost or was never tracked.  This includes data such as design records and 
drawings, fabrication records, maintenance and inspection records and data, and operational 
usage data.  Vessels not originally fabricated for NASA that were procured from other 
organizations may have minimal data regarding their use prior to acquisition from NASA.  Even 
for vessels originally fabricated for NASA, the records may be more than 50 years old and have 
been subject to varying degrees of care and retention.  The majority of these data exist only in 
paper format, with some documents scanned into local records.  However, some design drawing 
documents have been scanned and made accessible Agency-wide. 
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Another important point, not unexpected but readily apparent, was that there is not an Agency 
consensus on approaches to certification, recertification, inspection, maintenance, record 
keeping, or usage of these vessels.  There is no consensus on what constitutes a certification or 
recertification of an LPV, or when it is required.  Some Centers periodically “recertify” these 
vessels with their local procedures, while others do so only when a vessel is repurposed or not at 
all, although such an approach is not consistent with NASA’s PVS requirements documents.  
There is no consensus regarding intervals between required periodic maintenance and 
inspections, nor on which methods are required for those inspections.  As will be discussed 
below, there is a variety of different inspection and analysis methods that are used across the 
Agency.  Further, no consensus exists on the operating conditions under which these vessels are 
allowed to operate, such as the temperature at which they can be used or the safety factor that is 
required. 
7.1.1.1 Summary of NDE or Other Inspections/Analyses Related to Continued Safe Usage 
In discussions with the Centers, it was noted that NDE methods and detectability levels have 
changed over time and that the detection requirements for currently available NDE methods for 
LPVs are not well established.  There are no formal defect size requirements established for the 
different regions of an LPV, due to the lack of validated analysis methods and limitations in 
available materials property data.  Additionally, the capabilities of some of the methods that are 
used to inspect LPVs are not established or validated for these complex structures.  Thus, the 
NDE data are used for “engineering evaluation,” and findings of flaw indications can lead to 
repair actions or removal of a vessel from service.  However, the lack of findings of flaw 
indications does not necessarily ensure lack of defects or continued safe operation of LPVs.  
Further, as noted previously, the periodicity at which NDE is applied and which techniques are 
used vary from Center to Center.   
Conventional surface inspection methods such as visual (VT) (including borescope), magnetic 
particle (MT), and dye penetrant (penetrant testing (PT)) methods are widely used at most 
Centers to inspect outer surfaces, exposed weld surfaces, and inner shells when access is 
available.  The capabilities for these NDE methods are well established and documented, and 
there are no unique considerations for applying these methods to LPVs.  However, their 
application is limited to exposed surfaces of these structures, and these methods are not 
completely effective unless surface coatings are removed. 
UT methods are also utilized at some Centers to inspect the monolithic heads and the head-to-
nozzle welds.  UT is often used as a follow-up method to inspect regions of the outer and inner 
(when accessible) shell layers where surface techniques have indicated a flaw.  UT in this case 
can provide information about the depth of the flaw in these layers, whereas the surface methods 
only indicate the presence of surface-breaking flaws.  UT is also used to measure thickness and 
assess any loss of thickness due to corrosion.  UT, however, cannot penetrate into the interior 
shell layers.  It is not commonly used for complete scanning of the inner or outer shell layers.  
Conventional UT methods have not been successful for inspecting the full penetration 
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circumferential head-to-shell or shell-to-shell welds due to reflections from the layers 
boundaries. 
RT has been used at some Centers to inspect the circumferential head-to-shell and shell-to-shell 
welds, as well as the longitudinal welds in shell layers.  The presence of multiple shell layers 
adds irrelevant indications (i.e., layer wash) to radiographic images, which make detection of 
flaws more difficult.  Although RT has been used to detect indications of cracks in layered 
sections and welds, some of which have been confirmed by destructive analysis and repair 
operations, the capabilities (i.e., flaw type and minimum detectable flaw size/probability of 
detection) of this method have not been established for application to these structures.  Thus, the 
fact that flaw indications have not been found does not provide assurance that no flaws are 
present. 
AE is one of the few methods that offers the potential for detecting crack growth within internal 
shell layers or longitudinal welds in these layers.  A number of Centers have used AE to evaluate 
LPVs.  Although AE methods have not been fully validated for application to LPVs, work in 
China [ref. 22] has shown at least one successful case of the detection of cracking in full 
penetration circumferential welds of an LPV.  The crack was confirmed first with PAUT 
techniques and then by destructive material removal and visual examination.   
Historically, there are two types of AE measurement systems.  The first, known as parameter-
based, or conventional, AE measurement does not actually record the full waveform for an AE 
signal.  Instead, when a signal crosses a preset trigger threshold, analog circuits are used to 
rapidly measure certain parameters or features of the signals from each sensor, such as the peak 
amplitude, duration, arrival time, energy, etc.  These parameters are then plotted for real-time 
visualization, as well as stored for later, more detailed analysis.  Parameter-based AE systems 
were originally developed because high-speed digital waveform acquisition systems were not 
available at the time.  The advantages of these systems include high data acquisition rates and the 
ability for near real-time data analysis and visualization.  Resonant sensors are most often used 
with parameter-based AE systems as they provide the highest sensitivity response.  
The second type of AE measurement system is known as waveform acquisition.  As the name 
implies, this newer type of system digitally acquires from AE sensors each waveform whose 
signals cross the trigger threshold.  The advantage of waveform systems is that the entire signal 
is acquired and available for more detailed analysis, which in turn can provide additional and 
more accurate information about the AE signal and its source.  As an example, the signal arrival 
time, which is used to triangulate source location, can be more accurately determined.  One 
limitation of these systems is that the larger amount of data acquired for each signal leads to a 
significant increase in data storage requirements.  This increase in the amount of data for each 
signal can also lead to signals not being acquired at higher AE event rates due to dead time (i.e., 
time during which the system cannot accept new triggers) which occurs during data 
transfer/storage.  Also, the capability of near real-time data processing and display during a test 
is more limited.  Most often, broadband sensors, which have a lower sensitivity but a higher 
fidelity in reproducing the actual signal, are used with waveform acquisition systems.  Some 
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newer systems offer the ability to capture both parameter and waveform data in the same 
acquisition system. 
There is also a variety of analysis methodologies for AE data from the two different types of AE 
systems.  One particular methodology that has been developed for parameter-based AE data for 
metallic pressure vessels is known as MONPAC™ [ref. 25].  The MONPAC™ approach was 
developed from the analysis of parameter AE data from testing a large number of storage tanks 
and monolithic pressure vessels.  Correlations with certain signal parameters and when they 
occurred in the vessel pressurization profile were developed to discriminate background 
extraneous noise and to identify signals of interest.  Signals of interest are graded using intensity 
analysis to determine a course of action that ranges from no action, to performing additional 
NDE, to the immediate shutdown of the vessel with additional NDE.  Since the proprietary 
database on which MONPAC™ is based is built on the testing of monolithic pressure vessels, its 
applicability to LPVs is not known. 
Another approach to the analysis of waveform AE data is known as Modal AE (MAE).  In MAE, 
the waveforms are analyzed based on knowledge of the specific wave modes that will propagate 
in the structure being tested.  MAE has been demonstrated to be useful in discriminating 
extraneous noise and in identifying crack sources of interest based on the signal modal content.   
Within NASA, both parameter and waveform AE data have been acquired during testing of 
LPVs.  MONPAC™ and MAE analysis approaches have been employed, along with other 
analysis methods, such as location analysis.  Efforts toward validation of the MAE method 
performed at NASA ARC in 2011 and 2012 [ref. 26] (funded by OSMA) are summarized later in 
this report.  These efforts have included characterizing wave modes that propagate in these 
vessels, demonstrating signal transmission through the layered sections using simulated AE 
sources, and one test monitoring crack growth from a known crack in a full-scale vessel.  While 
signals from the known crack were detected, they were of very small amplitude near the 
threshold for detection.  Results from full-scale vessel testing with both the MONPAC™ and 
MAE methods have shown that substantial noise is detected in comparison with the testing of 
monolithic vessels, believed to be associated with the relative movement of the shell layers as the 
layers expand and rub against one another.  This background noise makes detection of actual 
crack growth much more difficult than for monolithic vessels.  Additional efforts are necessary 
to understand and validate the capabilities of AE techniques relative to the application to LPVs.  
In particular, the sensitivity of the AE technique to detect cracks of different sizes relative to 
critical crack sizes will need to be established. 
Other testing or measurements reported by Centers included the use of hardness testing, as well 
as precision diameter tape (i.e., Pi Tape) measurements on LPVs for circumferential expansion 
as a function of pressure, consistent with current ASME BPVC Part-ULW requirements.  A few 
Centers reported cleaning of vent holes and checking for leaks.  However, it was not clear that all 
Centers cleaned or monitored vent holes or, for those Centers that did, how frequently this was 
done.  Hydrostatic pressure testing to 1.42 times the MAWP was used by one Center as part of 
their initial certification of vessels.  Other Centers have also applied the typical 1.5 times MAWP 
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hydrotest (required by the BPVC at the time of construction) when placing the vessels into 
service at NASA.  AE testing has been performed during overpressure testing at a lower level, 
typically 1.10 times MAWP. 
Some Centers reported the use of a number of different analysis approaches to estimate static 
strength (burst pressure) and fatigue life (pressurization cycles to failure), as well as additional 
permissible cycles following proof/overpressure testing of LPVs.  In all cases, it was noted that 
many assumptions were necessary for these analyses, especially with regard to material 
properties, flaw size detection capabilities for NDE, and the structural response of the layered 
shells.  Further, it was noted that none of the analysis methods have been validated on LPVs.  
Most Centers expressed significant doubt with regard to the validity of these assumptions and, 
thus, the results of the analyses.  Nonetheless, overpressure testing may demonstrate that 
additional remaining cyclic life exists and, thus, increase confidence that a near-term failure will 
not occur during normal operations; however, as previously noted, this cannot currently be 
accurately quantified. 
7.1.1.2 Summary of Additional Risk Mitigation Approaches Currently in Use 
Other approaches to either mitigate the risk of, or consequence from, catastrophic LPV failures 
that were reported by the Centers included the use of berms or other physical barriers around 
some vessels, as shown in Figure 5.0-1.  However, these approaches cannot practically be 
employed uniformly across the Agency.  Also, the degree to which any such barriers truly 
mitigate consequences was not investigated in this assessment.  Location of the vessels to remote 
sites and limiting personnel access was also reported.  Multiple Centers have intentionally 
derated vessel MAWP to reduce risk and increase safety factor, while others are operating below 
nameplate MAWP due to reduced pressure needs of the facility being serviced.  In some cases, 
operational pressure cycles are limited and closely tracked.  An additional approach employed by 
a couple of Centers is to have more frequent recertification intervals for LPVs, although the 
effectiveness of recertification is an open issue at present. 
7.1.1.3 Summary of Risk Mitigation Methods no Longer Used 
The Centers were also asked to report on any risk mitigation methods that were used in the past 
but are no longer used.  Most Centers reported none, although a couple of Centers reported that 
the MAWP had been reduced to mitigate risk but was later increased because of operational 
impacts caused by the reduced pressure.  Two Centers also reported that the use of AE (both the 
MONPAC™ and MAE approaches) had either been eliminated or was under review because of 
questions that recent validation test results had raised with regard to the capability of this 
method. 
7.1.1.4 Summary of Risk Mitigation Methods under Testing and Development 
In response to inquiries regarding risk mitigation efforts under testing and development, a 
number of responses were provided by the Centers and are described in this and subsequent 
sections.  Details of these activities, which prior to this assessment were sometimes only 
communicated locally within the Centers performing the work, were communicated across the 
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Agency to all Centers.  This communication afforded other Centers the opportunity to provide 
input and, in some cases, data or materials that enhanced these ongoing activities.  Additionally, 
in some cases these efforts served as a basis for Task 2 activities that were funded within this 
assessment.  Communication of these efforts across the Agency and the resulting follow-on 
improvements was perhaps one of the more significant accomplishments of this assessment. 
NASA MSFC, operator of the largest number of these vessels across the Agency, initiated 
several activities to address risk associated with LPVs.  Efforts were underway in 
characterization of materials properties from a sacrificed vessel, development of new analysis 
methodologies that would include some of the structural details of layered vessel construction, 
and, working with SSC, characterization of a new NDE method, PAUT, for inspection of the full 
penetration circumferential head-to-shell and shell-to-shell welds.  Details of some of these 
efforts will be described in a following section.  As a result of the communication fostered in this 
NESC assessment, additional materials from other sacrificed vessels at other Centers were 
provided to MSFC to expand the materials property database and evaluate vessel-to-vessel 
variability.  Additional efforts in materials characterization, structural analysis, and NDE were 
identified and funded as part of Task 2 of this assessment to augment some of the efforts already 
underway at MSFC. 
MSFC also continues to perform MONPAC™ AE testing on field LPV vessels to build a 
database.  Primarily, tests to date have used the MONPAC™ AE approach, as there is limited 
MAE instrumentation available at MSFC.  Plans include procurement of additional MAE 
instrumentation to allow future testing to apply both methodologies.  As the AE method is still 
not validated for LPVs, the information acquired is for engineering evaluation only.  However, it 
is providing useful information on issues related to applying AE in the field on these vessels and 
on the assessment of the background noise produced and how this noise varies across different 
vessels that have undergone different periods of inactivity.  No AE indications of crack growth 
have been detected in the recent history of vessel testing, including a vessel with a known crack 
that was tested at GRC as part of the photogrammetry work that was supported by MSFC (see 
Section 7.2.4 of this report).  However, a vessel with a known crack (V256) has been removed 
from service, and plans are under development to perform hydrostatic testing while monitoring 
with AE. 
NASA ARC had significant efforts completed and underway to work toward validation of MAE 
methods for application to LPVs.  ARC has used MAE since 2001 [ref. 27], when a concurrent 
test was performed with both MAE and parametric AE vendors on a single vessel.  As a result of 
that work, ARC contracted for MAE testing of all 16 active A. O. Smith vessels in 2002 and 
2008 [refs. 28 and 29].  No relevant crack indications were identified during this testing.  During 
this work, ARC demonstrated the transmission of AE signals between layers and from the inner 
layer to the outer layers.  For these tests, pencil-lead breaks were used to generate simulated AE 
signals (per ASTM E-1419) in a part-through hole drilled in one vessel and on the inner layer 
surface, which were detected with minimal attenuation by sensors on the outer layers.  They also 
demonstrated the ability to detect and accurately locate such pencil-lead breaks over 20 feet from 
the nearest sensor on their large vessels at the specified ASTM threshold sensitivity.  However, 
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since no actual crack was ever found (and none are known to exist), the ARC PSM concluded 
that full-scale testing was required to fully validate the method on LPVs.  In principle, this could 
be accomplished by MAE monitoring of an LPV under pressure cycling to force crack growth 
from a starter notch.  This was proposed as a research project to OSMA in 2010 and accepted as 
2011/2012 work.  ARC managed the work through its site wind tunnel engineering and 
operations contractor and the selected MAE vendor.  This particular crack growth turned out to 
be harder to detect than expected, and more testing is needed.  Discussion of the cyclic test 
results and conclusions are contained in Section 7.1.2.2, Appendix G of this report, and reported 
in reference 26.  As part of the cyclic test effort, when cycling was completed, the vessel was 
sent to an independent laboratory for materials property characterization to validate the ability to 
calculate crack growth using newly measured fracture properties and the NASGRO® fracture 
analysis program via comparison to the actual crack extension.  This very limited material 
assessment in the vicinity of the crack was supplemented in 2012 with Phase 2 work by the same 
laboratory to more fully characterize shell, head, weld, and HAZ material, with some unexpected 
results but good correlation between the analysis and crack measurements.  The materials 
characterization efforts are discussed in Section 7.1.2.2 and Appendix H of this report and 
reported in references 41 and 42.   
Based on discussions with the same testing laboratory, ARC also identified PAUT as a potential 
method for inspecting circumferential welds in these vessels, and the laboratory developed a 
proposal for initial development of this method using a section of the sacrificed test vessel as a 
calibration block.  This proposal was accepted and included as part of Task 2 of this assessment, 
with task management transferred to LaRC.  Again, additional details on these efforts are 
provided in following sections and appendices.  
Finally, the NASGRO® fracture analysis program (which was originally developed by NASA) 
has never been fully developed for application to ground-based vessels, and the above work 
required simplified geometry and nonstandard use of program features that limit its usefulness to 
the PSMs.  Stress intensity factor modeling and failure assessment diagram application 
development are needed to make it fully and efficiently useful to the Centers.  Since NASGRO® 
is free to all NASA users, the ARC PSM also requested a proposal for that software development 
work from the same independent laboratory mentioned above (which develops NASGRO® under 
a Space Act Agreement).  This was provided to ARC, and the proposal was later passed on to 
OSMA and NESC for consideration in future tasks. 
NASA GRC reported on efforts to continue refinement of their customized UT bore probes for 
nozzle and nozzle-to-head weld inspections.  This capability was originally developed by GRC, 
and, while it had been discussed to a limited extent among the PSMs under their OSMA working 
group, it was not widely understood and had not been implemented at any other Centers.  With 
further validation, it might be an approach that finds application across the Agency.  NASA GRC 
also noted some preliminary efforts to apply full-field optical measurement approaches, such as 
photogrammetry, for measurement of LPV surface deformation as a result of pressurization.  
There are two potential applications for such a measurement tool.  First, the measured 
deformations, if suitably accurate and sensitive, can in principal provide a basis for validating 
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analysis methods under development.  Additionally, if it can be shown that the presence of flaws, 
including manufacturing anomalies and in-service defects, results in significant changes to the 
surface deformation of LPVs under pressure that are greater than the threshold noise/sensitivity 
level of the method, then the technique could possibly be used as a flaw screening method.  
Additional testing with this method was performed again as part of Task 2 and is described in 
more detail in Section 7.2.3 of this report.  The ability to measure general surface deformation 
was demonstrated (e.g., vessel elongation and bending due to internal pressure).  Efforts in 
detecting deformation variations due to known flaws were not successful, and additional analysis 
tools are needed to understand whether this would be possible, and if so, what size flaws might 
be detectable.  Analytical efforts are needed to determine expected surface deformations due to 
various defects, such as major layer weld cracks or layer gaps.  Usefulness of the technology will 
depend on whether motion due to defects is sufficient enough to not be masked by other vessel 
physical characteristics. 
MAF reported that the operating pressures for their vessels had been reduced unless otherwise 
specifically required for a short-duration test.  In such cases, additional requirements for 
operation were introduced, including evacuation of personnel from potential blast zones and 
installation of temporary or permanent berms.  It was noted that such higher pressure operations 
typically only occurred one to three times a year and lasted only 1 or 2 days at a time. 
7.1.1.5 Summary of Proposed or Recommended Risk Mitigation Methods 
The Centers were also asked for input on any proposed or recommended risk mitigation 
methods.  A number of responses were received, many related to ongoing work previously 
discussed.  One NDE method not previously noted was identified as having potential to inspect 
through layered shell sections.  This is the Saturated Low Frequency Eddy Current (SLOFEC™) 
technique, an electromagnetic inspection technique that has been used in efforts to detect 
corrosion in thick-walled steel piping [refs. 30 and 31].  Given that no current methods exist for 
inspecting the shell sections, some initial efforts to evaluate its capabilities for LPVs, at least 
with modeling, and if warranted, laboratory testing, are recommended. 
Multiple Centers recommended additional efforts to validate AE techniques, including full-scale 
vessel testing with known and independently verified measurements of crack growth.  Likewise, 
multiple Centers recommended additional efforts to develop and validate the PAUT method for 
inspecting circumferential welds.  One Center suggested further work on photogrammetric 
techniques.   
In a different area, one Center recommended the installation of manways to allow internal 
inspections of LPV inner shells.  Another Center suggested the redesign of systems to provide 
local storage of low-pressure/high-capacity gas capabilities to reduce the requirements for, and 
risk associated with, high-pressure LPVs and systems currently in use.  However, physical 
modification and/or replacement of the vessels was outside the scope of the NESC’s charter, and 
these were not pursued further. 
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7.1.1.6 Summary of Special Concerns Noted 
The Centers were asked to identify any special concerns they had with respect to LPVs.  One 
response highlighted the variability that has been observed in previous testing to characterize the 
material properties of the A225 material used in LPV heads.  The variability makes it difficult to 
use generic materials properties for this material in analyses and may lead to requirements to use 
either very low bounding properties or to the development of some methods to assess properties 
specific to individual vessels.  The problems associated with the unknown relevance of past 
Charpy U-notch or keyhole data to current fracture toughness methodologies were also 
highlighted. 
Several Centers highlighted concerns over the application of ASME Division 1 versus  
Division 2 methods to rate pressures for these vessels.  Some noted that Division 2 was not 
appropriate because these vessels were not fabricated to all Division 2 requirements, while others 
suggested that Division 2 could be used safely.  This was identified as an area that needs 
resolution, and it is noted that the OSMA PVS lead and at least one PSM strongly disagrees with 
the appropriateness of applying Division 2, as is discussed elsewhere in this report.  Also, it was 
questioned as to when updated MAWP calculations should be required. 
Another concern highlighted by multiple Centers was the need to understand the overall safety 
record for these vessels in industry, as well as to better understand the catastrophic failures that 
have occurred.  In particular, the importance of understanding how the LPVs that failed were 
used was identified, as well as identifying the similarities and differences as to how NASA uses 
these vessels. 
One Center highlighted the lack of internal access for inspection of vessel inner shells as a 
particular concern.   
Another concern identified by multiple Centers was the difficulty that might result from attempts 
at implementing uniform processes across the Agency because of the variety of vessel designs 
and applications.  It was noted that as an example, invasive inspection approaches might be 
acceptable for one Center and application but could create excessive problems and possible 
damage from contamination in other Centers and applications.  The need for having tailored 
approaches for inspection and hazard mitigations was highlighted. 
7.1.1.7 Summary of Processes/Time Periods for Communicating Risk to Center 
Management 
The Centers were asked to provide insight as to the processes, time periods for reporting risk 
associated with these vessels to Center Management, and, in general, perceptions as to the 
awareness of Center management of the risks.  The responses clearly indicated that the frequency 
and methods of reporting LPV risks to Center management and their awareness of the risks 
presented by continued use of these vessels varies significantly from Center to Center.  The types 
of reporting and frequency of reporting ranged from quarterly reports to Center management 
with specific inclusion of risks and efforts to reduce risk for LPVs, to no reporting at all.  Some 
Centers cited waivers for their operation that were approved at various times in the past, ranging 
NESC Request No.: TI-13-00852 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report
Document #: 
NESCP-RP-
13-00852 
Version: 
1.1 
Title:
Evaluation of Agency Non-code LPVs 
Page #: 
39 of 193 
from within the last couple of years to more than a decade ago.  Further, it was noted that these 
waivers were not periodically reviewed, updated, or required to be reapproved.  Most Centers 
generally reported that there was not a high degree of awareness of potential, albeit undefined, 
risks associated with LPVs at Center management levels, but that the potential risk was better 
known to personnel within the facilities or operations organizations, as well as the safety 
organizations.  
7.1.2 Summary of Previous or Ongoing LPV Related Work Identified at NASA Centers 
During the internal review as part of Task 1, it was determined that several Centers had previous 
and ongoing activities to help mitigate risks associated with these vessels.  Several examples of 
these efforts are summarized in the following.  Although some of these efforts were collaborative 
involving multiple Centers, it was important to note that information about much of the work and 
associated results were not being effectively communicated across the Agency.  The lack of an 
Agency team or forum to address this problem sometimes resulted in information about the 
individual efforts being kept local to the Center or Centers performing the work.  One significant 
accomplishment of this assessment was that information about these efforts has been 
communicated across the Agency and further collaboration on these efforts has been established. 
7.1.2.1 MSFC Materials and Processes Laboratory LPV Activities 
The MSFC Materials and Processing Laboratory conducted several preliminary activities to gain 
an understanding of the materials used in the non-code LPVs.  These activities were in the area 
of material properties, NDE, and analysis.  Available material properties were reviewed, and 
preliminary mechanical tests and metallurgical evaluations were performed.  Several NDE 
inspection methods were investigated to provide a sufficient understanding of their relative 
screening efficacies in order to down-select appropriate NDE methods for future evaluations.  
Stress levels and corresponding limiting flaw sizes for vessels of concern were investigated using 
the ASME FFS [ref. 32] methods.  In order to gain a better understanding of the structural 
loading inherent to LPVs, with specific interest in determining the location and sizes of flaws for 
a damage-tolerance-based FFS analysis, an analytical tool was developed to parametrically 
model the weld regions in LPVs.  The results from this preliminary effort were used to request 
funding to proceed with an ongoing LPV effort, which was ultimately funded and is described in 
detail in Section 7.2. 
7.1.2.1.1 Materials 
Material testing objectives were to develop an initial understanding of material performance of 
LPVs, more specifically, the structurally significant material properties, including tensile and 
fracture mechanics behavior.  Representative surplus vessels were identified to collect data to 
develop a materials database.  Material sources available at MSFC included a CB&I vessel 
(V0125) and an A. O. Smith vessel (V0032) (see Appendix C).  This included 1146a shell and 
A225 head material from V0032, and 1146 and 1143 shell and A225 head material from V0125, 
where the materials were identified from the original manufacturer’s data reports.  Both 1143 
and 1146 were A. O. Smith designations, while A225 is an ASTM designation.  Based on later 
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testing, which is described in Section 7.2.1, the pedigree of the 1146a inner shell material from 
V0032 was shown not to be in question, but this was unknown at the time of the preliminary 
effort.  Both vessels were slated for mechanical testing and NDE to determine if there were any 
meaningful differences between materials based on the vendor or material lot.  Existing material 
property data were surveyed and compared with preliminary materials tests.  Limited tensile 
properties collected at MSFC for the CB&I vessel did not show the expected margin over 
reported design strengths (see Appendix D), and microstructural tests showed unexpected 
possible material anisotropy. 
Fracture toughness as a function of temperature was identified as the most influential material 
property for vessel assessment.  The fully ductile fracture toughness (upper shelf) and the 
temperature at which the steel transitions to cleavage fracture (lower shelf) were determined to 
be of critical interest in the assessment of LPVs.  The use of the T0 reference temperature 
methodology from ASTM E1921-13, “Standard Test Method for Determination of Reference 
Temperature, T0, for Ferritic Steels in the Transition Range” [ref. 33], was chosen as a method to 
evaluate fracture mechanics toughness data as a function of temperature due to brittle transition 
effects.  Cleavage versus ductile in terms of ASTM E1921-13 refers to the fracture mechanism, 
(i.e., cleavage of crystal planes versus ductile crack-growth crack mechanism).  A brittle 
structural failure can mean either cleavage or ductile but implies a low toughness controlled 
failure relative to failure due to net-section yielding behavior.  The E1921-13 approach was 
expected to minimize the number of test samples required to define the ductile-to-brittle 
transition curve.  The E1921-13 method was considered especially advantageous because it uses 
a fracture-mechanics-based weakest link theory in the evaluation to maximize the information 
gained from testing from a limited number of tests and because E1921-13, as a statistical 
method, allows failure probability levels (confidence levels) to be statistically determined.  The 
fact that it is a fracture-mechanics-based method rather than a correlation means that it gives 
accurate rather than conservative measurement of the temperature above which cleavage fracture 
is not to be expected, compared with nil-ductility-temperature (NDT) based approaches.  This 
method was applied to generate confidence curves for several LPV materials (see Appendix E).    
A consultancy between MSFC and a cleavage fracture specialist was researched and proposed to 
assist in planning the scope and performing the analysis for E1921-13 testing.  To date, the 
Master Curve method has predominantly been used to evaluate steels in the nuclear industry, and 
it was expected that an expert consultant could help address some of the unique challenges that 
were anticipated.   
Preliminary examination of several welds was also conducted to identify potential fracture planes 
to investigate.  These locations included head-to-shell and shell-to-shell welds.  The scope of this 
evaluation was to investigate the varied microstructure around the various welds (see  
Appendix D).  
This initial effort led to the recommendation to procure funding to pursue: 
1. Mechanical testing on LPV A225 base head material, to characterize the ductile-to-brittle
fracture toughness versus temperature response.  The initial literature research showed
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that the A225 material would likely have the most elevated transition temperature and 
may cleave at operating temperatures. 
2. Mechanical testing on LPV shell materials including 1143 and 1146, to characterize the
ductile-to-brittle fracture toughness versus temperature response.
3. Preliminary mechanical and microstructural testing in LPV weld materials, including:
a. A225 head-to-shell
b. shell-to-shell
c. longitudinal welds (inner shell and wraps)
d. A225 to 5002 nozzle (circumferential weld at base of nozzle), where 5002 is a
common nozzle steel used in the majority of vessels
These activities are discussed in Sections 7.2.1. 
7.1.2.1.2 AE testing of LPVs 
AE testing at MSFC is used as a method of screening LPVs, with the goal of identifying active 
crack growth.  The original plan at MSFC was to use the MONPAC™ testing procedure to 
screen for crack growth.  However, because MONPAC™ is primarily intended for structurally 
significant defects (those close to failure), an additional analysis method was added to the 
MONPAC™ intensity analysis to allow screening for potentially catastrophic crack growth and 
smaller crack extensions.  This approach does not require a MONPAC™ procedure change and 
uses three-dimensional and two-dimensional algorithm-based source location software that can 
locate smaller sources.  The software accuracy is verified using a pretest calibration consisting of 
lead breaks and/or center punch strikes in known locations.  The AE software sound velocity 
setting is then adjusted until the software accurately locates the breaks/strikes. 
MSFC uses a Physical Acoustics Corporation 56 Channel DiSPTM Workstation (with 40 channels 
installed) with the following parameters and capabilities: 
• Test parameters currently in use: threshold, 42 dB (decibels), 100–400 kHz frequency
filter
• R15I-AST sensors: mid-range sensors, operating range 80–200 kHz
• WDI-AST sensors: wideband sensors, operating range 200–900 kHz
• Waveform option module: processor, buffer, memory, adjustable sample length and rate
Plans are for procurement of additional MAE instrumentation to allow future testing to apply 
both methodologies.   
The current AE test plan at MSFC is to gather data from approximately 10% of the layered 
vessels in the MSFC active inventory to establish an initial data set for evaluation (17 to  
20 vessels total).  Ten layered vessels have been AE tested at MSFC to date.  No AE signals that 
had characteristics associated with the propagation of structurally significant defects have been 
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detected.  MSFC is also planning to conduct lab-scale AE testing later in fiscal year (FY) 2014, 
as funding allows, using layered vessel coupons to investigate crack extension and overall AE 
test effectiveness and sensitivity.  The goal of this testing is to understand the amplitude of AE 
signals that might be produced in a typical AE test on an LPV, which is usually accomplished by 
a 10% overpressure at nominal operating ambient temperature conditions, and to evaluate the 
apparent feasibility of using AE to detect growing cracks in the LPVs during proof testing.  
Accordingly, the data of most interest will be crack growth at room temperature.  The samples 
will be as large as can be machined and tested due to the constraints of the thin, curved pressure 
vessel materials.  With regard to specimen dimensions, the thickness of the samples is one 
limitation that will affect the signal characteristics significantly; it will change the signal mode of 
propagation from bulk modes to plate modes.  However, with the layers present in the tank this 
may occur naturally to some extent for the real signals that occur in the tank.  Test specimens 
will be used that maximize the lateral extent since the effect of reflections from these lateral 
boundaries will impede observation of the original arriving mode and make it difficult to assess 
the direct arriving signal amplitude of interest.  For these tests, the focus is only whether the 
crack grew and by how much, not necessarily on calculating the fracture toughness, which is to 
be accomplished separately.  Detecting cleavage fracture at low temperatures, which would 
likely produce the largest amplitude and most easily detectable AE signals, will not be pursued. 
Since the AE method is still not validated, the information acquired is for engineering evaluation 
only.  However, the method is providing useful information on issues related to applying AE in 
the field on these vessels and on the assessment of the background noise produced and how it 
varies between different vessels that have undergone different periods of inactivity.  A vessel 
with a known crack (V0256) has been removed from service, and plans are under development to 
perform hydrostatic testing while monitoring with AE.  
7.1.2.1.3 Analysis 
The infrastructure LPVs are considered industrial ground support equipment (GSE) for which 
safety rationale based on FFS is being developed.  National consensus code approaches are 
customarily used on GSE because these approaches maintain proper conservatisms and 
consistency in the FFS assessment.  The current ASME BPVC [ref. 1] and ASME-FFS-1  
(API-579) [ref. 32] and related document are being considered as the FFS anchor for the LPV 
assessments.  Even though ASME FFS-1 (API 579) does not specifically address assessment 
methods for layered vessels, Part 9 of this Standard allows flexibility for tailoring and 
establishing an approach for assessing LPVs.  
To establish a viable FFS approach for the LPV fleet requires not only a clear understanding of 
the material behavior fundamentals being investigated concurrently (as discussed in Sections 
7.1.2.1.1 and 7.2.3) but also an understanding of the physical behavior resulting from the layered 
construction.  These include the effects of unintended layer gaps, flaws in intermediate layers or 
layer welds, residual stress effects, and the effects of proof tests on the overall state of stress, for 
example.  Since a real-time snapshot of the interior or in-between layers of LPVs is not always 
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practical, analytical tools, such as finite element analyses, are being employed to gain an 
understanding of these physical fundamentals. 
As part of this assessment, finite element analyses were conducted to investigate various 
parameters that affect the state of stress of an LPV as compared with the classical thick-walled 
pressure vessel solution.  A modeling tool, LPV Analysis Tool (LAPVAT), was developed to 
automatically generate and post-process LPV finite element models using the Abaqus® Python™ 
interface.  LAPVAT enables efficient parametric studies by allowing the user to input the 
dimensions of the vessel, the number of layers, the layer gaps, the material properties, meshing 
parameters, internal pressures, temperatures, angular section size, and other parameters.  These 
inputs are used to automatically generate a three-dimensional model of a sector of an LPV 
including a head, the specified number of shell layers, and the head-to-shell weld region with 
contacts between layers.  Details of the development of this tool and results may be found in 
Appendix G. 
7.1.2.2 NASA ARC – MAE Validation and Materials Testing Efforts 
AE testing is a method used to detect cracks or other damage sources in structures by detecting 
and analyzing acoustic waves that are produced by growth of the damage or the contact and 
rubbing of crack surfaces as a result of load or pressure being applied to the structure.  An array 
of acoustic sensors is placed on the structure to detect AE signals.  The detected AE signals are 
analyzed to locate the damage site by triangulation and to assess the damage and discriminate 
extraneous noise by analysis of the signals or features of the signals.  A simple analogy of the 
AE technique is that of structural seismology, where the growing damage sources are the 
equivalent of earthquake sources within the structure. 
MAE is an AE approach based on the capture and analysis of complete AE waveforms acquired 
with high-fidelity, broadband acoustic sensors.  MAE analysis incorporates a physics-based 
understanding of the modes of acoustic propagation for the structure being tested and the 
relationship between the crack sources of interest and the resulting acoustic modes that are 
generated and propagated [refs. 34–36].  This is in contrast to the resonant sensors and analysis 
of signal features or parameters based on a preexisting database for similar structures, which are 
employed in a competing approach that has also been applied to LPVs, known as MONPAC™ 
AE [ref. 25].  MAE has the potential for providing more accurate location of AE sources and for 
improved characterization of AE sources and discrimination of extraneous noise as compared 
with conventional AE parameter analysis approaches. 
Although MAE has not been previously fully validated for application to LPVs, it has been 
validated for a number of other related applications.  One example is the application of MAE to 
retest DOT cylinders and submarine flasks that resulted in the award of a DOT Special Permit 
[ref. 37] and the Navy’s ongoing use of MAE for flask requalification.  Previous conventional 
parameter-based AE approaches were demonstrated for detection and location of subcritical and 
critical size cracks in these solid-wall high-strength steel vessels [refs. 38 and 39].  MAE 
improved on these approaches by providing improved source location accuracy and the ability to 
discriminate noise.  In these and other applications of MAE, Digital Wave Corporation (DWC) 
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utilizes published ASTM standards [refs. 40–43] as they apply to MAE with respect to 
instrument calibration and system performance testing. 
Because of its demonstrated success in detecting crack growth in other related applications 
involving steel pressure vessels, MAE was evaluated for and eventually applied to full-scale 
testing of LPVs at NASA ARC as well as at other NASA Centers.  As part of this effort, NASA 
ARC has worked with DWC since 2001 to fully validate MAE for LPVs [refs. 26–29] with 
cyclic testing in 2011 and 2012 funded by the NASA OSMA.  These efforts, which are described 
in more detail in Appendix G, have successfully demonstrated many aspects of MAE for LPVs 
including evaluation of modal wave propagation characteristics (i.e., modal content, velocity, 
and attenuation) of signals generated by simulated AE sources (i.e., pencil-lead breaks) in LPVs, 
demonstration of AE signal propagation though the layered shell thickness, and evaluation of 
LPV background extraneous noise.  The only aspect of MAE that was not demonstrated in initial 
testing on the large vessels at ARC was detection of actual crack growth in an LPV because it 
was not feasible to achieve verifiable growth of an induced crack on these large vessels. 
Even without the full validation of the MAE technique to detect growing known cracks in an 
LPV, it was the engineering judgment of both DWC and NASA PSMs at several Centers that the 
method could be used as a periodic inspection tool to determine whether any relevant, growing 
cracks existed in the vessels (i.e., large cracks growing with each pressure cycle, probably close 
to critical size).  This was based on the known success of MAE for monitoring other steel 
pressure vessels and the success in demonstrating MAE propagation in LPVs.  Thus, MAE was 
applied for full-scale testing on the ARC vessels with the intent that if MAE indicated the 
presence of any growing cracks, the vessels would be removed from service and efforts made to 
verify the presence of cracks through other forms of NDE.  The vessels would then, if possible, 
be repaired.  If any indicated cracks were confirmed, this would provide additional validation 
data for the method.  However, none of the vessels at ARC exhibited MAE indications of crack 
growth.  Thus, ARC concluded that an additional validation test was required in which MAE 
would be applied to monitor an LPV with a known, fully characterized growing crack. 
Attempts at demonstrating MAE detection of crack growth in a LPV were performed using 
cyclic crack-growth tests on a much smaller LPV (44 cubic feet) that was obtained from KSC.  
This work was managed by ARC and their prime contractor, Jacobs Technology, under OSMA 
research funding, and carried out by DWC.  The test vessel was pressure cycled 4,688 times, 
about half of which were between its nameplate rating of 6,600 psi and 1,000 psi, and the 
remainder at progressively higher pressures up to yield strength of the outer layer.  MAE was 
recorded throughout.  This effort was, however, only partly successful in that, while MAE was 
shown to be able to detect the actual growing crack under field test conditions, the crack 
exhibited low acoustic energy release and was essentially at the threshold of detectability for the 
AE system being used.  As such, it would likely have been missed in a standard production field 
test.  It was later determined that the crack was much smaller than the expected critical size 
(approximately 25%) [refs. 26 and 44], which results in lower AE signal amplitude.  Incomplete 
knowledge (at the time of the test) of the higher toughness of the material in the vessels 
contributed to using too small an initial crack size in the previous demonstration test.  Further, 
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limited funding precluded continuation of the vessel cycling to grow a larger crack closer to 
critical size with (presumed) greater intensity AEs.  Tests on vessels with larger cracks (closer to 
the critical crack size) will be necessary to better demonstrate and fully validate the capability of 
MAE for detecting crack growth and to document the relationship between signal amplitude and 
detectable crack size.  Details on both the cyclic pressure testing and MAE assessment work 
performed by DWC are contained in reference 26. 
While additional full-scale cyclic testing is required to validate either modal or parametric AE, 
this cyclic test work suggested that research on AE monitoring of laboratory scale specimens 
under cyclic loading could provide important information regarding the absolute intensity of AEs 
from growing cracks as detected by the various approaches to AE.  Although this is discussed in 
the literature with mixed results, current techniques could improve upon issues encountered in 
the past.  This recommendation was accepted by the NESC and ongoing work at MSFC and 
LaRC in that regard is described in Section 7.2.6 of this report.  
Upon completion of the MAE tests of crack growth on the smaller LPV, the vessel was sent to 
Southwest Research Institute® (SwRI)® for fractographic analysis of the crack growth and 
materials characterization efforts to assess some of the relevant properties for the vessel 
materials [refs. 44 and 45].  In particular, measurements of fracture toughness and fatigue crack-
growth properties of the principal material components for this vessel were performed.  This 
work focused on the inner and outer shell layers, material from one of the heads, and weld and 
HAZ material from one head-to-shell weld.  For this limited sampling from this one vessel, 
tensile properties, impact energy, fracture toughness, and fatigue crack-growth properties were 
documented.  When SwRI® incorporated these properties into a fracture crack-growth analysis 
(using NASA’s NASGRO® software, for which they are a Space Act Agreement developer) of 
the starter notch that was machined into the outer shell, the calculated crack growth closely 
matched the actual growth experienced in the cyclic field test.  Of note, critical fracture 
toughness for both shell and head material was shown to be greater than indicated by prior work 
done at LaRC in the 1970s [ref. 46], although impact energy absorption using the Charpy  
V-notch test (which is required by ASME) was measured to be much less at low ambient 
temperatures.  In fact, both head and shell material exhibited brittle fracture characteristics at 
0°F, which can be a significant problem at several Centers.  While there are known issues with 
utilizing Charpy impact energy results to statistically predict brittle fracture behavior, further 
work is required to determine the NDT and safe operating temperatures for all of the material 
that comprises these vessels.  This effort has begun at MSFC with a program to determine 
transition reference temperature in accordance with ASTM E  
1921-13 [ref. 33] and ASME FFS-1/API-579 standards [ref. 32].  In addition, since destructive 
material testing cannot practically be performed on NASA’s fleet of in-service vessels, a much 
wider sampling of materials from other similar vessels is needed to develop an adequate 
confidence level in applying the SwRI®, MSFC, or any other test data obtained from specific 
surplus vessels to the in-service fleet.  Details on both the phase 1 and phase 2 work performed 
by SwRI® are contained in a detailed summary in Appendix H, and the SwRI® reports are 
available in total as NASA Contractor Report documents [refs. 44 and 45]. 
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7.1.2.3 SSC/MSFC Evaluation of PAUT Methods for Inspection of Full Penetration 
Circumferential Welds on LPVs 
There are currently no NDE techniques available that are validated for volumetric inspection of 
cracks in the full penetration circumferential welds of LPVs (RT limitations were discussed 
previously).  PAUT techniques have been identified as a potential method for inspection of these 
welds, and at least one report in the literature [ref. 22] has shown promising results.  Preliminary 
evaluation performed for MSFC and SSC also demonstrated the potential of this method. 
Background 
In April 2013, personnel from Davis NDE, located in Hoover, AL, were invited to visit MSFC to 
provide a demonstration of PAUT equipment for potential use as a weld inspection tool for 
LPVs.  Davis NDE had previously reported to the SSC PSM some success in detecting flaws in 
layered vessels located overseas using PAUT techniques.  In a collaborative effort between SSC, 
MSFC, and GRC, a plan was made to have Davis NDE provide an overview of the PAUT 
technique and operating principles, along with a hands-on demonstration of the PAUT 
equipment.  MSFC was chosen as the site for the equipment demonstration due to the close 
proximity of MSFC to the Davis NDE office and the fact that MSFC had an out-of-service vessel 
readily available for the weld scanning demonstration. 
Davis NDE was not under contract with MSFC for any services and the initial visit was intended 
to be an equipment demonstration only, at no cost to the government.  However, subsequent to 
the visit, Davis NDE was asked to perform a review and interpretation of the PAUT data and 
provide informal (courtesy) reports to MSFC.  It was understood that the PAUT weld scans 
performed were not code-quality scans since there was no calibration standard available for 
PAUT equipment calibration or for code-required weld scan plan development.  Therefore, the 
PAUT weld scan data provided in this report are for reference purposes only and may not be 
used to assess vessel V0256 FFS. 
Initial Demonstration of PAUT Equipment 
The initial proof-of-concept demonstration by Davis NDE included general setup and operation 
of Olympus Omniscan phased array equipment.  MSFC provided a vessel head-to-shell weld 
coupon obtained from layered Vessel V0125.  Davis NDE personnel discussed general PAUT 
equipment setup and operation, performed a weld scan of the vessel coupon to demonstrate the 
scanning technique and on-screen data presentation options, and provided a real-time 
interpretation and discussion of the screen data.  This first demonstration was focused primarily 
on equipment setup and adjustment, various scanning techniques, transducer options, data 
presentation formats, calibration requirements, and critical variables associated with 
development of weld scan plans.  
PAUT Demonstration on Vessel V0256 
Davis NDE personnel were asked to perform an in situ scan of weld areas on MSFC vessel  
V0256, shown in Figure 7.1.2.3-1, which was previously depressurized and taken out of service.  
V0256 is a 1,250-cubic-foot, 5,000-psig layered vessel built by CB&I in 1963.  The vessel was 
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constructed with a monolithic head and a layered shell section consisting of 14 total layers 
(15/32-inch inner layer and 13 overwraps of 9/32 inches each) for a total shell thickness of  
4 1/8 inches.  Vessel V0256 also has a readily visible defect in the outer layer base metal, a 
longitudinal crack running perpendicular to the head-to-shell weld, which was originally detected 
during an MT inspection (see Figure 7.1.2.3-2). 
Figure 7.1.2.3-1.  MSFC Vessel V0256 with Welds Stripped for Inspection  
(A225 head material; MLP 1143 shell material) 
Figure 7.1.2.3-2.  Longitudinal Crack in Outer Layer of V0256   
Aside:  Radiography had recently been performed on the full penetration welds of vessel V0256, 
not only to assess the quality of the vessel welds, but to gain more insight into the challenges of 
performing radiography on large, thick-wall layered vessels and to understand the extent and 
quality of volumetric weld data available from the radiography.  Because MSFC has limited 
experience with performing radiography on large, thick-walled vessels, personnel from GRC 
traveled to MSFC to assist with the setup and provided setup tools commonly used at GRC.  In 
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short, radiography was being considered as another inspection tool for use by MSFC in 
evaluating the integrity of LPVs.   
Vessel V0256 provided an opportunity for demonstration of the PAUT technique and equipment 
under field conditions and on a shell-to-shell weld, which was not available with the vessel  
V0125 coupons.  Weld segments on V0256, including both head-to-shell and shell-to-shell weld 
regions, were prepared in advance of the PAUT demonstration by grinding the weld crowns flat 
to allow better coupling of the ultrasonic transducer with the vessel weld surface.  Radiography 
was performed on V0256 prior to arrival of Davis NDE but resulted in only one positive 
indication, which could be used for comparison with the PAUT results.  
Davis NDE personnel scanned the areas identified by MSFC, demonstrated various scan 
techniques, provided real-time data interpretation, and conducted hands-on training for the 
MSFC NDT technicians present.  The line scan inspections on vessel V0256 were performed by 
setting the PAUT equipment gain to define both the weld root area and the shell section layers.  
Davis NDE indicated that this approach was used because no qualified procedure or calibration 
block was immediately available for this vessel inspection.  Davis NDE personnel also scanned 
the longitudinal crack in the outer layer base metal and the adjacent head-to-shell weld in an 
attempt to better characterize the flaw. 
Results 
Figures 7.1.2.3-3 through 7.1.2.3-6 show PAUT scans of various indications observed in the 
vessel V0256 head-to-shell and shell-to-shell weld volumes.  These figures demonstrate the 
PAUT capability to distinguish, to some extent, the shell layer edges from indications within the 
weld volume.  In particular, Figure 7.1.2.3-5, which is a shell-to-shell weld scan, shows the 
symmetry of the individual layer tip reflections (indications) on both sides of the weld volume.  
In Figure 7.1.2.3-6, Davis NDE reports a discontinuity extending from the end of a layer into the 
weld volume. 
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Figure 7.1.2.3-3.  PAUT Scan of Head-to-Shell Weld Region (top portion) 
Figure 7.1.2.3-4.  PAUT Scan of Head-to-Shell Weld Region (bottom portion) 
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Figure 7.1.2.3-5.  PAUT Scan of Shell-to-Shell Weld Region 
Figure 7.1.2.3-6.  PAUT Scan of Shell-to-Shell Weld Region 
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Davis NDE also provided tabular results of the weld scans for specific weld segments on  
vessel V0256 using both time based and linearly encoded scans.  Davis NDE used both 
techniques to further demonstrate the scanning and data acquisition capabilities of the 
equipment.  Table 7.1.2.3-1 shows the results for head-to-shell weld using linearly encoded weld 
scans.  The linear encoding allowed Davis NDE to characterize the indications (i.e., height and 
length) and shows the relative location of the indications along the weld length.  Table 7.1.2.3-2 
shows results reported by Davis NDE for the vessel shell-to-shell weld using time-based scans 
rather than linearly encoded scans.  Further characterization of the indications from these scans 
was not provided since the data were not encoded for this part of the demonstration.   
The PAUT data interpretation by Davis NDE resulted in observations at each weld location 
scanned.  Davis NDE personnel were asked to identify any and all observations, not just those 
that would be BPVC rejectable indications.  Weld C3, location O-P is the only weld area of those 
scanned by Davis NDE personnel where radiography also indicated there was any indication 
within the weld volume.  The MSFC American Welding Society film interpreter reported a 
BPVC rejectable indication of porosity at this weld location (C3/O-P).   
As noted earlier, the data reviewed were not from code quality scans, which results in less than 
desirable confidence in the accuracy of the reviewed data.  The records below are merely 
documentation of the indications presented in these scans and do not detail the overall 
component quality. 
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Table 7.1.2.3-1.  Head-to-Shell Weld 
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Weld C1 
(TOP) X .05” .24” 0” 6.7” Slag 
X .18” .35” +.7” 7.9” LOF 
X .10” .27” 0” 9.3” Slag 
X .15” .26” 0” 9.9” Slag 
X .09” .28” +.2” 12.9” Slag 
X .28” .37” +1” 13.0” LOF 
X .07” .14” +.2” 13.8” Slag 
Weld C1 
(BOT) X .59” 2.9” -.1” 7.5” Crack 
X .34” .26” +.3” 11.3” Slag 
X .07” .15” 0” 12.1” Slag 
X .44” .21” +.1” 13.0” Crack 
Table 7.1.2.3-1 notes: 
1. The head-to-shell data were encoded but scan axis positional information may differ
slightly from the first to the second index position.
2. 100% weld coverage was not obtained in this scan.
Table 7.1.2.3-2.  Shell-to-Shell Welds 
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Weld C3 (L 
to K) X Slag 
X Slag 
X Crack-like 
Weld C3 (O 
to P) X          Crack-like 
X          Slag 
The only weld location scanned by Davis 
NDE which had indication (porosity) 
previously identified by radiography 
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Weld C5 (M to 
N) X Crack-like 
X Slag 
X Crack-like 
X Crack-like 
X Slag 
Weld C5 (N to 
O) X Slag 
X Crack-like 
X Slag 
X Slag 
X Slag 
X Crack-like 
Table 7.1.2.3-2 notes: 
1. The shell-to-shell weld scans were not encoded, which prohibits reporting of any
relatively accurate information pertaining to flaw length.
2. 100% weld coverage was not obtained in this scan.
Figures 7.1.2.3-7 through 7.1.2.3-9 show additional data obtained by Davis NDE during the 
PAUT scan of vessel V0256.  These figures provide a comparison of the “A,” “S,” and “B” scan 
data available with the Olympus Omniscan phased array equipment.  A-scan is the typical time 
versus signal amplitude plot shown in the upper left of these figures.  The S-scan is the sectorial 
scan image shown in the upper right in which the ultrasonic beam is electronically steered 
through a sector of the material while the transducer remains at a fixed location.  The B-scan is 
shown in the lower image where the transducer is translated along the weld.  Figure 7.1.2.3-7 
shows an indication in the C5 weld O to N location, indicative of slag.  Figure 7.1.2.3-8 shows a 
linear indication in the C5 weld O to P location indicative of lack of fusion.  The “S” and “B” 
scan data formats provide a far more intuitive presentation of data than that of the “A” scan 
(which is the typical conventional UT data format).  It should be noted that these figures are 
screen views, which represent data from only a single location along the length of the weld.  
Phased array data were being recorded at approximately every 0.040 inches along the weld 
length.  These screen views are also not representative of all the indications listed in  
Table 7.1.2.3-2 for the C5 weld. 
Figure 7.1.2.3-9 shows the scan data from the visible crack in the outer layer of V0256 (photo of 
crack shown in Figure 7.1.2.3-2).  The PAUT data do not provide any significant new 
information beyond what could be determined from radiography or conventional UT but do 
provide better characterization of the crack as it runs through the outer shell.  As noted earlier, 
the crack is contained in the outer shell base metal and does not enter the weld. 
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Figure 7.1.2.3-7.  PAUT Scans for Indication in C5 Weld O to N Location, Indicative of Slag 
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Figure 7.1.2.3-8.  PAUT Scans for Linear Indication in C5 Weld O to P Location, Indicative of Lack 
of Fusion 
NESC Request No.: TI-13-00852 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report
Document #: 
NESCP-RP-
13-00852 
Version: 
1.1 
Title:
Evaluation of Agency Non-code LPVs 
Page #: 
56 of 193 
Figure 7.1.2.3-9.  PAUT Scans for Visible Crack in Outer Layer of V0256 
Observations and Conclusions 
The demonstration by Davis NDE of the Olympus Omniscan PAUT equipment provided insight 
into the overall equipment operation and capabilities, as well as the weld scanning techniques.  
The amount of data and detail observed using the PAUT equipment far exceeded the amount of 
information available from the radiography or conventional UT in the specific weld areas 
inspected.  The PAUT data shown in this report are only a small sample (screen view snapshots) 
of the data recorded during the V0256 weld inspection demonstration.  
• No direct conclusions can be made from the comparison of PAUT data with radiography
or conventional UT data on Vessel V0256 since there were few indications for
comparison and there were no fully characterized flaws within the weld volumes that
could be used for a quantifiable comparison.  The PAUT weld scans of vessel V0256
were the most expedient means of obtaining PAUT data at the time to better understand
the inspection technique and to assess general equipment capabilities.  Many of the
indications reported by Davis NDE in Tables 7.1.2.3-1 and 7.1.2.3-2 simply cannot be
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confirmed at this time since radiography revealed no indications at these locations and no 
weld excavations have been performed. 
• The PAUT technique appears to offer an immediate improvement over conventional UT
inspection in the level of detail that can be observed for solid head to layered shell weld
inspection.  Although radiography and conventional UT could be used for inspection of
the head-to-shell weld, PAUT offers the benefit of being a nonintrusive technique while
providing beam steering capability to more fully investigate the area of interest, which is
not available with conventional UT.  (Beam steering refers to the PAUT capability to
shift the phase of the signals from the pulser array, taking advantage of constructive and
destructive wave interference and, in essence, directing (steering) the sound beam to
specific areas of interest within the weld volume.  Conventional UT does not provide this
capability since only a single pulser-receiver is used.)
• The PAUT data appear to distinguish between indications of individual layers and
indications in the weld volume.  Further assessment will be needed to determine how
defect orientation, size, and location (especially with respect to the shell layers) will
affect capability and probability of flaw detection.
• The additional data presentations available with PAUT but not with conventional UT—
the “S” and “B” scan data formats—allow a far more intuitive presentation of the weld
volume and facilitate improved characterization and evaluation of flaw data.  The
improved data visualization in combination with the beam steering capability offers a
powerful tool for weld inspection and assessment.
• The advantage that PAUT offers over conventional UT is somewhat offset by the
additional training, interpretation skill required by the NDE specialist, and initial cost of
the PAUT equipment.  Individual assessment is required to determine whether PAUT
benefits outweigh the associated cost especially in cases where other existing NDE
techniques are already being employed with some success.
• PAUT does not provide a means of inspecting the longitudinal welds within a layered
vessel other than those layers that are physically accessible (i.e., the outer shell and
sometimes the inner shell) as the layer gaps are reflective surfaces and preclude passage
of sound waves.  However, PAUT may provide a means of inspecting a short distance
into the layers immediately adjacent to the full penetration welds.  Additional evaluation
will be necessary to determine how far inspection capability extends into the layers, if at
all, and how the weld geometry affects the probability of flaw detection.
• The Olympus Omniscan equipment provides capability to digitally store all equipment
parameters and data from the inspection.  Once the welds are scanned, the resulting data
files can be reviewed at any time, and these data files provide a permanent record of the
inspection.  These data files also facilitate collaboration with others when evaluating and
interpreting the inspection data.
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• PAUT requires a relatively flat weld crown to provide better coupling between the weld
surface and the ultrasonic transducer.  This requires time and effort to prepare welds,
especially on larger vessels, but once the weld surfaces are properly prepared subsequent
PAUT inspections can be performed without further weld preparation.
• Other, more general benefits of PAUT include:
o PAUT can be performed with the vessel in service (on-stream), minimizing
impact to ongoing operations.
o Reduced vessel downtime in cases where PAUT is used in lieu of intrusive vessel
inspection techniques.  The reduced downtime can be substantial for vessels
containing cryogens, propellants, and high purity media due to both the pre-
inspection and post-inspection activities required to open the vessel, inspect it,
and return it to service (e.g., pre-inspection warming and the rendering of
cryogenic and propellant vessels inert; post-inspection leak check, cleaning,
sampling, inerting, and reestablishing media purity levels).
o No personnel exclusion zones (as are required for radiography) are necessary for
PAUT, allowing inspections to be performed during regular working hours and
concurrent with other unrelated but ongoing operations.  RT exclusion zones can
be particularly intrusive to other operations when using a cobalt source, which
would be necessary for radiography of the many heavy walled vessels at MSFC
that are in close proximity to inhabited buildings and test facilities.  All costs and
benefits of each inspection method must be included in analyses, including such
items as cost of NASA or NASA contractor personnel who may need to work
overtime to monitor after hours operations.
Future Work 
Additional work is planned to further explore the capabilities of PAUT for inspection of LPVs.  
The PAUT work that initially began as a collaborative effort between SSC, MSFC, and GRC 
now includes participation by the NESC.  
A statement of work (SOW) was developed in late FY13 to further investigate and better 
quantify the capabilities and limitations of PAUT for detecting flaws in LPVs.  The SOW the 
and associated drawing were provided to Davis NDE to obtain a cost estimate to build a 
performance demonstration block that will simulate a layered vessel full penetration weld and 
will include a number of induced flaws with prescribed size, orientation, and location.  ASME 
Code Case 2235 is being used as a basis for flaw size for the demonstration block and has been 
validated by the MSFC Material Laboratory personnel as an acceptable approach for this effort.  
In addition, ASME Section VIII Div I Part ULW [ref. 1] will be used as the basis for 
construction of the layered demonstration block.  The primary objectives of this work will be to: 
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• Further quantify the capability of PAUT to characterize known flaws in the weld volume
(accuracy of flaw sizing and locating within the weld volume) and identify variables
associated with flaw characterization.
• Investigate the effect of layer gap reflections in the area adjacent to the full penetration
weld region and the ability of PAUT to distinguish layer gaps (layer tip reflections) from
actual flaw indications in the weld volume.
• Determine whether PAUT can detect flaws that occur in the layers and do not continue
into the circumferential weld, and if so, assess how far into the layers flaws can be
detected.
• Further the development of weld scanning techniques, procedures, and scan plans for
PAUT inspection of head-to-shell and shell-to-shell full penetration welds.
The start date for this follow-on work with Davis NDE is planned for mid-FY14.  Additional 
work may be required beyond this planned effort to further assess PAUT capabilities, to address 
specific problem areas that are identified or to quantify the probability of flaw detection. 
Additional efforts to develop a calibration block for PAUT evaluation was included as part of 
Task 2 of this assessment.  The results from this activity are described in Section 7.2.5. 
7.1.3 External User Survey 
In addition to the internal survey of NASA Centers, select external users of non-code LPVs were 
contacted and questioned about their approaches to operating, inspecting, and maintaining these 
vessels.  To assist in this external user survey, a nationally recognized consultant on these 
vessels, Dr. Maan Jawad, was added to the assessment.  Dr. Jawad previously worked with a 
company that designed, fabricated, and repaired LPVs.  He also has served extensively in 
numerous roles on the ASME Codes Committees responsible for the development and approval 
of codes for pressure vessels, including LPVs.  As such, he had numerous contacts in industry 
where these vessels are in use.  Additionally, he was able to provide general background 
information on the procedures for non-code commercial LPV certification and inspection.  
In addition to the contacts provided by Dr. Jawad, several other contacts for additional industrial 
and government facility users of these vessels were gathered.  In all, responses from seven 
different external LPV users were received.  Most agreed to provide information only on the 
condition that their company names would not be included in the final report.  Most of the 
external users surveyed were in the chemical processing industry, although some were in 
aerospace.  In general, the LPVs used in the chemical processing industry were operated under 
significantly different conditions from those within NASA.  They typically contained corrosive 
products and were operated at elevated temperatures.  The vessels in use at aerospace facilities 
were operated under similar conditions to NASA LPVs, storing high-pressure noncorrosive gases 
and used under ambient temperature conditions but at times subject to low temperatures 
associated with blowdown operations or unusual weather conditions. 
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In the following section, some general information regarding the certification and inspection 
procedures for non-code LPVs is provided.  Then, some additional insight from the specific 
external users contacted in this survey is also provided. 
7.1.3.1 General Procedures for Commercial Non-ASME Stamped LPVs 
7.1.3.1.1 Certification 
The rules for layered vessels were incorporated in the Sections VIII-1 and VIII-2 in 1978.  Prior 
to that time, layered vessels were built in accordance with the manufacturer’s in-house standards. 
Each manufacturer had its own construction standard.  The design of these layered vessels was, 
as much as possible, in general accordance with VIII-1 [ref. 1].  Because of these variations from 
BPVC requirements, these layered vessels could not be put into service in states requiring code 
construction without first registering them with the state jurisdiction where the vessel was to 
operate.  Jurisdictional requirements can vary greatly from state to state.  However, the general 
registration process proceeds along the following lines: 
• The manufacturer contacts the Chief Boiler Inspector of the state where the layered
vessel is to operate and requests a “state special.”
• The “state special” certificate is issued by the Board on Boilers and Pressure Vessels for
that state.  The Board consists of members who are normally appointed by the Governor
and approved by the senate of that state.  The board members represent various “interest”
segments within the state and usually include representatives from manufacturing,
academia, users, labor unions, insurance companies, technical consultants, etc.
• The manufacturer submits a package to the Board prior to their meeting (they typically
meet four times a year) consisting of the following:
o Design report showing the required thicknesses of various components such as
heads, shell, nozzles, skirt, etc.
o Manufacturing drawings showing materials used and details of construction.
o Welding details and procedures in accordance with Section IX of the ASME
BPVC.
o NDE testing in accordance with Section V of the ASME Code.
o Hydrotest information and procedures.
o Any other pertinent information.
• The manufacturer’s request is discussed at one of the meetings of the Board.
Representatives from the manufacturer (typically, the chief engineer and chief
metallurgist) are normally present at the meeting to answer any questions the Board may
have.
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• The Board usually approves the registration request with additional requirements.  These
additional requirements vary greatly from state to state and may include changing the
factor of safety, imposing additional fabrication and or testing requirements, etc.
• The Board issues a “State Special” certificate with a registration number.  This number
will be stamped on the vessel nameplate prior to operating the vessel.
7.1.3.1.2 In-Service Inspection 
Commercial layered vessels are inspected during routine shut downs (normally every 2 to  
5 years).  For inspection guidance, the chemical industry normally follows the rules of the 
National Board Inspection Code (NBIC) [ref. 47], and the petroleum industry follows the rules of 
API 579 [ref. 32], although neither of these standards contains guidance specific to LPVs.  Some 
large companies have their own proprietary in-house standards to supplement the standards 
mentioned above.  Some of the features of layered vessels that are taken into consideration in the 
in-service inspection program in commercial applications are listed here. 
• Vent holes:  Vent holes are considered one of the most important safety features of
layered vessels.  Any cracks that occur in the inner shell during operation will result in
leakage through the vent holes, which is detectable in principle by a number of different
means.
o Many companies, and especially those producing fertilizer, routinely monitor the
depth of vent holes during planned shutdown to make sure they are not plugged
with product (such as carbamate, which changes from liquid to solid immediately
upon exposure to atmospheric pressure).
o Many companies, especially those using lethal gases, connect all vent holes to a
piping system that use sniffers, vacuum sensors, and pressure sensors to detect
leaks caused by cracking of the inner shell.
• Residual stresses in circumferential welds:  The ASME BPVC requires carbon steel
welds greater than 1 ½ inches in thickness to be post-weld heat treated (PWHT) in solid
wall construction.  Heat treatment accomplishes two purposes.  The first is to temper the
welds, and the second is to reduce fabrication residual stresses.  Such a requirement for
PWHT is not mandated for layered construction.  Thus, the circumferential thick welds
in layered construction tend to have high hardness and high residual stresses, both of
which are detrimental to the welds due to the possibility of both SCC and fatigue.
Accordingly, the inside and outside of these welds are routinely dye-penetrant examined
or magnetic-particle inspected during scheduled shutdowns to detect any possible cracks.
7.1.3.2 Responses from Specific External LPV Users 
Three companies were contacted regarding their procedure for inspecting layered vessels.  The 
information received is general in nature, with no specifics.  This was to be expected due to 
liability issues.  Two of the companies used the NBIC, which is for general guidance only.   
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API 579 was also mentioned as a reference, although API 579 does not contain specific rules for 
layered vessels.  
Company A (chemical plant in Tennessee) 
The company does not have in-house rules for inspection, repair, and alteration.  The company 
follows the NBIC and state rules for operations. 
• The company uses NBIC as a basis for all of their pressure-vessel inspection, repair, and
alterations.
• The company supplements NBIC rules with the more rigorous rules of API 579 (when
needed), subject to the state jurisdictional approval.
o API 579 allows operation with full pressure and 90% remaining wall thickness
(10% general corrosion) with appropriate NDE testing.
o API 579 allows temporary operation of a vessel with a crack.  The company uses
very conservative KIc and crack-growth values and thorough NDE examination in
order to allow a vessel to operate with a flaw until a scheduled shutdown, during
which the flaw is removed and repaired.
Company B (refinery in California) 
• The company does not have in-house rules for inspection, repair, and alteration but rather
follows the NBIC, API 579, and state rules for operations.
• All inspection is done by the inspection department of the company in accordance with
the NBIC.
• If the NBIC does not have rules that address a specific problem, then the inspection
department contacts the engineering department for an evaluation using the rules in
API 579.
• API 579 has three levels of evaluation.  Level 1 is the most comprehensive, and level 3 is
the least.  The state jurisdiction requires that all repairs and alterations made in
accordance with level 1 must be approved by the Chief Boiler Inspector of the state prior
to implementation.
Company C (polyethylene and polypropylene plant in Texas) 
• The company uses layered vessels when a process is highly corrosive and the stainless
steel inner shell is needed for protection, and the vent holes are needed for leak detection.
• Because of the corrosive environment, the company uses AE for monitoring the layered
vessels, which is performed by Stress Engineering (of Houston, Texas) during a hydrotest
using a factor of 1.1 on operational pressure.
• The company encounters more problems with cracking when the layers are made of high-
strength steel and the heads of lower strength steel.
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• When cracking is detected, it is at the head-to-shell junction.
• The company inspects the layered vessels inside and out during normal shutdowns.
• The company does not normally use the NBIC since Texas is a non-code state.
Based on the above information, it can be concluded that the commercial segment uses available 
NDE and inspection tools.  No particular new methodology or procedure has been developed for 
inspecting and monitoring layered vessels.  However, these vessels are regularly inspected 
during planned shutdowns at intervals of 2 to 5 years. 
Two other chemical companies provided responses.  One noted that their vessels have jackets, 
which is where they have the most problems with cracking due to differential thermal expansion 
at elevated temperatures.  Another company noted that they had undergone a process to rerate 
their LPVs to operate at higher pressures a number of years ago.  This was based on results from 
analysis and MAE testing under hydrostatic proof testing.  Unfortunately, they were not able to 
provide any details of the analysis or test results.  Otherwise, both companies reported the use of 
similar inspection methods, including visual inspection, inspection of vent holes, and limited UT. 
Two aerospace LPV users (one commercial company and one government facility) provided 
responses.  Both indicated that their vessels were used for high-pressure, noncorrosive gases at 
ambient operating temperatures similar to NASA LPVs.  Both also indicated that hydrostatic 
proof testing was used as part of the initial certification of the vessels.  They also used visual 
inspections, UT, and radiography during initial certification.  One user noted that their vessels 
were last certified for an additional operating period of 20 years and were approaching the end of 
this certification.  They stated that they were unsure of what they would do to recertify the 
vessels for continued operation and were interested in the results from this assessment and 
follow-on testing to help in their decisions for recertification.  Neither user was doing any 
materials testing work or evaluating any new NDE methods for these vessels, although one noted 
that they had discussed evaluating the applicability of PAUT. 
7.1.3.3 Summary of Key Points from External User Survey 
Although the external review consisted of contact with a limited number of commercial LPV 
users, no significant new approaches to inspection, analysis, and testing of these vessels were 
identified, nor were any efforts to develop materials property databases for the materials used in 
these older vessels.  The commercial companies were largely applying hydrostatic proof testing 
and conventional NDE inspection methods such as visual inspection, MT, conventional UT, and 
radiography.  The chemical industry performs detailed inspections of these vessels at regularly 
scheduled plant shutdowns every 2 to 5 years.  Most admitted that they felt these methods were 
inadequate for key areas of the vessels such as the layered shells and the associated welds and 
the circumferential full penetration welds.  As a result, most companies contacted were very 
interested in the results of this NESC assessment and any follow-on testing and highlighted the 
need to have an established standard or procedure for inspection and certification of these 
vessels. 
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7.1.4 Risk Assessment for Different LPV Regions 
Based on the information obtained in Task 1, the assessment team attempted to identify the 
highest risk operating conditions or regions of NASA LPVs.  The purpose of this activity was to 
provide a basis for selection of additional efforts to be funded in Task 2, as well as to provide a 
basis for prioritizing the final team recommendations to be incorporated in this report.  
Information considered included the review of previous LPV catastrophic failures, as well as 
reports of commonly reported noncatastrophic damage; review of how NASA LPVs are 
operated, inspected and maintained in comparison with those in industry and, in particular, in 
comparison with those that have catastrophically failed; and the limitations of available materials 
property data, structural analysis methods, and NDE techniques as applied to LPVs. 
Table 7.1.4-1 provides a summary of the high-risk LPV regions or operating conditions that were 
identified by this assessment team, along with the reasons for the high risk and potential actions 
to understand and/or mitigate the risk.  The highest risk for NASA LPVs that was identified was 
the operation of the LPVs below the ductile-brittle transition temperature (i.e., NDT).  The 
reason for this concern is that operation below the NDT can result in the propagation of any 
existing cracks by a lower energy brittle fracture mode resulting in an increased potential for 
catastrophic failure.  Although the LPVs are typically operated above the MDMT that is either 
cited on the nameplate of the vessel or on the design drawings, as noted previously the MDMT 
values determined for these older, non-code LPVs were generally based on strength only and did 
not account for brittle fracture at lower temperatures of –20°F or greater.  Some LPVs with lower 
nameplate MDMTs were keyhole impact tested consistent with BPVC requirements at the time, 
although this is not a code-accepted impact test method today.  Further, data on the NDT for 
materials used in these vessels are not available.  Thus, it is possible that some NASA LPVs are 
being used at temperatures near or below the NDT.  To address this risk, characterization of the 
toughness and NDT is needed for all materials in NASA LPVs, including head, shell, weld, and 
weld HAZ materials.  Measurements of these parameters from multiple vessels are needed to 
establish bounding NDT values that can be utilized to define more appropriate MDMT values for 
these NASA LPVs.  Once the MDMT values are established, then operations can be restricted to 
ambient temperatures above these limits, or environmental controls such as enclosures or heaters 
can be utilized to maintain temperatures above these limits when ambient temperatures are too 
low.  Alternatively, a reduction in operating pressure can be used to allow lower temperature 
operation in accordance with ASME BPVC.  It should be noted that data showing previous safe 
operations of these vessels at lower temperatures may be beneficial.  However, this does not 
fully mitigate this risk since, if new cracks have formed or cracks have propagated to critical 
sizes in the interval since the last exposure, then the risk of brittle fracture can exist for the next 
exposure to similar low temperatures. 
The next high-risk region of NASA LPVs that was identified was that of the circumferential full 
penetration welds at either the head-to-shell, or shell-to-shell junctions of these vessels.  This 
was cited to be of high risk because of the history of failures that have initiated in these areas, 
along with the current lack of capability to inspect this region.  An additional concern is the lack 
of knowledge as to the stress state of this region, since these welds are not stress relieved in the 
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fabrication process.  With respect to the previous non-Agency failures relative to the NASA 
LPVs, it is noted that they occurred in vessels operating at higher temperatures with corrosive 
products, and there may have been environmental influences that contributed to the failures that 
are not applicable to NASA vessels.  While possibly enhancing corrosion, however, the elevated 
temperatures reduce the risk seen due to low-temperature operation at NASA.  To help mitigate 
risks associated with this region, analytical methods to predict the weld residual stress, as well as 
further predict stress states and critical initial flaw sizes, are needed.  Evaluation and, if possible, 
validation of NDE methods to inspect this region are also needed.  PAUT has shown some initial 
promise, and for this reason was included as one of the funded activities in Task 2.  The 
capabilities of radiographic and AE methods for this regions need to be determined also.  
Alternatively, proof test logic may be applicable to reduce risk in this region. 
The shell regions present elevated levels of risk in large part because of the lack of ability to 
inspect them except for the outer and inner (when internal access is available) layers.  
Additionally, one of the most common locations where cracks have been detected is in the inner 
or outer shell layers adjacent to the circumferential welds.  This is anecdotally attributed to 
complex stress states, including bending where the head transitions into the shell though this 
longitudinal bending fails to explain longitudinal cracks that would normally be caused by 
circumferential stresses.  However, currently available analysis models and materials property 
data are inadequate to provide detailed information on the stress states.  The longitudinal welds 
in these layers are also a concern due to the lack of ability to inspect them and the varying degree 
to which they were inspected when initially fabricated.  As with other high-risk areas, improved 
materials property data and analysis methods are needed to better understand the risk and 
estimate critical flaw sizes.  AE is a potential technique for detecting propagating flaws in these 
regions, but this method needs to be further evaluated and, if possible, validated.  Low-frequency 
electromagnetic NDE methods should also be evaluated for flaw detection capabilities in the 
shell regions.   
Nozzles and nozzle welds are areas of increased risk, especially those through the shell sections.  
While some UT methods have been developed for nozzles and nozzle welds through the 
monolithic heads, these have not been fully validated and have not been evaluated for nozzles 
through the shell sections.  Again, improved analysis capabilities are needed to better understand 
the risk, and development and validation of NDE methods such as UT, AE, or PAUT are needed 
to mitigate risks. 
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Table 7.1.4-1.  LPV Regions or Operating Conditions that Present the Highest Risk for Potential 
Failure for NASA Non-Code LPVs 
LPV Region or Operating 
Condition Reasons for Elevated Risk 
Potential Actions to 
Understand and/or 
Mitigate Risk 
1. Operation of vessels
below ductile-brittle 
transition temperature 
(i.e., NDT). 
* Use of pressure vessels
below NDT can lead to 
brittle fracture, resulting in 
catastrophic vessel failure. 
* NDT has not been
established for head, shell, 
and weld materials in 
NASA LPVs. 
* NASA LPVs are used at
ambient temperature 
conditions year round, 
which even in southern 
locations can be quite cold. 
* Some NASA LPVs are
used in blowdown 
operational modes, which 
result in reduced vessel 
temperatures. 
* Characterize NDTs for
head, shell, nozzle, and 
weld materials in NASA 
LPVs (including variability 
across multiple vessels). 
* Ensure MDMT is
appropriately established 
relative to the measured 
NDT and restrict operation 
to temperatures above 
established MDMT. 
* Build enclosures with
temperature control around 
vessels or utilize heating 
pads around vessels that 
must be operated when 
ambient temperatures are 
below established MDMT, 
or when operational 
conditions such as 
blowdown could result in 
such temperatures. 
* Reduce operating
pressures to correspond to 
reduced operating 
temperatures in accordance 
with established procedures, 
such as the use of Figure 
UCS-66.1 of the ASME 
Section VIII, Division 1 
BPVC [ref. 1]. 
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LPV Region or Operating 
Condition Reasons for Elevated Risk 
Potential Actions to 
Understand and/or 
Mitigate Risk 
2. Circumferential full
penetration head-to-shell or 
shell-to-shell welds. 
* Known catastrophic
vessel failures originated at 
head-to-shell or shell-to-
shell welds.  Examples are 
the LPV failures at 
Cartagena, Colombia (shell-
to-shell weld failure) and 
Kansas (head-to-shell 
failure).  Environmental 
effects also played a part in 
these failures. 
* No current validated
NDE methods exist to 
provide adequate inspection 
for these welds. 
* Welds are not stress
relieved, resulting in 
unknown residual stress 
states. 
* Current lack of materials
properties and analysis 
techniques inadequate to 
characterize stress states 
and determine critical initial 
flaw sizes. 
* Evaluate and, if possible,
validate PAUT, AE, and/or 
radiographic methods for 
inspection of these welds. 
* Perform external surface
inspections (MT/PT). 
* Reduce inspection
intervals for aging vessels. 
* Investigate analysis
methods for determination 
of residual stresses. 
* Develop materials
property database. 
* Develop and validate
analytical techniques to 
assess stress states, fatigue 
crack growth, and critical 
initial flaw sizes at these 
welds. 
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LPV Region or Operating 
Condition Reasons for Elevated Risk 
Potential Actions to 
Understand and/or 
Mitigate Risk 
3. Shell sections near head-
to-shell welds 
* Most common flaws
found and repaired in these 
vessels are cracks in outer 
and inner shell layers near 
or intersecting head-to-shell 
welds, although some flaws 
have been detected at this 
region in intermediate 
layers especially where the 
longitudinal welds intersect 
the circumferential weld. 
* Anecdotally attributed to
complex stress states in this 
region that includes bending 
at this transition from head 
to shell, although current 
limited materials properties 
and analysis techniques are 
inadequate to provide 
detailed stress information. 
* Cracks at this location
only observed directly at 
outer and inner (when 
accessible) layers.  When 
repairs are made, additional 
cracks in interior layers 
adjacent to repaired layer 
have been found.  Due to 
lack of NDE methods 
capable of inspecting 
interior layers, it is 
unknown whether similar 
cracks may exist in interior 
layers away from the 
repaired area, although 
some cracks have been 
detected in intermediate 
layers using RT. 
* Develop materials
property database. 
* Develop and validate
analytical techniques to 
assess stress states, fatigue 
crack growth, and critical 
initial flaw sizes at these 
locations. 
* Develop improved non-
traditional NDE methods 
for inspecting interior shell 
layer when manways are 
not present to allow interior 
access to the inner layer. 
* Investigate capability of
AE methods for detecting 
crack propagation in 
interior layers. 
* Investigate very low
frequency electromagnetic 
NDE methods for detecting 
cracks within interior 
layers. 
* Evaluate and, if possible,
validate radiographic 
methods for inspection of 
these regions. 
* Reduce operating
pressure (also account for 
low operating temperatures 
if below MDMT). 
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LPV Region or Operating 
Condition Reasons for Elevated Risk 
Potential Actions to 
Understand and/or 
Mitigate Risk 
4. Longitudinal welds in
shell sections (especially at 
intersection with 
circumferential welds). 
* No current validated
NDE methods for 
inspecting these welds other 
than on outer layer (and 
inner layer if internal access 
is available), although RT 
methods have been 
successful at detecting some 
flaws. 
* Degree of NDE
inspection of these welds at 
time of fabrication is 
unknown or varied by 
manufacturer, and typically 
was not consistent with 
current code requirements.  
In some cases, RT 
inspection of inner shell 
longitudinal weld was 
performed, but no 
inspection of intermediate 
layer longitudinal welds. 
* Limited knowledge of
materials properties, as 
constructed structural 
configuration (i.e., size of 
layer gaps, etc.), and 
analysis techniques 
inadequate to provide 
detailed stress analysis and 
establish initial flaw sizes 
(other than those assumed 
by the code) as well as 
critical flaw sizes. 
* Develop materials
property database. 
* Develop and validate
analytical techniques to 
assess stress states, fatigue 
crack growth, and critical 
initial flaw sizes at these 
locations. 
* Investigate capability of
AE methods for detecting 
crack propagation in 
longitudinal welds of 
interior layers. 
* Investigate analysis of
flaw tolerance within the 
layered shell and means for 
detecting overstress of outer 
shell via Pi Tape, 
photogrammetry, or other 
means. 
* Investigate very low
frequency electromagnetic 
NDE methods for detecting 
cracks within longitudinal 
welds of interior layers. 
* Reduce operating
pressure (also account for 
low operating temperatures 
if below MDMT). 
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LPV Region or Operating 
Condition Reasons for Elevated Risk 
Potential Actions to 
Understand and/or 
Mitigate Risk 
5. Drain nozzles or other
penetrations through shells 
and associated welds. 
* No current validated
NDE methods to provide 
adequate inspection for 
these welds. 
* Welds not stress relieved
resulting in unknown 
residual stress states. 
* Current lack of materials
properties and analysis 
techniques inadequate to 
characterize stress states 
and determine critical initial 
flaw sizes. 
* Cross-bore openings are
areas of stress 
concentrations and, thus, 
would have elevated stress 
intensity factors for cracks 
occurring in these regions. 
* Most likely sites for
failure during burst tests 
* Greatest potential for
adiabatic cooling and 
operation below MDMT. 
* Develop NDE methods
as cited above for 
identification of defects. 
* Reduce inspection
intervals for aging vessels. 
* Develop materials
property database. 
* Develop and validate
analytical techniques to 
assess stress states 
(including residual 
stresses), fatigue crack 
growth, and critical initial 
flaw sizes at these welds. 
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LPV Region or Operating 
Condition Reasons for Elevated Risk 
Potential Actions to 
Understand and/or 
Mitigate Risk 
6. Shell sections in parent
materials away from welds 
* Recent discovery of
cracks in exterior layer of 
KSC vessels at locations 
remote from welds – 
unknown what factors 
contributed to occurrence of 
these cracks. 
* No current validated
NDE methods for 
inspecting regions other 
than on outer layer and 
inner layer if internal access 
is available. 
* Lack of materials
properties, as constructed 
structural configuration 
(i.e., size of layer gaps. 
etc.), and analysis 
techniques inadequate to 
provide detailed stress 
analysis and establish initial 
critical flaw sizes. 
* Further develop materials
property database. 
* Develop and validate
analytical techniques to 
assess stress states, fatigue 
crack growth, and critical 
initial flaw sizes at these 
locations. 
* Investigate capability of
AE methods for detecting 
crack propagation in 
interior shell layers. 
* Investigate very low
frequency electromagnetic 
NDE methods for detecting 
cracks within interior shell 
layers. 
* Investigate analysis of
flaw tolerance within the 
layered shell and means for 
detecting overstress of outer 
shell via Pi Tape or 
photogrammetry or other 
means. 
* Reduce operating
pressure (also account for 
low operating temperatures 
if below MDMT). 
Regions within LPVs that were considered to be of less risk were also identified.  These are 
summarized in Table 7.1.4-2 with the basis for this designation along with residual risk 
considerations and possible risk mitigations. 
NESC Request No.: TI-13-00852 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report
Document #: 
NESCP-RP-
13-00852 
Version: 
1.1 
Title:
Evaluation of Agency Non-code LPVs 
Page #: 
72 of 193 
Table 7.1.4-2.  LPV Regions or Operating Conditions with Lower Risk for Potential Failure for 
NASA Non-Code LPVs 
LPV Region or Operating 
Condition Reasons for Lower Risk 
Residual Risks and 
Potential Methods to 
Mitigate 
1. Monolithic vessel heads
(other than when operating 
at temperatures below 
MDMT or at or near head-
to-shell welds). 
* While what is known of
material fracture properties 
in this region is not 
encouraging, there is better 
capability of NDE methods 
for inspection of monolithic 
vessel heads, although NDE 
methods are not currently 
and consistently used to 
regularly inspect acreage of 
heads. 
* Analysis methods more
adequate for predicting 
stress states and estab-
lishing initial critical flaw 
sizes in monolithic heads. 
* Material properties not
well characterized for head 
materials – further develop 
materials property database. 
* Quality of thick head
materials likely less than 
thin shell materials – 
develop materials property 
database, ensure critical 
initial flaw sizes established 
and validated inspection 
techniques used to ensure 
flaws that exceed critical 
initial flaw size are not 
present. 
2. Welds at through-head
nozzles or other 
penetrations. 
* Available NDE methods
for inspecting these welds. 
* Analysis methods more
adequate for predicting 
stress states and 
establishing initial critical 
flaw sizes. 
* Material properties not
well characterized for weld 
materials – develop 
materials property database 
* Different NDE
methods/procedures in use 
at different Centers – 
determine best approach 
and standardize these 
inspections across the 
Agency. 
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LPV Region or Operating 
Condition Reasons for Lower Risk 
Residual Risks and 
Potential Methods to 
Mitigate 
3. Corrosion on vessel
interior. 
* Unlike LPVs used in
industry that contain 
corrosive products and 
operate at elevated 
temperatures, NASA LPVs 
contain high-pressure gases 
at ambient temperatures and 
are at low risk for internal 
corrosion. 
* For vessels with internal
access, internal corrosion is 
readily detected and can be 
abated. 
* Difficult to inspect
interior of vessels with no 
internal access.  Use 
borescopes and collapsible 
UT probes on best effort 
basis.  
4. Corrosion on vessel
exterior. 
* Proper use of protective
paints and coatings can 
minimize occurrence.  
* Readily detectable and
can be abated. 
* Maintenance and
inspection protocols vary 
from Center to Center – 
develop standardized 
process and ensure adequate 
funds available to inspect 
for exterior corrosion and 
apply protective coatings to 
minimize corrosion. 
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LPV Region or Operating 
Condition Reasons for Lower Risk 
Residual Risks and 
Potential Methods to 
Mitigate 
5. Vent holes. * Safety feature to detect
cracks in internal layers 
resulting in product loss 
through vent holes. 
* Occurrence of corrosion
in the vent hole resulting in 
a plugged vent hole, 
preventing detection of 
internal layer cracks – 
inspect vent holes to ensure 
no blockage. 
* Provides potential path
for moisture intrusion to 
layers, resulting in 
corrosion – evaluate and 
document any corrosion in 
layers around vent holes 
during vessel sectioning. 
* Periodic clean-out of vent
holes, and protection from 
moisture without creating a 
pressure seal. 
7.2 Task 2 – Limited Scope Testing and Analysis 
As a result of the information and data gathered in Task 1, a number of limited scope testing and 
analysis activities were identified for support as part of Task 2.  The purpose of these activities 
was to provide additional data to better formulate the final recommendations for this report.  
Additionally, these efforts provided a mechanism to augment some of the Center-led activities 
that were already ongoing.  In addition to the OSMA funds that were provided for this NESC 
assessment, some additional NESC funds available at the end of the fiscal year were added to 
increase the number and scope of the Task 2 activities supported.  The following Task 2 efforts 
were conducted and are summarized in the following sections: 
• Characterization of material toughness transition temperature for specimens from head,
inner shell, and shell layer materials.
• Evaluation of the toughness of different microstructural regions of LPV welds (e.g., weld,
fusion zone, heat-affected zone, etc.).
• Weld residual stress (WRS) modeling of LPVs.
• Evaluation of photogrammetric methods for measurement of LPV deformation and
potential flaw detection.
• Evaluation of PAUT methods for inspecting head-to-shell welds.
• AE laboratory specimen design.
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7.2.1 LPV Material Evaluations Conducted at MSFC 
This section describes current materials testing and analysis performed at MSFC related to this 
NESC LPV non-code vessel assessment.  Although other LPV related characterization efforts 
independent of this NESC assessment are ongoing at MSFC, the following tasks were defined 
expressly as a part of this assessment effort: 
• Task 1: Determine the toughness transition reference temperature T0 per ASTM
E1921-13 for A225 head material.
• Task 2: Determine the toughness transition reference temperature T0 per ASTM
E 1921-13 for cylindrical shell base metals.
• Task 3: Investigate the LPV weld regions microstructurally to develop recommended test
methodologies for future evaluation.
A complete list of terminology and variables used in these sections is provided in Table 7.2.1-1 
to assist the reader. 
Table 7.2.1-1.  Definition of Terms Specific to LPV Materials Testing Discussed in this Section 
Term Definition 
1T Syntax used to represent fracture toughness specimen dimensions; general 
form is nT, where the specimen thickness is n inches 
a Crack size (length), a lineal measure of the principal planar dimension of a 
crack 
ASTM E 399-12 “Standard Test Method for Linear-Elastic Plane-Strain Fracture Toughness 
KIC of Metallic Materials” 
ASTM E 1820-11 “Standard Test Method for Measurement of Fracture Toughness” 
ASTM E 1921-13 “Standard Test Method for Determination of Reference Temperature, T0, for 
Ferritic Steels in the Transition Range;” referred to as the Master Curve 
method 
b0 The initial remaining ligament, the distance from the crack tip to the back face 
of the specimen; a critical parameter for determining crack tip constraint 
B0 Full thickness of a fracture toughness specimen, ignoring side grooves if 
present 
C Used to designate the orientation of the crack or applied load for a toughness 
test specimen, indicating the circumferential direction around a pressure 
vessel  
Compliance Used for measuring crack length during fracture toughness testing; the ratio of 
specimen displacement increment to applied force increment (the inverse of 
specimen stiffness) 
C(T) Compact-tension specimen, a single-edge notched and fatigue cracked plate 
loaded in tension and used for fracture toughness tests 
∆a Change in specimen crack length during test, in this context, due to stable 
tearing 
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Term Definition 
δj  Kronecker delta from ASTM E 1921-13 analysis, equal to 1 if the datum is 
valid or 0 if the datum is a substitute value related statistical censoring of 
invalid test results 
E Elastic modulus 
FCC Face-centered cubic crystal system, the only steel crystalline structure to 
which ASTM E 1921-13 is directly applicable 
ICP Inductively coupled plasma, a quantitative chemistry technique for 
determining chemical composition 
JC Fracture toughness test result measuring the energy of fracture, taken as the 
point of cleavage instability prior to the onset of significant stable tearing 
crack extension, and meeting validity requirements of ASTM E1820-11 
JIC Fracture toughness test result measuring the energy of fracture, defined at an 
average of 0.008 inches of stable, ductile crack extension, and meeting 
validity requirements of ASTM E1820-11 
KIC Fracture toughness test result for linear-elastic measure of fracture toughness 
and meeting validity requirements of ASTM E399 
KJC Fracture toughness test result obtained by converting a JC value to a linear-
elastic equivalent stress intensity factor  
KJc(1T) Fracture toughness test result obtained by adjusting a KJC value to an 
equivalent value from a specimen of size 1T, accounts for statistical size 
effects on cleavage and used as an input to the T0 analysis 
KJC(Limit) Maximum allowed KJC capacity of a specimen that will maintain a condition 
of high crack-front constraint at fracture based on specimen size; test results 
exceeding this limit must be statistically censored in order to be included in 
the ASTM E 1921-13 T0 analysis 
KJ∆a Value of KJ at the crack extension limit; tests that terminate in cleavage in 
which slow stable crack growth exceeds the smaller crack extension limit of 
either 0.05b0 or 0.040 in. must be statistically censored to be used in the 
ASTM E 1921-13 T0 analysis by substituting this value for KJC 
L Used for designating the orientation of the crack or applied load for a 
toughness test specimen, indicating the material longitudinal direction or 
pressure vessel longitudinal axis 
M Used for designating the orientation of the crack or applied load for a 
toughness test specimen, indicating the pressure vessel meridional axis for 
hemispherical heads 
R Used for designating the orientation of the crack or applied load for a 
toughness test specimen, indicating the pressure vessel radial axis 
RTNDT An index temperature determined from Charpy V-notch and nil-ductility 
temperature data that provides conservative bounding values of fracture 
toughness versus temperature 
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Term Definition 
RTT0 A Master Curve-based index temperature determined from fracture toughness 
data used as an alternative to RTNDT as permitted by ASME Code Cases N-629 
and N-631 that establishes an RTNDT – like quantity from a T0 value via the 
relationship RTT0  = T0 + 35°F. 
S Used for designating the orientation of the crack or applied load for a 
toughness test specimen, indicating the material short-transverse direction 
SE(B) Single-edge notch bend specimens, see ASTM E1820 
σys Yield strength 
T Used for designating the orientation of the crack or applied load for a 
toughness test specimen, indicating the material long-transverse direction 
T temperature 
T0 Reference transition temperature determined from ASTM E 1921-13 that 
represents the temperature at which the statistical median of the KJc 
distribution from 1T size specimens equals 100 MPa√m (91.1 ksi√in.) and 
statistically locates the fracture toughness versus temperature curve 
T35,50  Transition temperature from Charpy V-notch specimens that exhibit at least 
35 mils of lateral expansion and not less than 50 ft-lbs of absorbed energy per 
ASTM E 23-12c. 
TNDT nil-ductility-temperature from drop weight testing from ASTM E 208-06 
uTS Ultimate strength 
ν Poisson’s ratio 
W  Width dimension for fracture toughness specimens; other specimen 
dimensions are commonly expressed relative to this width 
7.2.1.1 Background on Vessels and Associated Materials 
These three tasks are considered introductory in scope.  They are intended to provide early 
guidance for evaluating the overall risk posed by the current LPV fleet, as well as to provide 
sufficient guidance to develop meaningful recommendations for future evaluations.  These tasks 
do not provide a final answer with regard to the LPV material behavior.  For example, the 
important issue of material property variability from lot-to-lot has not been addressed. 
Tasks 1 and 2 involve evaluating the tensile strength and fracture toughness of the LPV base 
materials.  These properties, particularly fracture toughness, are the most critical for a proper 
FFS assessment for the LPVs.  Because these tests are destructive, the materials testing could 
only be performed on available sacrificial vessels.  In situ evaluations on vessels in service are 
generally not practical.  As testing for these tasks began, the surplus vessels available for 
sacrificial testing were limited to two MSFC vessels: V0032 (MV-50288-34) and V0125  
(M-117).  The parenthetical designations are the manufacturer’s vessel numbers.  Additional 
vessel materials were gathered as made available in preparation for future testing but were not 
evaluated as part of these tasks. 
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Both V0032 and V0125 were of multilayered, right-cylinder construction manufactured by the 
A. O. Smith Corporation in 1962 and by CB&I in 1963, respectively, as shown in  
Figures 7.2.1.1-1 and 7.2.1.1-2.  The body of vessel V0032 was constructed from six total  
layers (shells) with the inner layer nominally ½-inch-thick and the remaining five layers each 
nominally ¼-inch-thick, for a total nominal wall thickness of 1 3/4 inches.  The body of V0125 
was of similar construction, but with only four total layers, with the inner layer nominally  
½-inch-thick and its remaining three layers each nominally ¼-inch-thick, for a minimum total 
thickness of 1.217 inches.  The shells were fabricated from A. O. Smith 1143, 1146, and  
1146a steel, which were proprietary, non-ASME material specifications.  The hemispherical 
vessel heads were fabricated from monolithic, A225 Gr. B, a standard ASTM plate material.  
V0032 was 16 feet, 7.5 inches in total length, with an ID of 20 inches.  V0125 was 
approximately 12 feet, 6.5 inches in total length, with a 24-inch ID.  Table 7.2.1.1-1 summarizes 
the characteristics of these two vessels. 
Figure 7.2.1.1-1.  Vessel V0032 before Sectioning, Shown with Sister Vessels V0030 and V0035 
Figure 7.2.1.1-2.  Vessel V0125 Shown after Sectioning 
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Table 7.2.1.1-1.  Summary of Vessels Evaluated 
M
SFC
 V
essel ID
 
M
anufacturer V
essel ID
 
M
anufacturer 
M
anufacture D
ate 
T
otal Layers 
Inner Shell T
hickness (in) 
O
uter Shell T
hickness (in) 
H
ead T
hickness (in) 
O
verall L
ength 
Inner Shell M
aterial 
O
uter Shell M
aterial 
H
ead M
aterial 
N
ozzle M
aterial 
Shell ID
 (in) 
M
A
W
P (psi) 
Purpose 
D
esign T
em
perature 
V0032 
MV-
50288-
34 
A. O. 
Smith 
Sept. 
1962 6 ½ ¼ 
2-
3/16 
16 ft. 
7 ½ in. 1146a 1146a 
A225 
Gr. B 
FBX 
ASTM 
A105 
Gr II 
20 5,500 Gaseous Hydrogen Ambient 
V0125 M-117 CB&I Sept. 1963 4 ½ ¼ 1.056 
12 ft. 
6 ½ in. 
MLP 
1143 
Mod 
MLP 
1146 
A225 
Gr. B 
FBX 
MLF 
5002 
Mod 
24 3,500 
High-
Pressure 
Air 
120 °F 
7.2.1.1.1 Evaluated Base Materials, Tasks 1 and 2 
Table 7.2.1.1-2 summarizes the primary base metals that are considered representative of the vast 
majority of the LPVs in service throughout the Agency.  Each is a low alloy steel.  The most 
common material for vessel heads is ASTM A225, Grade B, which is the subject of the Task 1 
evaluations.  The shell materials (i.e., 1143, 1146, 1146a) are the subject of Task 2.  Though 
clearly important to the thorough and proper assessment of the LPVs, the nozzle materials 
(mainly MLF 5002) were not included in this assessment activity due to limitations in funding.  
For the base metals evaluated in Tasks 1 and 2, a decision was made to focus on only one lot of 
material during this assessment, primarily for the technical reasons that are described in detail in 
the discussion of the fracture toughness testing (Section 7.2.1.2).  The focus on strength and 
toughness evaluations of base materials during this assessment does not imply that these are 
considered priorities over such testing in the LPV welds.  To the contrary, the welds are 
considered the most critical aspect of the LPV material system, based, for instance, on the failure 
history of non-NASA vessels.  However, the weld evaluations are considerably more 
complicated than the base metal evaluations.  The prudent order of evaluation for this assessment 
was to begin in the relatively simpler base metals, leaving the detailed assessment of the welds as 
required forward work. 
Table 7.2.1.1-2.  Typical Material Properties for LPV Materials (plate materials are reported for 
thicknesses ranging from 0.180 to 0.375 inches, inclusive; data are taken from original 
manufacturer’s certifications) 
Use Common Designation σys (ksi) 
uTS 
(ksi) 
Elongation 
(%) 
Inner Layer 1143 [ref. 48] 75 90 22.0 
Outer layers 1146 [ref. 49] 70 105–135 20.0 
Inner/Outer Layers 1146a [ref. 50] 77 105–135 22.0 
Heads ASTM A225 Gr. B [ref. 51] 43 75 18.0 
Nozzles MLF 5002 Mod [ref. 52] 51 80 18.0 
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7.2.1.1.2 Selected Base Materials for Evaluation 
With the focus on base materials limited to a single lot, the head material from vessel V0032 was 
selected for the Task 1 evaluation of the ASTM A225 Grade B material. 
As shown in Table 7.2.1.1-2, the two MSFC sacrificial vessels provide access to three shell 
materials: 1143 and 1146 from V0125, and 1146a from V0032.  The 1146 and 1146a materials 
were initially considered to have the same chemistries, but discovery of a CB&I material 
specification [ref. 53] for 1146 suggests that the 1146a material, with increased maximum 
allowable phosphorus and sulfur contents and an increased tensile strength, is a modified version 
of alloy 1146.  While increased phosphorous can result in higher strength, it has been known 
since at least 1940 that sulfur and phosphorus can promote hot cracking and lower toughness in 
alloy steel welds [ref. 54], so it is unclear why an increase in the allowed maximum allowable 
phosphorus and sulfur would have been allowed.  Considerable inconsistencies were also present 
in the historical 1146 and 1146a specifications available through the period manufacturers, 
which would ultimately require additional effort to settle, although a final, conclusive answer 
may prove elusive [ref. 55].  An evaluation of the constituent chemistry in currently tested and 
future lots of alloy 1146 and 1146a should be performed.   
Though the original A. O. Smith paperwork indicates that 1146a was used to fabricate all V0032 
shells (inner and outer), substantial differences in strength for the inner shell material were 
observed in the MSFC tests compared with the specification minimum properties and lot 
acceptance data provided for the V0032 inner shell material.  These data are summarized in 
Table 7.2.1.1-3.  The data brought the pedigree of the inner layer material into question.  
Replicate testing on the inner shell on multiple sample configurations ruled out that the data were 
the result of testing anomalies.  Testing of the inner and outer ¼-inch layer materials resulted in 
tensile properties that were consistent with the A. O. Smith certification, indicating that the 
pedigree issue was limited to the ½-inch inner layer.   
Table 7.2.1.1-3.  Comparison of Tensile Data Obtained from V0032 against A. O. Smith 
Certification and Lot Acceptance Values 
Specimen ID Location Sample Type Orientation σys (ksi) 
uTS 
(ksi) 
Elongation* 
(%) 
380-11-1A-13 Inner Shell 
Round, Ø 
0.250 in.  L 50.8 76.6 32.3 
380-11-1A-14 Inner Shell 
Round, Ø 
0.250 in.  L 50.8 77.1 32.5 
380-1 Inner Shell 
Round, Ø 
0.113 in.  C 52.4 80.2 37.4 
380-2 Inner Shell 
Round, Ø 
0.113 in.  C 45.3 80.8 33.8 
380-3 Inner Shell 
Round, Ø 
0.113 in.  L 51.1 82.0 32.4 
380-4 Inner Shell 
Round, Ø 
0.113 in.  L 53.3 82.1 29.9 
380-21-33 Inner Shell 
Flat, 0.250 in. 
Gage L 48.1 74.0 34.4 
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380-22-34 Inner Shell 
Flat, 0.250 in. 
Gage L 49.1 74.5 35.5 
380-19-31 Shell Layer 2 
Flat, 0.250 in. 
Gage L 93.0 124.1 24.1 
380-20-32 Shell Layer 2 
Flat, 0.250 in. 
Gage L 92.5 124.6 24.5 
380-40 Outer Shell 
Flat, 0.250 in. 
Gage L 88.5 119.5 24.8 
380-41 Outer Shell 
Flat, 0.250 in. 
Gage L 87.1 120.0 24.7 
V0032 Lot 
Acceptance 1 
Inner 
Shell Not Given Not Given 88.4 114.4 36.0 
V0032 Lot 
Acceptance 2 
Inner 
Shell Not Given Not Given 91.8 124.8 29.0 
V0032 Lot 
Acceptance 3 
Inner 
Shell Not Given Not Given 90.7 117.0 28.0 
V0032 Lot 
Acceptance 4 
Outer 
Shell Not Given Not Given 90.0 116.4 25.0 
V0032 Lot 
Acceptance 5 
Outer 
Shell Not Given Not Given 93.4 118.7 28.0 
A. O. Smith 
Spec 
Base 
Metal Not Given Not Given 77.0 105 - 135 22.0 
V0032 
Certification 
Base 
Metal Not Given Not Given 77.0 
Not 
Given Not Given 
* Elongation values referenced in Table 7.2.1.1-3 are provided for reference only, as the
extensometer used for testing was verified to only 8%. 
The strength test results suggested that a potential undocumented substitution of softer material 
or heat treatment modifications to the 1146a may have occurred for the V0032 inner shell during 
construction, possibly to avoid problems with hydrogen embrittlement, since V0032 was 
designed for gaseous hydrogen storage.  An industry consultant suggested that based on his past 
experience, a lower strength steel like A-285 or A516 Grade 70 may have been substituted for 
the 1146a [ref. 56].  It may be worthwhile to investigate the inner shells of the available sister 
vessels to V0032 to determine whether their properties also show a discrepancy.  In the larger 
context, the discrepancy observed for V0032 indicates that the manufacturer’s data records, the 
originating source of material pedigree information, are not infallible.  Uncertainty in the 
pedigree of the material should be recognized as a risk associated with these vintage LPVs.  
Generally, it is not feasible to independently test and verify the material pedigree of the inner 
layer materials in a vessel due to limited physical access.  
Once this material discrepancy was discovered, no further testing was performed on the 1146a 
material from V0032, although the thinner, higher strength 1146a material in the V0032 outer 
layers should be part of future evaluations.  The pedigree of the V0032 inner layer material was 
evaluated by chemical analysis.  X-ray fluorescence (XRF) analysis was attempted, with the 
hope of differentiating the material from other candidates, such as 516 or A-285, based on the 
presence of vanadium as a discriminator (i.e., 1146 has vanadium, where most potential 
candidates do not).  XRF is best used as a comparator against known standards.  Without such 
reference standards in this case, the XRF results were simply inconclusive; therefore, inductively 
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coupled plasma (ICP) analytical chemistry tests were performed.  ICP is more time consuming 
but produces very accurate chemistries, including many trace elements in metals.  The ICP 
chemistry results are shown in Table 7.2.1.1-4.  
Table 7.2.1.1-4.  ICP Analytical Chemistry Composition Results for V0032 Inner Shell Material 
Compared with 1146a Specification Requirements (this material was designated as 1146a on the 
originating A. O. Smith manufacturer's report)   
Material ICP (Run 1) ICP (Run 2) 1146a Specification Agreement 
Manganese (Mn) 1.26 1.29 1.10 to 1.50 Yes 
Phosphorus (P) <0.02 <0.02 0.040 max Yes 
Silicon (Si) 0.261 0.247 0.20 to 0.35 Yes 
Vanadium (V) 0.154 0.156 0.13 to 0.18 Yes 
Nickel (Ni) 0.555 0.556 0.40 to 0.70 Yes 
Chromium (Cr) 0.065 0.066 Not Given NA 
Copper (Cu) 0.048 0.048 Not Given NA 
Carbon (C) Not Given Not Given 0.18 to 0.25 Unknown 
Sulfur (S) Not Given Not Given 0.05 max Unknown 
Note: Specification agreement for chromium and copper is described as not applicable (NA) since these 
elements often existed in steels with a scrap component. 
The levels of manganese, phosphorus, silicon, nickel, and vanadium were confirmed to meet the 
1146a specification requirements.  Carbon and sulfur were not reported, as the ICP test cannot 
measure those trace elements.  A separate, targeted test for carbon was considered but not 
performed due to cost.  Chromium and copper were also reported in small quantities.  Because of 
these subtle ambiguities, the V0032 inner shell material remains unidentified.  Based on the 
strength data and the chemistry results, this soft inner layer material is not expected to be 
representative of the general population of LPV materials in use across the Agency and, thus, 
will likely not be investigated further.  The base metals evaluated in Task 2 were, therefore, 
limited to the 1143 and 1146 materials from the V0125 vessel.  These materials are considered to 
be generally representative of the nominal LPV materials used for the shells by A. O. Smith 
LPVs in NASA’s infrastructure, with the caveat that the 1146 material is not as strong as 1146a 
and is expected to have slightly greater fracture toughness than 1146a.  An evaluation of properly 
representative 1146a material should be performed.  
In reference to Table 7.2.1.1-3, lot acceptance data are provided for the LPV materials that were 
evaluated.  Lot acceptance testing for 1143 inner shell material for V0125 demonstrated a 
minimum 70-ksi yield and 91-ksi ultimate strength minimum in one material lot.  It appears that 
the 1143 material from V0125 did not meet the yield strength specification minimum of 75 ksi, 
which again underscores the confusion associated with the observed specification 
inconsistencies. 
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7.2.1.1.3 LPV Materials Collected for Future Evaluations 
An ongoing aspect of this assessment activity has been to identify material resources in the form 
of vessels available across the Agency and elsewhere that may be sacrificed to provide needed 
materials for evaluation.  This collection of vessel materials will be critical to fulfill the 
recommended future testing required to evaluate each of the base materials and welds properly.  
Furthermore, a bulk of material from a variety of vessels will be critical to assessing the expected 
material variability present in the LPV fleet across the Agency.  A considerable amount of the 
vessel materials have been collected at MSFC and are being carefully retained in long-term 
storage in anticipation of this future testing.  As part of this collection effort, an A225 head from 
a multilayer vessel at GRC, designated as GRC Vessel PV0296, was obtained, as well as all of 
the remnant pieces from a multilayer vessel designated by serial number MV-50466-8 that was 
tested at SwRI® as funded by NASA OSMA and managed by ARC  [refs. 44 and 45].  Vessel 
MV-50466-8 was fabricated from 1146a and A225.  The original manufacturer’s data report for 
the PV0296 vessel was unavailable, but the report for a representative vessel produced and 
delivered at the same time by the same vendor designated as serial number MV-50405 
demonstrates that the PV0296 head material is likely A225 Gr. B.  Vessel V0031, a sister vessel 
of similar size, construction, and service history to V0032, was also available.  No material 
testing was performed on PV0296, MV-50466-8, or V0031 in this assessment.  
7.2.1.1.4 Material Anisotropy 
The correlation between the structural and material orientations must be identified first to orient 
and extract appropriate test specimens.  As a general rule for FFS assessments, fracture 
mechanics material property data are generated on the plane within the material that provides the 
least capability.  For most thin-plate materials, specimens are extracted such that the crack is 
oriented parallel to the direction of elongated material grains, usually the longitudinal rolling 
direction.  This typically produces bounding material properties.  This philosophy for generating 
material data on the least capable orientation is required if the material orientation in the vessel is 
not certain.  The small selection of sacrificial vessels under consideration in this assessment has 
illustrated that material orientation cannot be assumed to be consistent.  While this assessment 
has proceeded mindful of determining bounding fracture properties in-plane, the behavior of 
cracks growing radially through the thickness of the materials has not been evaluated.  Tests for 
this behavior in the thin-shell materials would typically use a surface-crack geometry.  These 
studies were beyond the scope of the current assessment but should be considered for future 
evaluation.  Material orientations are specified relative to the original plate corresponding the 
material longitudinal (L), transverse (T), and short-transverse (S) directions.  The structural 
orientations of a vessel are described by the circumferential (C), longitudinal (L), radial (R),  
and meridional (M, spherical head) directions.   
Due to inexperience with these types of pressure vessel steels, significant anisotropy was not 
initially anticipated in the planning stages of this assessment and was not a part of the budgeting 
process when allocating the available assessment funding.  This oversight required time and 
testing resources to resolve, hindering the ability to achieve the scope that was anticipated in the 
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testing tasks; thus, the 1143 and 1146 materials were more completely characterized than A225 
due to these complications.  Although unfortunately coming to the attention of the planning team 
too late, the material anisotropy was clearly identified in the SwRI® findings resulting from the 
mechanical testing they performed on an A. O. Smith vessel MV-50466-8 for NASA ARC  
[refs. 44 and 45].   
Due to this anisotropic behavior, the material orientation for each piece of material needed to be 
determined prior to orienting the final set of test specimens.  The shell materials proved fairly 
easy to orient, given that they maintained distinct orthogonal rolling directions.  The only 
question to be resolved was whether the shell material longitudinal direction was oriented 
circumferentially around the vessel or along the vessel axis.  Fracture toughness tests were 
performed in these two orientations (C-L and L-C) to determine the material orientation, which 
was always made clear by a large reduction in toughness in the longitudinal direction of the shell 
material.  (Note that in the two-letter fracture toughness orientation designations above and 
elsewhere in this report, the first letter indicates the direction of applied loading, and the second 
letter indicates the direction of crack extension.)  Identifying the bounding toughness orientation 
in the A225 head material was considerably more complicated.  Both selective microstructural 
investigation and instrumented Charpy impact testing were used to help identify the material 
orientation.  The microstructural evaluations were inconclusive, but the Charpy impact testing 
proved informative.  Further details on the efforts to identify material orientation are provided in 
the discussions of Task 1 and Task 2 results. 
7.2.1.1.5 Lot Variability 
Though the LPV fleet is comprised of nominally the same steels based on the A. O. Smith 
designations previously discussed, the LPV fleet contains vessels fabricated over a span of years 
and by different vendors and the steels may have been processed by different mills using 
different rolling procedures.  The LPV steels are expected to contain significant lot-to-lot 
variability; thus, one cannot assume the data obtained in this study are directly applicable to all 
LPVs without a further characterization of this variability.  
The initial plan for this assessment was to test from as many different lots of material as possible 
to diversify the testing and characterize the lot-to-lot variability.  This goal shifted primarily due 
to technical reasons and, to a lesser extent, schedule reasons.  The technical reason for the shift to 
single material lot evaluation was that the E 1921-13 Master Curve test method used in this 
investigation is best applied to a macroscopically homogeneous material having uniform and 
isotropic strength and toughness properties.  Therefore, the proper way to approach the transition 
toughness evaluation is to test a sufficient quantity of specimens to independently evaluate each 
lot.  The result from each lot can then be compared for variability.  A subsequent analysis 
combining data across lots can then be assessed for comparison. 
7.2.1.2 Fracture Toughness Testing 
Fracture toughness testing was the focus of this effort because fracture toughness as a function of 
temperature is the most important material property for FFS assessment of the vessels.  The fully 
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ductile fracture toughness (upper shelf) and the temperature at the transition to cleavage fracture 
(transition range) were of interest.  The Master Curve methodology from ASTM E 1921-13  
[ref. 57] was used to facilitate the assessment of the fracture toughness data and determine the 
fracture toughness versus temperature behavior for the LPV materials.  The Master Curve 
method is a robust approach to characterizing the temperature dependent fracture toughness of 
ferritic steels with as few as six test samples.  The following background information on the 
Master Curve method will provide a brief introduction to the concept and convey the rationale 
for choosing this method to evaluate the LPV materials instead of using the more traditional 
impact energy (Charpy) methods.  
Other than obvious schedule and cost constraints, the choice of a fracture toughness test method 
is usually dictated by the expected failure mechanism of the material.  The two primary 
mechanisms by which fracture occurs in ferritic steels are ductile rupture and cleavage.  These 
are micromechanisms for fracture that describe the mechanism by which a material fails at the 
microstructural level.  Care is needed not to confuse these mechanisms with terms such as 
“ductile” or “brittle,” which are often used to describe the failure behavior of structures or 
specimens.  Note that a ductile rupture fracture may very well occur in an unstable, “brittle” 
manner.  This is common in many alloys used in the aerospace industry, such as high strength 
aluminum or titanium alloys.  Ductile rupture occurs in metals that fail by the growth and 
coalescence of voids initiating from loosened or broken inclusions and second-phase particles.  
Cracks extend through this void coalescence process, driven by plastic deformation, ultimately 
leading to fracture in either a stable or unstable manner.  This is the typical failure mechanism 
for structural steels when they are kept sufficiently warm and not loaded in a highly dynamic 
manner.  In contrast, cleavage fracture is a much lower energy process that progresses by the 
splitting of atomic planes with little associated plasticity, resulting in a flat and faceted fracture 
surface.  The cleavage fracture process is of primary concern in structural steels at reduced 
temperatures or high loading rates [ref. 58].  
For ferritic body-centered-cubic steels, the fracture mechanism undergoes a demonstrative 
transition from ductile rupture to cleavage as temperature decreases, which leads to a 
concomitant decrease in fracture toughness.  This temperature dependency of fracture toughness 
is common to all ferritic steels.  The material property of most importance to ferritic structural 
steels in LPV applications, therefore, is the ductile-to-brittle transition temperature curve that 
quantifies the fracture toughness loss with decreasing temperature and identifies the probability 
that a cleavage fracture will occur.  Despite the common use of the term “transition temperature” 
that implies a discrete temperature below which steels fail by cleavage fracture, the reality is 
more subtle and complicated.  An “upper shelf” exists where temperatures are sufficiently warm 
to ensure fracture progresses by ductile rupture mechanisms.  Fracture toughness is greatest on 
the upper shelf and is generally consistent and repeatable.  As temperatures decrease (or loading 
rates increase), the steel enters into a “transition range” where ductile rupture and cleavage are 
competing fracture mechanisms.  In this range, the fracture behavior becomes considerably more 
variable since both mechanisms are operative and fracture toughness values drop below those of 
the upper shelf. 
NESC Request No.: TI-13-00852 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report
Document #: 
NESCP-RP-
13-00852 
Version: 
1.1 
Title:
Evaluation of Agency Non-code LPVs 
Page #: 
86 of 193 
Determining this temperature range where cleavage fracture becomes probable is critical to 
understanding the reliability of the LPVs.  Cleavage fracture events often result in unexpected, 
catastrophic structural failures.  Historically, brittle fracture has been characterized by a linear-
elastic fracture toughness test to determine KIC, which treats the material in front of the crack tip 
as a homogeneous and elastic continuum.  This simplistic approach is insufficient to characterize 
cleavage where the fracture process is governed by the random distribution of cleavage initiators, 
such as carbide particles or inclusions, in the highly stressed zone of material just in front of the 
crack tip.  This makes cleavage initiation a strongly stochastic process that follows a weakest 
link model.  Therefore, a statistical approach is needed to adequately characterize cleavage 
fracture.  ASTM Standard E 1921-13 [ref. 57] couples modern fracture mechanics and statistical 
methods to define a statistically based curve of fracture toughness versus temperature that is 
derived using only fracture-mechanics-based test data.  The statistical nature of the method 
allows confidence bounds to be determined.  This elastic-plastic method utilizes the J-integral at 
the point of cleavage instability, JC, which is converted into a stress-intensity equivalent, KJC, 
and uses these data to define a curve of median fracture toughness, KJC versus temperature.  
Performing elastic-plastic J tests and deriving K from J, as opposed to conducting linearly elastic 
K tests directly, was necessitated by specimen size limitations imposed by the thin, cylindrical 
pressure vessel layers.  Specimens for J test methods can be as much as 1/40th the size required 
for linear-elastic K tests and still maintain sufficient constraint to produce toughness data that are 
unaffected by sample size [ref. 59].  It would not have been possible to perform linear-elastic 
fracture toughness tests per ASTM E 399-12 due to the thin-layer material constraints in LPV 
shells.  Test specimens could not be made large enough to obtain the linear-elastic fracture 
toughness, KIC.  
Though the use of the J-integral method greatly relaxes specimen size requirements for testing 
fracture toughness, it does not altogether remove the effect of specimen size from the process of 
evaluating cleavage.  Because cleavage fracture is a stochastic process, the amount of material 
sampled during a test will affect the likelihood of a cleavage event occurring.  Therefore, the 
thickness of the specimen brings a size effect into the process by dictating the volume of material 
sampled along the crack front.  This size effect is simply the increase in the likelihood of having 
a cleavage initiation particle along the crack front for samples of increased thickness.  This 
influence of specimen size is accounted for in the statistical treatment of the test data in ASTM 
E1921-13.  E 1921-13 uses a standard thickness of 25.4 mm (1 inch) and provides statistical 
relationships to relate thinner or thicker specimen tests to obtain a standard output.  An extension 
of this logic then must be used in the application of the standard result to the structural 
application [ref. 60].  The relatively thin specimens dictated by the shell materials require more 
size correction than those extracted from the comparatively thick head material.  These size 
corrections also play a role in the proper application of cleavage fracture toughness data obtained 
from laboratory specimens to the prediction of fracture behavior in real structures like the LPVs. 
The E1921-13 approach is referred to as the Master Curve method because it has been 
demonstrated that the fracture toughness versus temperature behavior for most ferritic steels 
conforms to one universal curve shape [ref. 60].  The Master Curve method is empirically 
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derived and supported by a wealth of data that includes thousands of tests generated over more 
than three decades [ref. 61]. 
The universal Master Curve is made specific for a given material by being positioned on a plot of 
KJC versus temperature by means of T0, the reference transition temperature.  ASTM E 1921-13 
prescribes both experimental and computational procedures that are used to determine the 
reference temperature T0.  This one value, the T0 reference temperature, is the only unknown that 
needs to be determined from the test data to fully establish the Master Curve for the subject 
material.  T0 is defined as the temperature at which a set of data obtained with 1-inch-thick 
specimens will have a median KJC of 100 MPa√m based on testing six or more specimens at a 
single temperature.  While this definition of T0 may seem somewhat arbitrary, because the shape 
of the Master Curve has been empirically predetermined, the T0 definition simply serves as a 
standardized anchor for positioning the Master Curve on the temperature axis.  It is important to 
realize that T0 is not the same as the historically common NDT, TNDT, though the two values are 
easily reconciled.   
T0 and TNDT can be reconciled by utilizing available ASME code cases, which are official 
responses from ASME to the user community when meaningful inquiries are raised about the 
ASME code so that the knowledge base can be expanded, the code adapts, and repetitive 
inquiries are avoided.  Relevant to the Master Curve method are ASME code cases N-629 and  
N-631, which establish the basis for using a Master Curve-based index temperature derived from 
T0 as an alternative to TNDT.  These code cases directly permit use of the Master Curve index 
temperature: 
RTT0 = T0 + 35°F (Eq 7.2.1) 
This is an alternative to RTNDT, where RTNDT is related to the NDT from ASME Section III and 
ASME NB-2331.  For pressure retaining materials other than bolting applications, ASME  
NB-2331 requires that the reference NDT RTNDT is established: 
RTNDT = MAX{TNDT, T35/50 – 60} (in °F) 
where TNDT is the NDT from drop-weight testing from ASTM E 208-06 and T35,50 is the 
transition temperature from Charpy V-notch specimens that exhibit at least 35 mils of lateral 
expansion and not less than 50 ft-lb of absorbed energy per ASTM E 23-12c.  The use of RTNDT 
was intended to account for heat-to-heat differences in fracture toughness transition temperature 
and collapse the data more completely into a single curve, but it does not do so as well as the 
Master Curve.  
The assumption in using the Master Curve index temperature is that it should provide the same 
implicit margin between KIC and measured fracture toughness data as the accepted RTNDT 
approach.  While the fundamental relationship between T0 and RTNDT has unfortunately not been 
derived, comprehensive statistical analyses against existing fracture toughness data has shown 
that the relationship between RTT0 and T0 used in the ASME code cases N-629 and N-631  
(i.e., RTT0 = T0 + 35°F) bounds 97.5% of existing fracture toughness data [ref. 61].  
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RTNDT is considered conservative compared to the fracture toughness versus temperature 
relationship determined by T0.  The two methods differ in their approach.  T0 is a statistically 
based fracture mechanics method that allows for a direct determination of the transition 
temperature, whereas TNDT is defined by a relatively simple bounding method where the impact 
energy for fracture of blunt-notched specimens drops below a given threshold.  
Defining RTNDT from T0 is straightforward as given by the ASME code cases.  On the other hand, 
defining the proper MDMT for the LPV fleet from this value will require additional study.  The 
use of a Master Curve derived T0 to define the RTNDT (and subsequently an MDMT) rather than a 
TNDT based on an impact energy threshold is expected to reduce conservatism in that value.  
(Note: the Master Curve was born out of necessity to reduce known conservatisms in the 
traditional RTNDT method, so the nuclear power industry could demonstrate adequate safety in 
aging structures in use beyond their original design service objectives.)  The key distinction to 
underscore is that the Master Curve is consistent with a risk-informed framework for decision 
making that provides best estimates of fracture toughness by means of an explicit description of 
uncertainty.  The Master Curve provides two key features: a statistical description of fracture 
toughness at a single temperature and the relationship between fracture toughness and 
temperature.  
The process used by E1921-13 to establish the Master Curve indexing temperature T0 is 
essentially a four-step procedure: 
1. Six to eight fracture toughness specimens are tested as near to the estimated T0 as
possible as long as fracture occurs due to cleavage1.  Estimates of T0 can be made from
statistical offsets based on Charpy impact tests, if available.  The elastic-plastic fracture
toughness at cleavage instability, JC, is determined and converted to its corresponding
elastic fracture toughness KJC.  Test data must then be statistically censored according to
two primary censoring limits before the data can be used in the T0 analysis.  Any
specimens exceeding a ductile crack extension limit in which the slow stable crack
growth before cleavage fracture is greater than 5% of the initial remaining ligament or
that experience a loss of constraint are regarded as invalid and must be statistically
censored before being included in the analysis.  Any specimens that experience a loss of
constraint must also be statistically censored.  This statistical censoring, performed in
accordance with ASTM E1921-13, means that the measured value is replaced with a
smaller value close to JIC, the ductile initiation toughness as near to the test temperature
as possible.  Censoring is also necessary if the elastic-plastic fracture toughness exceeds a
small-scale deformation limit KJC(limit) defined in E 1921-13 that depends on the specimen
dimensions and the material’s yield strength.  For the steels tested here, this limit was not
1 The fracture toughness tests are performed in accordance with ASTM E 1820-11, according to the basic test method from sections 
8.1.2 and A2.4.2.1 without compliance unloading.  As the basic test method is used, only this cleavage instability JC is determined from a 
given test as opposed to a full J-R curve, which would be typical of unloading compliance fracture tests.  That only JC is determined as 
compared to the complete J-R curve is sufficient for determining T0.  The basic method facilitates fracture testing when cleavage 
instability is expected, since unloads may occur in the vicinity of a cleavage instability and obfuscate the ability to determine cleavage 
initiation. 
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approached, and this censoring was not required.  Compact tension C(T) specimens are 
preferred over single-edge notch bend SE(B) specimens because T0 differs for 
measurements made with C(T) and SE(B) specimen geometries due to differing 
constraints.  C(T) specimens have higher constraint and produce higher (more 
conservative) T0 temperatures.  All test data generated for purposes of determining T0 in 
this investigation were measured from C(T) specimens2 [ref. 49].  All specimens must be 
tested in the crack orientation corresponding to the lowest toughness in the material. 
2. The KJC data are statistically corrected based on specimen thickness to the equivalent of a
1-inch-thick specimen, referred to as 1T.  This correction reflects the fact that cleavage is
a stochastic process, dependent on the length of the crack front.  Inherent to this
conversion is the assumption that there is a lower shelf at which fracture energy reaches
an asymptotic limit and is independent of temperature.  The conversion of data to the
1T equivalence is necessary because the Master Curve method physically assumes that
the cleavage fracture mode is modeled by a weakest link process by which the fracture
process is determined by the failure of a single cleavage initiation site and assumes that a
random distribution of cleavage initiation sites exists through a given sample width.
There is no special incentive for the choice to normalize to the 1T thickness, other than
that provided a single, convenient, and common specimen width around which to develop
a set of closed-form equations for T0.
3. The temperature T0 at which the 1T equivalent KJC is 100 MPa√m is determined.  The
evaluation of T0 from the test data inherently assumes that the toughness data are well
described by the Master Curve.  (This assumption can be confirmed if a sufficient
quantity of data is generated, as was generally the case in this assessment.)  Toughness
data that are obtained closer to the T0 temperature are preferentially weighted, and all
tests must be within 50°C of T0 to be considered valid.  The 50°C window around
T0 exists because the weakest link assumptions become invalid as the upper and lower
shelf temperatures are approached [ref. 60].  Some iteration on temperature is to be
expected to determine T0; thus, a provisional estimate of T0 is needed after the first three
to four fracture tests are completed to ensure test temperature remains within the 50°C
window.  The combination of a low upper shelf toughness KJIC that is below 100 MPa√m
and the thin specimens available required testing close to the T0 – 50°C limit, which in
turn required the testing of 8 to 10 samples rather than the minimum of 6.  The extra data
did, however, permit a better assessment of the E 1921-13 standard for the case of
interest and as discussed below.
4. Based on the statistical procedures in ASTM E 1921-13, the median KJC of the 1T data
population corresponding to a 50% cumulative probability for fracture is determined and
plotted.  This curve is referred to as the Master Curve for the subject material.  The
2 A SE(B) fixture was manufactured, and a procedure for using the fixture for performing fracture tests on precracked Charpy V-notch 
samples was developed during this effort but was not used for measuring fracture data to be used in determining T0.  This fixture and 
procedure, however, are available for future testing, as necessary. 
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Master Curve statistical model provides the ability to define probability levels other than 
the median, such as 95% and 5% probabilities of cleavage; thus, upper and lower 
statistically bounding confidence intervals are also calculated and plotted.  The 
distribution of data with respect to the Master Curve should be evaluated to ensure that 
the curve-fit is loyal to the original data and described well by the Master Curve. 
This four-step procedure was used for each of the base metal evaluations discussed in the 
following sections. 
7.2.1.2.1 Task 1: A225 Head Material Fracture Toughness Reference Transition 
Temperature 
In order to perform mechanical tests on the pressure vessels, they were coarsely sectioned into 
smaller segments to better accommodate machining test specimens.  These cut plans are shown 
below in Figures 7.2.1.2-1 and 7.2.1.2-2. 
Figure 7.2.1.2-1.  V0032 Gross Sectioning Plan (drawing number CP-380) 
Figure 7.2.1.2-2.  V0125 Sectioning Cut Plan (drawing number CP-344) 
Task 1 of the materials characterization effort was to evaluate T0 for the A225 head material.  
The A225 material testing was afforded highest priority based on historical accounts and 
anecdotal evidence that the A225 material may be the highest risk to cleavage at common vessel 
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operational temperatures.  The A225 testing initially focused on the heads from V0032 and the 
head material provided from the GRC PV0296 vessel.  The decision to reduce focus to single 
lots for base metal testing led to using only V0032 head material in the current assessment.  As 
mentioned in the prior discussion of anisotropy, the biggest challenge of the A225 material 
involved identifying the lowest toughness orientation in the head.  At the time of this writing, the 
A225 T0 test series is still ongoing.  This section discusses the considerable efforts invested in 
determining microstructural orientation.  The plan to determine microstructural orientation began 
with a traditional metallographic approach.  When metallographic methods proved inconclusive, 
a series of Charpy impact tests were used to provide further quantitative insight. 
Metallographic microstructural evaluations at 50× and 100× magnifications were performed on 
A225 material from V0032 and GRC V0296 for determining material orientation3.  (Note: 
testing of the V0296 head was still ongoing when this report was prepared.)  Nine total samples 
in three orthogonal planes (C-M, R-C, and M-R) were taken at three equidistant circumferential 
locations around each head with 45° spacing between samples.  Three samples were taken as 
close as possible to each nominal circumferential location as possible to expedite the 
metallurgical evaluation, instead of evaluating a single sample.  Evaluation of a single sample 
would have required its polishing mold to be broken in order to evaluate a different sample  
face.  As such, a small tradeoff in accuracy was accepted for expediency.  Photographs and cut 
plans of the location in which blanks were evaluated from the V0032 head are provided in 
Figures 7.2.1.2-3 and 7.2.1.2-4. 
Figure 7.2.1.2-3.  V0032-1 Sectioned for Metallographic Microstructural  
Examination for Determining Material Orientation 
3 Performed by Element in Houston, TX. 
NESC Request No.: TI-13-00852 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report
Document #: 
NESCP-RP-
13-00852 
Version: 
1.1 
Title:
Evaluation of Agency Non-code LPVs 
Page #: 
92 of 193 
Figure 7.2.1.2-4.  V0032-1 Cut Plan for Metallographic Microstructural Evaluation for  
Determining Material Orientation 
The 0° location was chosen arbitrarily since there was no unique feature on the axisymmetric 
head that would indicate how the head was fabricated with respect to the parent plate.  Each 
dimension of the metallurgical blanks was unique to maintain traceability of the macro 
orientations.  The macros revealed no discernable microstructural evidence of the plate 
orientation prior to forming.  For V0032, the microstructure appeared to be independent of the 
circumferential location with a uniform grain structure generally following the shape of the head. 
Although the same Nital etching process (3% nitric acid, balance methanol) was followed for the 
samples from both heads, the grain orientation for GRC V0296 was much less apparent in the 
microstructural samples and even less useful in determining material orientation. 
The V0032 microstructure was dominated by what appeared to be considerable banding of 
pearlite and ferrite, which is undesirable (see Figure 7.2.1.2-5).  The dark bands are pearlite, and 
the lighter bands are ferrite.  This banding is possibly a result of microsegregation of alloying 
metals during the solidification of the original ingot, which was not ideally homogenized during 
the subsequent heat treatment.  Alloying elements always segregate to some extent during the 
solidification of steel.  Elements that are especially prone to segregation are carbon, phosphorus, 
sulfur, silicon, and manganese [ref. 62].  Manganese is especially problematic because it lowers 
the chemical activity of carbon in austenite, from which pearlite is formed.  The manganese-rich 
areas are, thus, the last to transform and are mostly pearlite [ref. 63].  During the microstructural 
evaluations, the banding features were observed regardless of the sample orientation or angular 
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location.  These microstructural features likely obscured any visible anisotropy introduced into 
the material from the original plate production. 
Figure 7.2.1.2-5.  Microstructural Evaluation at 50× Magnification of A225 Material from Vessel 
V0032 showing Banding of Pearlite and Ferrite on Meridional Face (both radial and 
circumferential faces demonstrated similar features) 
These inconclusive microstructures, showing either no orientation or spherical banding following 
the head, were not expected.  There was an expectation that the prior plate microstructure would 
remain dominant.  Although exact historical records are incomplete, information on the typical 
head fabrication process was obtained from an industry consultant4.  For forming a head such as 
V0032, the steel mill would start with a thick slab of commercial A225 and roll the plate at a 
temperature close to 1,000°F between two rolls to reduce the thickness.  In this process, one 
primary direction would be stretched the most and become dominant—the plate longitudinal (L) 
direction.  The orthogonal direction in the flat plane of the plate is identified as the transverse (T) 
direction.  Based on the desired surface area of the hemisphere, the head manufacturer would cut 
an appropriately sized disk out of the plate.  The head manufacturer would usually heat the blank 
disk to around 800 to 900°F and press it between male and female dies in small increments in 
order to attain the desired head dimensions and form.  
Based on this manufacturing process, the head forming operations would not be expected to 
eliminate the prior plate microstructure, but rather the plate material orientation was projected 
over the head while retaining much of the original orthogonality.  If the prior plate 
4 Information provided by Maan Jawad, Consultant. 
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microstructure remains, then the microstructure would continuously change circumferentially 
around the head, lining up with a prior plate orientation every 90°.  The lack of such structure 
implies that the head material may have experienced an intermediate thermal treatment to 
eliminate the plate microstructure.  Determining grain orientation by macros is commonly 
difficult in steels, particularly when the macros are arbitrarily oriented, as in this case.  Given the 
inconclusive nature of these microstructural studies, a more quantitative approach with Charpy 
specimens was undertaken. 
Instrumented Charpy V-notch tests according to ASTM E 2298-13 [ref. 64] were performed as a 
quick, relatively inexpensive yet quantitative way to determine the material orientation in the  
A225 head material from V0032.  Due to deciding to focus on one lot of material, impact tests on 
the GRC V0296 head were not performed under this assessment.  Instrumented Charpy tests 
utilize strain gages to capture the load versus displacement record at specimen impact.  It is a 
more robust method than traditional Charpy tests, even if the load versus displacement is used 
only qualitatively as an aid to evaluate the fracture mechanism between a brittle and ductile 
failure.  The instrumented test is also preferred for its precision in measuring fracture energy; it 
is more precise than monitoring pendulum height after impact.  This precision also serves to 
lower the minimum range of impact energies that can be reliably measured, which can be 
important with cleavage.  Given cost considerations, samples were limited to two at each of the 
three circumferential locations in two orthogonal orientations, M-C and C-M.  Note that the 
direction of loading and crack extension is the same for Charpy specimens; therefore, in the two-
letter orientation designation for the Charpy specimen, the first letter indicates the direction of 
the long axis of the specimen, and the second letter indicates the direction of crack extension.  
The cut plans for these samples are shown in Figure 7.2.1.2-6.  Sample size was ASTM E23-12c 
type A, with a 10-mm by 10-mm square cross section and 55 mm long—the standard specimen 
used for ferrous metals.  
The results of these Charpy tests are shown in Table 7.2.1.2-1 and Figure 7.2.1.2-7.  All tests 
were conducted at 0°F.  Regarding the test temperature, these tests were not intended to 
determine the transition temperature but were simply used to reveal the least tough 
microstructural orientation in the material for subsequent fracture testing.  The prior work by 
SwRI® indicated that 0°F would be a good choice for determining anisotropy for this material 
because orientation impact energy differences appeared to be largest at 0°F in their tests [ref. 44]. 
More informative fracture toughness tests were considered for determining the material 
orientation, but due to the required quantity the Charpy tests were more financially viable.   
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Figure 7.2.1.2-6.  Cut Plan for V0032 Charpy Impact Samples 
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Table 7.2.1.2-1.  Charpy V-notch Impact Energy Results for V0032 A225 Head Material  
Note: Testing at 0 degrees F was to establish materials properties and should not be interpreted 
as a basis to safely operate LPVs at this temperature. 
The Charpy impact results showed that the C-M orientation produced significantly lower impact 
energies than the M-C orientation with invariance to the sample circumferential location.  This 
matches the observed orientation of the microstructural banding in the V0032 head material.  It is 
possible that the material anisotropy effects in the V0032 head are being dominated by this 
banding structure.  Future tests on head material without the banded microstructure may yield 
different results.  It is suggested that all future efforts to identify the material orientation for 
pressure vessel heads predominantly utilize Charpy impact testing.  Having attempted 
microstructural orientation evaluation in the A225 head material in the SwRI® work, the GRC 
PV0296 head material, and the V0032 head, none of these investigations has provided the clarity 
of the Charpy impact data.  Despite this finding, as future A225 material is evaluated it is 
suggested that the basic microstructure of the head material be documented for features such as 
banding. 
Sample ID Vendor Test 
ID
Temp 
(F)
Theta 
(deg)
Meridional 
Location
Orientation Impact 
Energy (ft-lbs)
Lat Exp 
(mils)
% Shear
CP-380-17 U09577 0 0 1 C-M 73.88 39 80
CP-380-18 U09578 0 0 1 C-M 66.83 34 40
CP-380-19 U09579 0 0 1 M-C 84.60 42 40
CP-380-20 U09580 0 0 1 M-C 90.85 44 40
CP-380-21 U09581 0 45 1 C-M 39.36 20 30
CP-380-22 U09582 0 45 1 C-M 34.28 20 30
CP-380-23 U09583 0 45 1 M-C 142.86 71 90
CP-380-24 U09584 0 45 1 M-C 135.21 71 80
CP-380-25 U09585 0 90 1 C-M 43.74 23 50
CP-380-26 U09586 0 90 1 C-M 42.60 22 30
CP-380-27 U09587 0 90 1 M-C 123.06 57 80
CP-380-28 U09588 0 90 1 M-C 111.80 55 70
CP-380-45 U33589 0 60 2 C-M 36.03 19 20
CP-380-46 U33590 0 60 2 C-M 36.91 18 20
CP-380-47 U33591 0 60 2 M-C 136.89 66 80
CP-380-48 U33592 0 60 2 M-C 186.76 81 100
CP-380-49 U33593 0 75 2 C-M 47.24 24 30
CP-380-50 U33594 0 75 2 C-M 44.66 26 35
CP-380-51 U33595 0 75 2 M-C 168.58 72 100
CP-380-52 U33596 0 75 2 M-C 163.52 75 100
CP-380-65 U47089 0 45 2 C-M 43.89 27 20
CP-380-66 U47090 0 45 2 C-M 39.18 19 20
CP-380-67 U47091 0 45 2 M-C 167.64 74 80
CP-380-68 U47092 0 45 2 M-C 200.16 72 100
CP-380-69 U47093 0 90 2 C-M 44.31 23 30
CP-380-70 U47094 0 90 2 C-M 44.50 27 40
CP-380-71 U47095 0 90 2 M-C 177.24 78 100
CP-380-72 U47096 0 90 2 M-C 162.75 67 90
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Figure 7.2.1.2-7.  Charpy V-notch Impact Test Results for V0032 A225 Head Material  
(note strong separation between C-M and M-C orientations without dependence  
on circumferential angle)  
Based on the Charpy impact results, a cut plan was developed for A225 material from V0032, 
which is shown in Figure 7.2.1.2-8.  All fracture toughness specimens are to be tested in the C-M 
orientation, which was determined as the lowest toughness orientation.  Based on the unexpected 
delays caused by the time required for identification of material anisotropy, these fracture 
toughness specimens are still in process at the time of this writing.  Due to time constraints, a 
survey through the thickness of the A225 head was also not performed to determine the 
bounding radial location for the samples.  Accordingly, fracture samples are planned to be tested 
at two radial locations as shown in the cut plan.  The feasibility of combining these two radial 
location data sets will be investigated in future work. 
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Figure 7.2.1.2-8.  Partial Cut Plan for Fracture Toughness and Tensile Test Specimens from A225 
Head Material from V0032 Showing Salient Features of Full Cut Plan  
(the full cut plan shows detailed views of all specimens, but those views are self-similar 
 to the views currently shown and are omitted for simplicity)   
7.2.1.2.2 Task 2:  Shell Materials Fracture Toughness Reference Transition Temperature 
The objective of Task 2 of the materials characterization effort was to determine the toughness 
transition reference temperature T0 per ASTM E 1921-13 [ref. 33] for the LPV shell materials.  
This study was limited to 1143 and 1146 shell materials.  Absent from this study was the 1146a 
material, which was initially based on the assumption that 1146 and 1146a were expected to 
produce nearly equivalent properties.  The 1143 material was tested from the inner shell of vessel 
V0125.  Where possible, inner shell material was preferred for testing because the greater 
thickness meant that thicker fracture toughness specimens could be machined and less of a 
statistical size correction would need to be made to account for the weakest link cleavage 
process.  The 1146 material was not available from an inner shell and was tested from the outer 
layers of V0125.  In reference to the master cut plan for V0125, the 1143 and 1146 samples were 
all taken from section 4.  This selection was arbitrary but helped minimize the costs of 
performing additional machining operations on large vessel sections.  Testing of these materials 
was confined to single vessels and layers so that the material would be representative of a single 
material lot.  
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Prior to testing the shell materials, as with A225 head material, material orientation needed to be 
determined with respect to the vessels such that samples could be machined from the material in 
the lowest toughness orientation.  Based on the assumption of logical manufacturing processes 
where the shells are rolled from thin sheets and from prior SwRI® testing results [ref. 44], this 
task was inherently much more direct for the shells than the head because there were only two 
possible complementary layouts for the shell materials: 
1. The longitudinal (L) direction of the plate material was coincident with the longitudinal
(L) direction of the vessel.  This would be evaluated with C-L fracture samples.
2. The longitudinal (L) direction of the plate material was coincident with the
circumferential (C) direction of the vessel.  This would be evaluated with L-C fracture
samples.
To determine the material orientation, two standard ASTM E 1820-11 [ref. 65] fracture 
toughness tests were each performed at room temperature in the C-L and L-C orientations for 
each material and vessel section tested.  These data were used to determine the material 
orientation, which would allow for test samples to be produced for determining T0 from the 
Master Curve method.   
For the 1143 material, fracture toughness tests performed at room temperature on the inner shell 
of section 4 from V0125 showed that the initiation fracture toughness was approximately  
40% lower for the C-L orientation than for L-C.  Fracture surfaces are shown in Figure 7.2.1.2-9.  
Neither of these tests produced a fully valid JIC or KJ value, but the results were sufficiently 
advisory on material anisotropy.  Given this outcome, all specimens for determining T0 from the 
Master Curve method for 1143 V0125 section 4 materials were obtained in the C-L orientation.  
Inspection of the fracture surfaces for the two orientations confirmed the results, as the L-C 
surfaces were much more ductile than the C-L surfaces.  Since the C-L orientation represents that 
the specimen loading direction was in the vessel circumferential direction with a crack plane in 
the vessel longitudinal direction, then, given the observed anisotropy, this inner shell was 
oriented in the lowest fracture toughness orientation with respect to the hoop loading direction in 
the vessel.  This suggests that material anisotropy was not a consideration in the original vessel 
design, further confirming the need to use the lowest toughness orientation throughout any FFS 
evaluations of the LPV fleet.  However, the results from the current study may not apply 
universally to all vessels; thus, in conducting further fracture toughness testing on materials from 
different lots and different manufacturers, it will be necessary first to determine the weakest 
orientation. 
For the 1146, material taken from the outer shells of section 4 from V0125 showed that the 
initiation fracture toughness was approximately 45% lower for the C-L orientation than L-C; 
thus, all 1146 specimens were also made in the C-L sample orientation.  
It is important to note that, to reduce material and labor costs, plates were sometimes rolled into 
cylinders with the plate transverse direction in the vessel longitudinal direction and sometimes in 
the vessel circumferential direction. 
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Figure 7.2.1.2-9.  Comparison of Fracture Surfaces for Fracture Toughness Tests Performed in  
C-L Orientation (upper image) and L-C Orientation (lower image) 
A total of 18 basic method fracture toughness tests were performed on C-L 1143 C(T) specimens 
over the range of –20 to –180°F.  This range was required because the test temperatures were 
continually decreased until the samples failed due to cleavage, a requirement for the Master 
Curve method.  The initial temperature selected for testing was –20°F based on the available 
Charpy impact energy data obtained by SwRI® for the LPV materials [refs. 44 and 45] and the 
procedure from ASTM E 1921-13, Section 8.4.1 [ref. 25], but significantly colder temperatures 
were required for cleavage. 
The fact that colder temperatures than initially predicted were needed to produce cleavage in the 
1143 material is advantageous for the FFS outcome of LPVs fabricated with 1143 material.  
However, this meant that more tests than initially planned were required to produce a large 
enough data set to evaluate T0 per ASTM E 1921-13.  In total, one fracture toughness test was 
performed at –20°F, one at –70°F, four at –120°F, five at –170°F, and four at –180°F, for a total 
of 15 tests.  The data are shown in Table 7.2.1.2-2.  Of the 15 tests, 9 were fully valid and 6 have 
not yet been included in the current analysis due to failing certain data qualification limits5.  The 
Kronecker delta shown in the table indicates whether the KJC data point is a fully valid data point 
5 The six tests that are currently excluded are not unconditionally excluded.  In fact, ASTM E 1921-13 explicitly contains a 
special censoring process for such data so that they may be included in the analysis.  This censoring procedure was attempted but 
is currently incomplete because i) there is a difficulty with applying the censoring procedure for the LPV materials that exhibited 
a very flat crack resistance R-curve (indicating that the fracture resistance did not monotonically increase with growing crack 
size) and ii) even though the E1820-12 Basic Method is advantageous for measuring cleavage initiation fracture toughness, the 
Basic Method is not conducive to the censoring procedure. 
NESC Request No.: TI-13-00852 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report
Document #: 
NESCP-RP-
13-00852 
Version: 
1.1 
Title:
Evaluation of Agency Non-code LPVs 
Page #: 
101 of 193 
or whether a data qualification limit was exceeded.  When δj = 0 at the jth KJC value, then a data 
qualification check has failed and that data point must be censored in order to be included in the 
analysis.  Data are used unconditionally when δj = 1.  Censoring, as defined by E1921-13, is a 
specific, conservative substitution process to ensure the data are well described by cleavage.  The 
term itself may be somewhat misleading since censoring often means deleting or removing, but 
in the context of E1921-13 censoring does not mean that the data are eliminated from the 
analysis.  Instead, if certain qualification limits are not satisfied, then in order to be included in 
the analysis, statistical censoring requires that a conservative estimate for KJC must be substituted 
for the KJC datum that was obtained.  This statistical censoring is necessary since the method 
applies a standard statistical analysis to measured data.  Statistical censoring is an accepted 
method with a long history, and E 1921-13 has simply adapted it for its purposes.  The two 
qualification limits for censoring are: 
• The loss of plastic constraint
• Excessive ductile crack growth before the onset of cleavage
First, the plastic constraint condition requires that the specimen remaining ligament b0 = W – a0 
have sufficient size to maintain a condition of high crack-front constraint at fracture.  This 
constraint is the three-dimensional stress state at the crack tip, and a high constraint condition is 
required to conservatively measure cleavage fracture toughness.  The maximum KJC capacity of 
a specimen is given by E 1921-13 as 
𝐾𝐽𝐶(𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡)= 𝐸𝑏0𝜎𝑦𝑠30(1 − 𝑣2) 
KJC data that exceed this requirement must be first used in a data censoring procedure to be 
included in the analysis.  The censored data must be replaced in the analysis by the KJC(limit) 
value.  The argument is that while the value of KJ at the onset of cleavage is unknown for this 
specimen, it exceeds KJC(limit), and this information should be included in the statistical analysis 
of the data set.  In the case for the steels investigated, none of the tests failed this censoring 
requirement. 
Second, a KJC datum is also invalid if too much slow, stable crack growth occurs before  
cleavage failure.  The limit allowed for this stable portion of crack growth is the smaller of either 
0.05 b0 or 0.040 inches (b0 is the length of the remaining uncracked ligament after precracking 
but prior to testing).  This latter condition is necessitated because the E1921-13 method is 
premised on a physical model that assumes a cleavage failure mechanism, and the volume of 
material sampled grows dramatically as the crack moves through the material.  For the size of the 
C(T) specimens tested in this effort, this meant that ductile crack growth was not allowed to 
exceed approximately 0.025 inches before the sample failed due to cleavage to be considered a 
valid test, which is determined by post-test measurements of the fracture surface.  This post-test 
measurement is a standard procedure in fracture testing.  As shown in Table 7.2.1.2-2, six tests 
failed this data qualification limit and could not be used in the T0 analysis without censoring.   
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Table 7.2.1.2-2.  T0 Transition Reference Temperature Data for 1143 Material from 
V00125 in Bounding Material Orientation 
Sample B0,in 
T,   
°F 
JC,              
in-lbf/in2 
KJC,               
ksi√in 
KJC (1T),                 
ksi√in δj
344-4-38 0.3738 –179.8 60.1 43.7 38.1 1 
344-4-41 0.3753 –180.1 69.2 46.9 40.6 1 
344-4-42 0.3743 –170.5 93.9 54.6 46.7 1 
344-4-44 0.3735 –170.8 100.3 56.4 48.1 1 
344-4-46 0.3735 –180.2 106.7 58.2 49.5 1 
344-4-24 0.3748 –170.1 117.6 61.1 51.8 1 
344-4-39 0.3742 –179.9 199.5 79.6 66.2 1 
344-4-23 0.3748 –120.2 220.0 83.6 69.4 0 
344-4-25 0.3762 –170.1 227.3 85.0 70.5 1 
344-4-28 0.3742 –171.5 234.2 86.2 71.4 1 
344-4-22 0.3752 –121.5 241.6 87.6 72.5 0 
344-4-17 0.3770 –20.1 334.9 103.1 84.7 0 
344-4-20 0.3757 –121.6 353.2 105.9 86.9 0 
344-4-18 0.3767 –70.2 403.0 113.1 92.6 0 
344-4-19 0.3743 –120.3 405.5 113.5 92.7 0 
A separate validity criterion requires that the test temperature be within ±50°C of T0.  If this 
condition is not met, then the data do not describe cleavage behavior well in the transition 
regime.  In this case, no censoring procedure is appropriate, and the data must be excluded from 
the T0 analysis per ASTM E 1921-13.  This requirement can be procedurally difficult to meet 
since T0 is not known a priori and is, in fact, what is being measured.  Fortunately, while many 
tests were close to violating this condition, none actually did so. 
Sufficient data were produced for calculating T0, even with the interim exclusion of the censored 
data.  Based on the nine valid tests, T0 was determined to be –71.0°C (–95.8°F).  This should be 
considered a provisional but generally representative T0 since the censoring process has not been 
performed and the inclusion of censored data is expected to change T0 slightly.  This provisional 
T0 is expected to be conservative compared with the fully qualified T0 determined with the 
censored data included.   
The reference transition temperature T0 is not equivalent to TNDT, but a Master Curve-based index 
temperature RTT0 can be determined, which can be used as a substitute for RTNDT.  This can be 
determined based on equation (7.2.1) to be RTT0 = T0 + 35°C = –71.0°C + 35°C = –36.0°C  
(–32.8°F) for the 1143 material. 
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It is noteworthy to consider that because T0 was not known before completing the tests and 
analysis, it is not surprising that some tests did not fail due to cleavage before the ductile crack 
extension limit was reached as test temperatures were iteratively decreased.  Historical testing of 
nuclear grade materials, which are much tougher than the materials tested for the LPV program, 
conventionally violate the plastic constraint data qualification limit.  Due to considerably lower 
toughness, this was not of concern for the LPV materials; no tests came close to violating this 
limit.  Conversely, there were many tests on the LPV materials that failed the ductile crack 
extension limit, which upon thorough analysis revealed some difficulties in censoring based on 
this limit.  Censoring is required in the case of excessive ductile crack growth before fracture 
because if the sample experienced an appreciable amount of ductile crack growth before failure, 
then the fracture is not described as cleavage.  In such cases, the measured fracture toughness 
following considerable crack extension needs to be bounded by a lower K value in order for the 
cleavage fracture assumption to be valid.  This lower K value is determined as the lesser of either 
(1) KJIC at the coldest possible temperature at which it can be measured or (2) the value of KJ∆a, 
which is the value of K in the specimen at the point in the test where the 0.025-inch ductile crack 
extension limit, was violated.  
In regard to the LPV material tests, the issue is that these limiting K values are difficult to 
determine given the LPV material behavior and the test method that was used.  Determining the 
KJ∆a value requires knowledge of the ductile J-integral resistance curve as the crack grows, 
which requires crack length data as it grows throughout the test.  The test method used in this 
assessment does not provide that feedback.  This choice involves a trade between running tests 
inexpensively with some that may not be valid, versus a more time intensive and complicated 
test that provides crack length feedback.  At the beginning, the choice was to utilize the simpler 
method, and this approach has been sufficient.  However, this choice has also left a number of 
tests lingering with the ductile crack extension invalidity.  It remains undetermined whether a 
change to the more complicated test is warranted to avoid these invalid tests.  
The other means of getting a proper censoring reference test is to determine the coldest value of 
JIC feasible to provide the KJIC.  A few tests were attempted for the 1143 material at –120°F but 
were unsuccessful.  During the tests, increases in displacement occurred without a corresponding 
change in load, indicating a test issue such as ice buildup on the measurement gage or possible 
carbide or manganese locking [ref. 66].  These tests will be further pursued to obtain a proper 
censoring KJIC.  As an alternative in the absence of such data, ASTM E 1921-13, Section 10.2.2, 
requires the use of the highest uncensored KJc(1T) in the data.  In the 1143 data set, this 
corresponds to specimen 344-4-25, with a value of 70.5 ksi√in.  This exceeds the KJc(1T) value for 
only 344-4-23 and, thus, does not make a reasonable censoring value for that specimen.  
However, this value would be acceptable in the absence of a better alternative to use as a 
censoring value for the five other censored tests.  At the time of this writing, this procedure has 
not yet been applied. 
It was determined from this test program is that testing at colder temperatures and then testing 
warmer, as needed, is likely a more effective method than testing in a decreasing temperature 
pattern.  The former method is likely to converge more quickly on the temperatures required for 
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cleavage.  One caveat to this is the cautionary note that testing at exceptionally cold temperatures 
is not recommended because the test temperature must be within 50°C of T0 for it to be useable 
in the T0 analysis.  It is noted that for both the 1143 and the 1146 material the testing 
temperatures ultimately required to produce cleavage pushed close to the extent of this allowable 
testing window.  Too much weight should not be placed on Charpy impact methods, which can 
be overly conservative. 
A total of 17 basic method fracture toughness tests were performed on C-L 1146 material over 
the range 32°F to –60°F.  To date, 1 test was performed at 32°F, 1 at –20°F, 2 at –50°F, and 13 at 
–60°F.  The data are shown in Table 7.2.1.2-3.  Of the 17 total tests, 11 were fully valid and
6 will require censoring and have not been included in the current analysis.  When considering 
only the fully valid data, sufficient data were measured for calculating T0.  This provisional T0 
was determined to be –2.6°C (27.3°F).  Based on Equation (7.2.1), RTT0 is determined to be  
–2.6°C + 35°C = 32.4°C (90.3°F).  The 1146 material clearly has a much higher T0 than the 1143
material, which was not predicted based on the strength properties shown in Table 7.2.1.1-3.  
This provisional T0 is considered generally representative but is expected to change when the 
censored data are included in the analysis.  Censoring the 1146 data according to ASTM  
E 1921-13, Section 10.2.2, is not possible because the highest uncensored KJc(1T) in the data 
corresponds to specimen 344-4-30, with a value of 68.1 ksi√in.  This exceeds the KJc(1T) value for 
all of the uncensored specimens and, thus, is not a reasonable censoring value. 
0Table 7.2.1.2-3. T Transition Reference Temperature Data for 1146 Material from 
V00125 in Bounding Material Orientation 
Sample B0, in 
T,        
°F 
JC, 
in-lbf/in2 
KJC, 
ksi√in 
KJC (1T), 
ksi√in δj
344-4-49 0.191 –59.8 94.6 54.9 42.4 1 
344-4-51 0.1905 –60.8 116.7 61.0 46.4 1 
344-4-14 0.1995 –60.8 142.8 67.5 51.0 1 
344-4-29 0.2453 –60.1 140.6 66.9 52.4 1 
344-4-35 0.2442 –60 141.3 67.1 52.5 1 
344-4-52 0.1901 –59.8 164.3 72.4 53.9 1 
344-4-50 0.1906 –59.7 165.0 72.5 54.0 1 
 344-4-15 0.1978 –60.1 179.9 75.7 56.5 1 
344-4-34 0.244 –60.3 179.8 75.7 58.5 1 
344-4-48 0.1901 –60.5 209.9 81.8 60.1 0 
344-4-33 0.2435 –60 192.6 78.4 60.4 1 
344-4-16 0.1985 32 221.4 84.0 62.0 0 
344-4-12 0.1962 –50.3 238.7 87.2 64.0 0 
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344-4-13 0.1993 –50.8 257.3 90.5 66.4 0 
344-4-11 0.1968 –20 268.3 92.5 67.6 0 
344-4-32 0.2435 –59.8 249.5 89.2 67.9 0 
344-4-30 0.245 –60.9 250.4 89.3 68.1 1 
All specimens tested to determine T0 for both the 1143 and the 1146 material were of C(T) 
geometries, with the specimen thicknesses maximized given the constraints of the thin shell 
layers.  The cut plans specified cutting the specimens to the full thickness with minimal cleanup. 
Multiple nominal thicknesses were tested for the 1146 material for no other reason than that the 
machinists became more adept with experience at maximizing the specimen thickness.  
Master Curve plots for the 1143 and 1146 materials are shown as the red lines in  
Figures 7.2.1.2-10 and 7.2.1.2-11, respectively.  Ninety-five-percent confidence bounds have 
been determined according to E 1921-13 and are also shown as the black dashed lines.  
Figure 7.2.1.2-10.  Master Curve Plot for 1143 Material 
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Figure 7.2.1.2-11.  Master Curve Plot for 1146 Material 
Note that certain details of determining T0 have been purposely omitted from this report, as they 
were not considered germane to the principal LPV scope.  Except for the use of only non-
censored data, the analysis for T0 was done according to ASTM E 1921-13.  Since not using 
censored data removes the highest toughness data from the analysis, any revised T0 will be 
higher and, hence, less conservative than the values reported here.  These details and all 
supporting data are planned to be completely provided in a separate NASA Technical 
Memorandum.  
7.2.1.2.3 Use of Fracture Toughness Values from T0 
The work described in the previous sections for generation of T0 values for the head and shell 
materials marks the first step in the process of determining the performance of these materials in 
the presence of defects as a function of the use temperature and material thickness (as related to 
potential crack front length).  It must be clear that the T0 value is only a reference value anchored 
at a toughness of 100 MPa√m for an equivalent 1-inch-thick specimen.  The 1-inch-thick 
reference specimen size establishes the 1-inch crack front length as the standard sampling 
volume of material relative to randomly occurring cleavage initiators, such as carbide particles.  
The T0 value must not be confused with the MDMT used to limit vessel temperature in use.  The 
T0 value should be considered only a convenient way to express the fracture toughness of the 
material as a function of temperature with a statistically substantiated model of the data.  There 
are a number of ways future work may utilize these T0 values to arrive at a MDMT for a given 
vessel.  First, as discussed in Section 7.2.1.1.5, it is important to recognize that the fracture 
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toughness testing performed to date represents the performance of only a single lot of the  
1143 and 1146 alloys.  Additional evaluation of T0 across many lots, including all alloys and 
welds, representing the larger LPV fleet is needed before obtaining T0 values that may be 
considered representative of the entire LPV population.  Once fully representative values for  
T0 are produced, there are two likely ways that the T0 value will be used to evaluate an MDMT.  
The first is to use the T0 model for thickness correction to develop a set of curves for the LPV 
materials along the lines of the Charpy exemption curves shown in Section VIII, part UCS-66 
[ref. 1].  This family of curves, covering a variety of specific pressure vessel steels, has 
classically been used to set the MDMT as a function of material thickness for vessels fabricated 
from the specified materials or by the bounding curve (A) for general carbon steels.  This 
approach is consistent with the traditional Section VIII design criteria and provides a rationale 
for MDMT independent of the actual defect state within the vessels; however, its safe application 
to older, non-code vessels requires further evaluation.  A second approach to using T0 to develop 
an MDMT is to use a vessel-specific FFS logic, using rationale based on fracture mechanics 
assessment in accordance with ASME FFS-1 [ref. 32].  This approach has the advantage of 
adapting to a given vessel’s use conditions (i.e., pressure and temperature), so it may provide 
additional flexibility.  Although this approach is perhaps more appropriate to the older, non-code 
LPVs because it starts with the assumption that the vessel includes crack-like defects, the need 
for this assumption is also the distinct disadvantage of this method.  As discussed in detail in this 
report, the LPV design currently precludes quantitative NDE.  This leaves the FFS approach 
potentially unanchored in many sections of the LPV.  Regardless of approach, there remains a 
considerable body of research to property define the MDMT for the LPV fleet.  The currently 
reported T0 values are merely the beginning of the process. 
7.2.1.3 Evaluation of Weld Microstructural Regions 
The third task of this assessment involved investigating various representative welds of the LPV 
system to begin the process of specifying a method for fracture toughness testing in the weld 
regions.  The welds are significantly more likely to contain defects that cause concern for the 
FFS of the LPV fleet; therefore, the toughness of the welds is of considerable interest.  The 
evaluation of the weld material is complicated by the presence of nonuniform microstructure and 
residual stress.  The toughness of the weld can vary significantly within the same joint, such as 
the weld nugget, the fusion lines, or the HAZs on either side.  A common method to begin the 
process of understanding the propensity for toughness debits across a weld is to look at the local 
hardness in the microstructure across the various zones of the weld.  Frequently, the zone with 
the lowest toughness will present itself with the highest local hardness.  To evaluate this, each of 
the representative welds in the V0125 vessel was cross-sectioned and mounted for 
microstructural evaluation.  A microhardness traverse was done across representative sections of 
the weld.  One example is shown in Figure 7.2.1.3-1 for the head-to-shell weld of V125.  The 
small white marks are reflections from the dents made by the microhardness indenter.   
Figure 7.2.1.3-2 shows the results of three of the hardness traverses.  
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Figure 7.2.1.3-1.  Microhardness Traverses Taken across the V0125 Head-to-Shell Weld 
Figure 7.2.1.3-2.  Microhardness Traverses Illustrating Hardness Response Differences in  
Inner Layer and First Thinner Layer in V0125 
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The microhardness profiles are well behaved, showing gradual changes across the weld zones 
and no isolated regions of particularly high hardness.  Because the LPV welds do not receive a 
post-weld heat treatment, it was expected that the hardness would vary more than observed in 
these data.  This is a preferred result from the perspective of the weld performance—there do not 
appear to be high-strength/low-toughness zones within the welds, but reducing the burden for 
testing the various zones across the welds does not help as was hoped.  Though of largely 
uniform hardness, the microstructures (and residual stresses) do vary across the weld.  The weld 
location of least toughness will have to be determined through toughness testing.  Though not 
accomplished as part of this assessment, preliminary weld region toughness tests are currently in 
planning. 
As another means of evaluating weld quality while helping to determine any systematic 
occurrence of weld process defects, a radiographic inspection of 1146a wrapping-layer 
longitudinal-seam welds was performed on approximately 50 inches of weld from section 11 of 
V0032 after the vessel section was dissected to reveal the welds [ref. 67].  For this vessel, each 
layer is joined to the adjacent layer by a single longitudinal seam weld, as shown in Figure 
7.2.1.3-3.  The five longitudinal welds in the 10-inch-long section comprised the 50 inches that 
were inspected.  Sampling the quality of these seam welds is important because there is currently 
no NDE method available for the longitudinal shell welds for intact LPVs and because the 
original LPV mechanical drawings typically specified only limited NDE inspection, including 
RT of inner shell longitudinal welds and some MT of longitudinal shell welds.  Data from these 
inspections are not available.  
Figure 7.2.1.3-3.  Cross Section for V0032-11, Evaluated by RT for Longitudinal  
Shell Welds Shown 
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The inspections performed in the current evaluation were conducted on dissected sections 
comprised of two layers with an individual longitudinal weld.  The goal was to determine the 
typical weld quality, including the location, type, size, and number of defects per linear foot of 
the welds, and whether a pattern emerges in the nature of these observed defects.  Pattern refers 
to any outstanding characteristic or feature in the observed defects, with special interest in 
features that might impact the final FFS rationale.  RT was a first attempt at characterizing the 
longitudinal shell welds, with the understanding that one of the limitations of RT is that it does 
not reliably detect cracks that are not open and are not optimally oriented with respect to the 
direction of the beam.  
The V0032 section 11 results showed considerable porosity and lack of fusion, with all welds 
inspected failing the inspection criteria per ASME Section VIII [ref. 1], Appendices 4 and 12.  
Appendix 4 is specific to rounded RT indications.  Appendix 12 is referenced so that lack of 
fusion can be included as a rejectable indication, as the BPVC does not include this callout under 
RT.  Given this unfavorable inspection result, five additional longitudinal seam welds from 
V0032 section 8 were inspected utilizing the same inspection method [ref. 68].  Section 8 was a 
19-inch-long segment, which at the time of this writing brings the total inspected length of 
V0032 longitudinal welds to approximately 145 inches.  All of the longitudinal seam welds 
inspected in V0032 to date have failed to meet ASME Section VIII due to lack of fusion and 
porosity.  
An additional set of RT inspections was performed on ring 4 from V0125 to determine possible 
vessel-to-vessel longitudinal weld quality differences [ref. 69].  As a four-layer vessel, this 
included the inspection of three welds, each approximately 8 inches in length.  In contrast to 
V0032 (an A. O. Smith vessel), no rejectable conditions were found in the longitudinal seam 
welds of V0125 (constructed by CB&I).  Overall, the quality issues that were observed (lack of 
fusion and porosity) are probably more indicative of weld processing issues than material quality 
issues.  Additional RT inspection is needed to build a sufficient family of data to provide a 
broader assessment.  This work is currently ongoing with additional evaluations planned for 
V0032 and V0125 and other available vessel materials. 
7.2.2 WRS Modeling of LPVs 
Introduction 
Remaining life assessment of the aging NASA LPV vessels requires that a fatigue and fracture 
mechanics FFS assessment be performed.  The WRS caused during LPV fabrication can strongly 
affect both fracture response and fatigue life6.  The purpose of this effort is to perform weld 
analyses of several different typical layered vessels to determine the WRS fields in the layered 
shells.  Two NASA vessels were chosen for WRS analysis:  (1) a small, four-layer vessel and  
(2) a large, 14-layer vessel.  This report summarizes the results for the small four-layer vessel; 
the results for the larger vessel will be reported later.  These analyses will be compared with 
those of monolithic shells to determine the layering effect on WRS fields.  If the layering effect 
6 WRS can affect corrosion growth, but this is not considered a problem in the NASA LPV tanks. 
NESC Request No.: TI-13-00852 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report
Document #: 
NESCP-RP-
13-00852 
Version: 
1.1 
Title:
Evaluation of Agency Non-code LPVs 
Page #: 
111 of 193 
is found to be small, it is possible that the WRS fields for use in fracture assessment may be 
obtained from monolithic vessels, which permit much easier analysis.  In addition, if the layering 
effect is small, the use of solutions that appear in the API-579 code [ref. 32] may be permissible. 
Geometry 
Only the results for the four-layer tank circumferential weld are provided here.  The smaller 
vessel was evaluated first because of its simpler construction (fewer layers) so that the layered 
vessel weld analysis procedure could be refined before addressing a larger vessel.  The 
description of this tank is discussed in [ref. 70].  A schematic of the weld geometry as modeled 
can be seen in Figure 7.2.2-1. 
Figure 7.2.2-1.  Four-layer Tank Considered for Weld Residual Stress Analysis 
As seen in Figure 7.2.2-1, a shell-to-shell and a head-to-shell weld were considered.  This 
represents a 3,500-psig, 609.6-mm (24-inch) diameter, and 3098.8-mm (122-inch) long vessel of 
vessel type M117.  This vessel has an inner shell thickness of 12.7 mm (0.5 inches) and three 
layers of 6.35-mm (0.25-inch) thickness, for a total thickness of 31.75 mm (1.25 inches).  In 
addition, the shell-to-shell and head-to-shell welds were also modeled as monolithic vessels 
(without the layers) in order to compare the layered analysis results with the monolithic results.  
Note that the four-layer model had a head the same size as the shell.  However, many heads have 
smaller diameters than the shell, which is often the case with NASA’s fleet of LPVs since 
primary stress in the hemispherical heads is only one-half that in the cylindrical shells.  The  
14-layer tank being analyzed now includes the taper transition.  The taper transition between 
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such sections, including the severity of the taper, has a yet-to-be-determined effect on the stress 
results and should be considered in the future. 
Weld Modeling Procedure 
The Computational Weld Model: The analysis was performed using the Virtual Fabrication 
Technology (VFT™) computational weld modeling code [ref. 71]7.  As seen in Figure 7.2.2-2, 
VFT has three modules:  
1. GUI (graphical user interface), which is used to define weld passes, material data, weld
sequence, etc. (i.e., GUI in Figure 7.2.2-2).
2. Thermal module, which calculates the temperature time histories at each nodal point as
each pass is deposited.  Here, the possibility of gap resistance between the plate layers is
ignored since the plates are generally assumed to be tight against each other.  Based on
discussions with a former layered vessel manufacturer8, the thermal conductance in the
radial direction at the layered regions was modeled as being 25% of the thermal
conductance in the other directions.
3. The structural solution is performed using Abaqus® with a weld-specific material user
routine (labeled “UMAT” in Figure 7.2.2-2), which is written to handle the unique
aspects of welding such as material melting/resolidification, annealing caused by material
heating above the phase transformation temperature, temperature-dependent hardening up
to melting (800°C to 900°C suffices for ferritic steels), etc.  The possibility of phase
transformation plasticity effects is ignored since data are not available.
Finite Element Weld Model – The finite element weld models are shown in Figure 7.2.2-3, where 
the upper left model is layered shell to monolithic head, the upper right is layered shell to layered 
shell, the lower left is monolithic shell to monolithic head, and the lower right shows the 
monolithic shell-to-shell weld.  The layers are identified via the different colors, as are the weld 
grouping elements.  A total of 14 passes are modeled.  Note that the simplified model using 
“rectangular” weld passes has been shown to have little effect on WRS results, as long as the 
relative pass sizes are realistic.  For the structural solution, there were convergence difficulties 
caused by the use of contact9 between the layers.  This was mainly caused during deposition of 
each pass when the material properties in the weld being deposited and near the interface contact 
zones were very low (low stiffness).  However, the convergence difficulties were overcome by 
using restart analyses where solution parameters were continually modified. 
7 Numerous publications of the theory and examples of weld residual stress and distortion calculations are available 
(for example, see references 67 through 70, and the many references cited therein, for more model details).  Emc2 
developed and uses VFT for many problems for weld modeling analysis, fatigue, and corrosion assessment of 
welded structures.  In addition, VFT is leased by a number of organizations including Caterpillar, Knowls Atomic 
Power Laboratory (KAPL), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Babcock and Wilcox (B&W), and Rolls 
Royce (United Kingdom). 
8 Maan Jawad, private discussions. 
9 Frictionless contact was used. 
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Figure 7.2.2-2.  VFT Weld Modeling System 
Figure 7.2.2-3.  Axisymmetric Weld Models and Meshes 
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Material isotropic hardening was initially used for the weld analyses.  With classical plasticity 
theory used here, the stress state must be on the yield surface during plastic straining.  With 
isotropic hardening, the yield surface expands during this plastic straining due to hardening.  
With kinematic hardening, the yield surface moves rigidly during plastic straining with the size 
of the yield surface remaining the same as the original size (i.e., the yield stress).  Mixed 
hardening permits both translation and expansion of the yield surface and is considered most 
accurate.  Isotropic hardening tends to produce upper bound results in WRS predictions.  The 
material data used for the weld metal should be obtained in the annealed condition because the 
shrinkage during solidification is modeled.  Here, the annealed data are not available.  Therefore, 
the analyses were performed using linear kinematic hardening10.  It is believed that use of 
kinematic hardening might be most appropriate here since the as-welded material data were used.  
However, this is only an experience-based guess at this point.  Both results are presented here 
since isotropic hardening results should produce conservative predictions of FFS.  It is noted that 
material data are not available to model mixed hardening. 
An accurate analysis requires material data for each material from room temperature up to 
melting.  As seen in Figure 7.2.2-3, the materials in the four-layer tank are 1146a for the shell 
and A225 Grade B for the head.  The weld metal also was assumed to be 1146a.  Since stress-
strain data were not available for these materials, the properties used were obtained by scaling 
known stress strain curves for another similar pressure vessel steel (A516) based on the actual 
yield stress data tested by SwRI® [ref. 45].  Based on prior work in the nuclear industry, it is 
believed that this approach produces estimates of the stress strain response for the layered tank 
materials that are quite reasonable.  The curves used to perform the weld analysis are shown in 
Figure 7.2.2-4.  Since actual properties for the weld material were not known, any weld 
overmatch was not modeled.  If it exists, it would result in increases in the WRS fields roughly 
by the ratio of the yield stresses between the base and weld materials. 
10 Mixed (Chaboche) hardening would be best to use since cyclic loading does occur as each weld pass is deposited 
near prior passes.  However, the material data necessary for this are not available. 
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Figure 7.2.2-4.  Stress Strain Curves Used for Mechanical Portion of Analysis 
WRS Results 
While no direct validation of the residual stress predictions was made here, the predictions of 
radial distortion and the corresponding gapping seen near the welds were qualitatively predicted.  
However, as mentioned in the previous section, extensive validation of the procedures and 
predictions of WRS and distortions have been made as indicated in references 72 through 76, the 
references sited therein, and user and validation manuals.  It turns out that the hydrotest pressure 
of the vessel (38.06 MPa/5,250 psi), which was performed at a pressure of 1.5 times the 
nameplate design pressure of 3,500 psi (24.13 MPa), tends to relax the as-welded WRS fields, so 
this process was modeled as well.  This hydropressure induces plasticity in and near the weld, 
which has the effect of relaxing the WRS magnitudes.  This result was not initially anticipated 
based on experience with modern code vessels.  However, since this layered vessel was 
fabricated from higher strength steel than is common today (105 ksi tensile strength, 75 ksi yield) 
and was designed with a significantly lower FS on shell tensile strength (2.86 FS) than code 
vessels at the time (i.e., 4) or modern BPVC vessels (i.e., 3.5), the stress due to pressure loading 
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is much higher than exists in code vessels.  In hindsight, it is not surprising that a  
1.5× overpressure test would cause more inelastic strain than anticipated with resulting residual 
stress relaxation. 
Figure 7.2.2-5 shows contour plots of hoop WRS fields in the layered shell-to-shell 
circumferential weld.  The upper illustration shows isotropic hardening, and the bottom shows 
linear kinematic hardening results.  As discussed above, it is believed that the linear kinematic 
hardening results are most appropriate since the as-welded properties for the weld metal had to 
be used.  However, results are shown using both hardening laws since isotropic hardening 
provides the most conservative predictions for FFS assessments.  For the fracture assessment, it 
may be desirable to use the most conservative predictions if they are not overly conservative. 
Figure 7.2.2-5.  Hoop WRS Predictions for Layered Shell-to-Shell Weld 
Figure 7.2.2-6 shows contour plots of axial WRS fields in the layered shell-to-shell 
circumferential weld.  The upper illustration shows isotropic hardening, and the bottom shows 
linear kinematic hardening results.  Somewhat higher axial stresses are seen near the ID and 
alternate between tension and compression at each layer.  This is clearly different behavior 
compared with a monolithic analysis (which was performed but not reported in this high-level 
summary).  Figures 7.2.2-7 and 7.2.2-8 show similar contour plots for hoop and axial stress, 
respectively, for the shell-to-head weld.  For the most part, the WRS in the shell-to-head weld 
are slightly higher than for the shell-to-shell weld.   
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Figure 7.2.2-6.  Axial WRS Predictions for Layered Shell-to-Shell Weld 
Figure 7.2.2-7.  Hoop WRS Predictions for Layered Shell-to-Head Weld 
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Figure 7.2.2-8.  Axial WRS Predictions for Layered Shell-to-Head Weld 
WRS Line Plots and Comparison to Monolithic Results – It is useful to compare line plots of the 
WRS fields from the layered shell cases to monolithic vessel cases to determine the importance 
of including the layers in the analysis.  As discussed above, solutions using the layers with 
contact are more challenging and can lead to convergence difficulties.  Moreover, if the layer 
effect can be neglected, then solutions from API-579 (or other sources) can be used to estimate 
the stress intensity factors using the weight function approach in Appendix C of API-579.  In 
addition, it is often easier to compare the stress fields directly with line plots. 
As seen in Figures 7.2.2-5 through 7.2.2-8, the WRS distributions vary spatially in the weld 
region, as well as in the HAZs.  For fracture mechanics assessment it is most proper to include 
this variation when calculating fracture parameters (e.g., the stress intensity factor, K) by using 
(for instance) the finite element alternating method (FEAM)11 to insert cracks at various 
locations within the WRS field and then determining the K value.  However, API-579 
conservatively permits the use of a through-thickness line definition of WRS (for use with 
Appendix C stress intensity factor weight function tabulations), which is assumed to be invariant 
throughout the weld and the HAZ12. 
11 FEAM is a convenient method for quickly obtaining stress intensity factors within WRS fields. 
12 Of course, this assumption is overly conservative since the WRS field clearly varies throughout the weld and 
HAZ, as can be seen in Figures 7.2.3-5 through 7.2.3-8. 
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In this section, line plots are provided and compared.  Line plots of stress are provided along 
three paths, as illustrated in Figure 7.2.2-9.  One represents a plot through the weld centerline, 
one intersects layer 1 with the weld (path 1), and one intersects layers 2 and 3 and the weld (path 
2-3).  Figure 7.2.2-10 illustrates line plots of axial and hoop WRS for the shell-to-shell case.  The 
solid black and solid red lines compare results between isotropic and kinematic hardening.  It is 
seen that the axial stress differences are relatively small except at the ID of the vessel.  It is noted 
that the differences between isotropic and kinematic hardening are much greater in the as-
welded condition prior to application of the hydrotest.  The dashed lines in Figure 7.2.2-10 are 
for the monolithic case.  The monolithic shell results do not compare well for the axial stresses 
and are conservative for hoop stresses. 
Figure 7.2.2-9.  Line Path Definitions for Through Thickness Stress Plots 
Figure 7.2.2-10.  Shell-to-Head Weld: Line Plot from ID to Outer Diameter (OD) along Centerline 
Figure 7.2.2-11 illustrates the line plots of the axial and hoop WRS fields along the layer  
path 2-3 (see Figure 7.2.2-9) for the shell-to-head case.  The axial stresses are highest at the ID 
for both the isotropic and kinematic hardening cases.  For low toughness materials, this may lead 
to a fully circumferential crack that, if undetected, could possibly grow through-wall with cyclic 
pressure loadings and eventually lead to a head blowout, although this was not specifically 
modeled and evaluated and would require crack-growth rate analyses and loading history 
assumptions that are well outside the scope of this study.  The axial stresses for the monolithic 
case are somewhat similar to the layered case here.  On the other hand, the monolithic shell-to-
Centerline Path Path 1 Path 2-3 
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head case produces higher hoop stresses than the shell case.  One can also see that the stresses 
have “jumps” near the layer-to-weld intersections where a natural crack exists.  Other plots like 
this show similar trends and suggest that modeling the actual shell behavior is more important 
than using the monolithic results.  The effect of tapered head-to-shell transitions must also be 
determined. 
Figure 7.2.2-11.  Shell-to-Head Weld: Line Plot from ID to OD along Layer Path 2-3 
Comparison to API-579 Solutions 
One of the goals of this effort was to determine whether the procedure in Appendix E of  
API-579 [ref. 32] for estimating WRS fields in pipes and vessels could apply to NASA LPVs.  
The API-579 estimates are meant to be upper bound generic solutions used in lieu of finite 
element WRS-based solutions13.  Figure 7.2.2-12 compares the WRS analyses for both the 
layered cases for the shell-to-shell (top) and shell-to-head (bottom) cases, respectively.  The use 
of the API-579 solution for both axial and hoop stresses (for evaluating circumferential and axial 
cracking, respectively) appears to be conservative for most points through the thickness14.  For 
the shell-to-shell case, the isotropic hardening axial stresses near the ID are highest.  However, if 
the API-579 solutions are used for cracks near the OD of the vessels, then fracture predictions 
will likely be too conservative as axial stresses approach 700 MPa and hoop stresses 800 MPa 
from the API solutions.  Note that the API-579 estimated solutions for the shell-to-head case use 
the material yield stress for the shell material (layer side of weld). 
As discussed above, the API-579-estimated WRS fields assume that the stresses are constant 
spatially throughout the weld.  This is not true based on Figures 7.2.2-7 and 7.2.2-8 contour 
plots.  Therefore, it is also useful to examine line plots at a location away from the weld 
centerline.  Figure 7.2.2-13 illustrates the WRS fields along the layer path 2-3 (see  
Figure 7.2.2-9), which is along the line near the top of the vessel where “natural cracks” exist 
due the structure of the layered vessel.  It is seen that the API-579 solutions for hoop stress are 
conservative throughout the thickness and probably too conservative from midway through the 
13 Users of API-579 always have the option of developing their own WRS fields from welding. 
14 It is noted that the API-579 solutions are not developed for the shell-to-head case, but it can be assumed to apply 
regardless. 
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thickness to the OD.  The API-579 axial stresses are conservative throughout except right at the 
ID and somewhat near mid thickness.  Again, the API-579 solutions near the OD are probably 
overly conservative. 
Figure 7.2.2-12.  Comparison of API-579 Solutions to Calculated Results for Both Shell-to-Shell and 
Shell-to-Head Tank Cases (axial, left; hoop, right): Weld Centerline 
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Figure 7.2.2-13.  Comparison of API-579 Solutions to Calculated Results for Both Shell-to-Shell and 
Shell-to-Head Tank Cases (axial, left; hoop, right): Layer 2-3 Path 
Measurement of Weld Residual Stress Fields 
It may be useful to obtain a sample of WRS measurements in order to validate the predictions 
since full material test data are not available.  There are several state-of-the-art methods that are 
often used in order to obtain through-thickness WRS fields, including neutron diffraction, deep 
hole drilling, and the contour method (see reference 73 for a summary of all three methods).  
Because of the nature of LPVs it appears that deep hole drilling might be most useful here.  It is 
noted, however, that there are often scatter in measurements and differences in measurements 
between the different methods.  Therefore, it is often useful to obtain measurements using two 
different methods. 
Summary and Conclusions 
From the analyses of the four-layer vessels, the following conclusions are drawn: 
• WRS predictions using isotropic hardening are almost always highest in absolute value
for hoop stresses (versus other hardening models), while axial stresses are quite similar
except near the ID.  Because there is a lack of material property data, both sets of results
are presented at this time.
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• Hoop WRSs are conservatively predicted using a monolithic geometry, neglecting the
layers for both shell-to-head and shell-to-shell welds.  However, predictions may be
overly conservative from an FFS standpoint.
• The use of API-579 WRS solutions will likely be overly conservative, and calculated
WRS fields where the correct hydrotest pressure is applied can be used if the API
solutions for FFS predictions are overly constraining.
• Axial and hoop WRS tend to be maximum along path 2-3, which is near the edges of the
weld near the region of layer-to-weld convergence.  Axial and hoop WRS spikes occur
near the region where the path intersects layer/weld interfaces due to the sharp crack-like
interface.  This could possibly be a crack initiation location for both circumferential and
axial cracks.
• Results for a 14-layer vessel are nearly complete and will be presented soon.
• Calculations of stress intensity factors in these WRS fields need to be made for cracks
positioned at different locations near the weld in order to perform FFS and remaining life
calculations.
• A second hydrotest pressure of 1.5 times design load was applied, and this had little
effect on reducing the WRSs.  However, when a second hydrotest pressure 10% higher
(41.86 MPa rather than 38.06 MPa) the WRSs were reduced with a maximum reduction
of about 5% (hoop stresses) and 7% (axial stresses).  This might be considered for life
extension if the additional higher-pressure hydrotest did not cause damage.
7.2.3 Evaluation of Two Digital Image Correlation Techniques to Detect LPV 
Deformations during Hydrotest 
NASA has a long history of safe pressure vessel operation that is largely attributable to a 
rigorous vessel certification program.  Vessel certification entails inspections to detect and assess 
the effect of damage such as corrosion and cracking.  Damage to solid wall vessels is readily 
detectable through standard NDE inspection techniques.  However, damage to the shell sections 
of LPVs is hard to detect using standard NDE inspection techniques.  For example, a crack 
within an intermediate layer is generally confined to the affected layer and cannot be detected 
using visual or surface NDE inspection techniques.  Such cracks could propagate undetected into 
critical head-to-shell welds, leading to catastrophic vessel failure without warning.  This type of 
intermediate layer damage could partially compromise shell integrity and might produce local 
shell deformations that could be detectable via photogrammetric techniques.  The ability to 
detect defects using this approach could be compromised by the effect of layer gaps, which result 
in a reduced outer shell deformation.  For example, ASME requires that an LPV have a 
minimum of only 50% of the outer shell deformation as measured by Pi Tape, compared with a 
monolithic shell.  
Full-field optical deformation techniques, which include scanning vibrometers, various types of 
interferometry techniques, and digital image correlation have become more commonplace within 
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the past decade.  Digital image correlation applications have vastly expanded due to the 
advancements in sensor hardware capability and computer processing power needed for the 
pattern recognition and point tracking algorithms.  In recent years, the testing paradigm has 
dramatically shifted from the use of physical instrumentation gages to optical techniques to 
capture deformation and motion.   
NASA has previously used commercial digital image correlation systems in a number of areas, 
including the Space Shuttle Program.  For the Columbia Accident Investigation and the Return to 
Flight Program, deflections of reinforced carbon-carbon test panels from impact tests were 
captured and used to validate analysis models for flight rationale.  In the current timeframe, 
optical metrology is used at nearly every NASA field center on a daily basis.  References are 
provided to illustrate the wide range of research and engineering applications of optical 
metrology in areas of material characterization [refs. 77–80], structural analysis [refs. 80–83], 
and biomechanics [refs. 84–87]. 
The test in this report used two photogrammetric techniques to measure deformations of a scrap 
LPV during hydrotest pressure excursion from 0 to 4,200 psig (150% of vessel design pressure).  
The objective of the test was to document gross vessel deformations, as well as specific surface 
locations where underlying flaws were known to exist via previous radiographic inspection.  The 
hydrostatic test was conducted at GRC from August 20 to 23, 2013, and consisted of four total 
excursions from 0 to 4,200 psig.  As part of this exercise, the team from MSFC conducted an AE 
survey on the first excursion with the intent to identify the applicability of AE to find internal 
flaws in pressure vessels.  Results of the AE effort are presented in Section 7.2.4 of this NESC 
report.  
7.2.3.1 Test Article 
The test article, shown in Figure 7.2.3.1-1, was a scrap A. O. Smith LPV MV-50405A-31 (GRC 
vessel PV0236) with a 52-inch internal diameter, 24 feet long, with an internal volume of 
306 cubic feet.  The vessel was fabricated with two solid heads and a shell section consisting of 
an inner shell with seven overwrap layers.  Manufacturer design pressure was 2,800 psig.  The 
hydrotest pressure was 4,200 psig (150% vessel design pressure), which was the original 
hydrotest pressure of the vessel at manufacture in 1959.  Prior to testing, the vessel was dormant 
for roughly 20 years due to internal crack-like defects located within vessel shell layers near the 
head-to-shell welds.  These flaws were discovered by radiographic inspection in the early 1990s. 
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Figure 7.2.3.1-1.  Pretest View of PV0236 (vessel measures 52-inches ID × 24 feet long, has an 
internal volume of 306 cubic feet and a design pressure of 2,800 psig, has a layered shell 
construction, and was fabricated in 1959) 
Prior to testing, the vessel was re-inspected with radiography and ultrasound techniques to better 
quantify internal flaws for correlation with both the acoustic and optical measurement methods.  
Radiography was performed on both vessel head-shell welds, and an ultrasonic bore-probe 
inspection was performed on both nozzle welds.  The radiographic inspection confirmed several 
crack-like indications in the vessel shell near both head-shell welds.  Ultrasonic inspection 
revealed lack of fusion in the front fusion zone of both nozzle welds.  These NDE findings are 
summarized pictorially in Figure 7.2.3.1-2.  Referring to the figure, there are three crack-like 
indications in the vessel shell near head-shell weld C-1, measuring between roughly 0.25 inches 
and 0.56 inches, and one 0.27-inch crack-like indication in the vessel shell near head-shell weld  
C-2.  The depth of these flaws within the vessel shell is unknown.  There is a lack of fusion in 
the front fusion zones of both nozzle welds consistent around the entire weld circumference. 
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Figure 7.2.3.1-2.  NDE Results Summarizing Known Vessel Flaws for Vessel PV0236 
7.2.3.2 Digital Image Correlation Methods 
Digital image correlation is the acquisition of engineering data from digital images of an object 
from different perspectives for determination of object shape and deformation at different states 
or loading conditions.  Two different commercially available measurement systems were 
employed on this test: Aramis and Tritop, developed by the German company, GOM mbH. 
Aramis computes full-field three-dimensional surface deformation and strains from stereo image 
sets taken at any selected time interval throughout a test sequence.  These image sets are 
acquired by two image sensors fixed to a rigid beam apart from one another and focused on the 
object of interest being tested.  Aramis utilizes pattern mapping/tracking algorithms to determine 
object deformations in the image pairs between discrete time intervals, and typically requires a 
high-contrast dot or speckle pattern to be applied to the test object of interest to ensure high-
fidelity data capture.  Post-test, the Aramis measurements can be viewed as full three-
dimensional color contour images or plotted against load, time, or other desired values for 
engineering analysis. 
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Tritop is a quasi-static photogrammetry technique that generates shape and deformation results 
from sets of photographs, taken from arbitrary points of view, of an object with a handheld, high-
quality, 12-megapixel digital single-lens reflex camera.  Tritop computes the spatial centroidal 
locations of dots and specialized “coded targets” placed at selected locations on the surface of a 
test article to generate a three-dimensional point cloud.  Using multiple sets of photographs, one 
or more point clouds of the test article can be generated at various test static states and then 
compared with the baseline data.  From these comparisons, Tritop calculates highly accurate 
three-dimensional positional changes for each dot and target, enabling effective visualization of 
structural motion between states.  Typical data reduction from Tritop shows vector plots resolved 
into a defined coordinate system representing the motion of each of the points in the point cloud. 
To calibrate both of these optical systems, a calibration object is required to orient the camera 
spatial locations and establish a scale to ensure the software uses accurate dimensions.  For this 
test sequence, a 2-meter carbon fiber cross, with digital targets placed at known dimensional 
locations, was used for calibration.  For Aramis, calibration of the stereo camera set takes place 
prior to the actual test by recording a few dozen images of the cross located at several different 
locations in the cameras field of view.  With Tritop, the calibration artifact remains in the field of 
view for a number of the handheld images, enabling the software to perform calibration at the 
same time it is calculating the spatial locations of the targets. 
A preliminary study was performed to establish that both Aramis and Tritop were capable of 
resolving the expected deformations for the vessel.  Hand calculations were performed to 
establish theoretical vessel stress, strains, and deformations under 2,800 and 4,200 psig loading 
pressures, for a fully intact vessel, a vessel with one layer lost, and a vessel with two layers lost. 
These parameters are summarized in Table 7.2.3.2-1.  At the 4,200 psig state expected results 
were nominally 1,692 microstrain circumferentially (hoop strain) and an axial vessel elongation 
of about 0.185 inches. 
Table 7.2.3.2-1.  Vessel Stress, Strain, and Deformation Computations at Two Pressure States based 
on Modulus of Elasticity of 2.95 E+07 psi 
AT DESIGN MAWP (2,800 PSIG) AT 150% MAWP (4,200 PSIG) 
All 
layers 
intact 
One 
layer 
lost 
Two 
layers 
lost 
All 
layers 
intact 
One 
layer 
lost 
Two 
layers 
lost 
Nominal Vessel Thickness (in) 2.1875 1.9375 1.6875 2.1875 1.9375 1.6875 
Ave Hoop Stress (PSIG) (1) 33280 37574 43141 49920 56361 64711 
Ave Hoop Strain, µε 1128 1274 1462 1692 1911 2194 
Circumferential Vessel Growth (in) 0.200 0.224 0.254 0.300 0.335 0.382 
Axial Shell Growth (in) 0.124 0.139 0.160 0.185 0.209 0.240 
The Aramis displacement resolution is linearly dependent on the physical length captured by 
each pixel on the sensor.  This means that the smaller the length that Aramis is measuring, the 
more accurately it can record deformation.  Thus, tradeoffs are commonly made when trying to 
optimize the combination of sensor distance to the test object and focal length of the lens 
(representing the size of the Aramis field of view) to establish the theoretical optimal accuracy of 
the test setup.   
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It was determined that one-half of the vessel would be imaged for each pressure cycle.  This was 
a balance between capturing a large overall view of the vessel, while maintaining acceptable 
displacement resolution.  The 5-megapixel sensors capture an image array of 2,448 pixels wide 
by 2,050 pixels high.  With the field of view being about 14 feet, or 168 inches, this would yield 
an effective pixel width of 168 inches/2,448 pixels, which equals 0.0686 inches per pixel.   
GOM mbH publishes a theoretical accuracy to 1/30th of a pixel (0.0686/30), resulting in a  
±2.3 thousandths of an inch theoretical maximum accuracy displacement for the 14-foot field of 
view on the vessel.  Referring back to Table 7.2.3.2-1, this value is well below the expected 
vessel expansion of 0.300 inches and axial growth of 0.185 inches at 4,200 psi.  This basic 
analysis calculation provided the confidence that Aramis would theoretically be able to 
accurately capture the vessel deformations throughout the planned test. 
7.2.3.3 Vessel Preparation 
As mentioned in the earlier section, Aramis correlates stereo image pairs through sophisticated 
pattern recognition and tracking.  In all cases of Aramis use, a high-contrast stochastic black and 
white pattern must be applied to the surface for measurements to be made.  The stochastic 
pattern, in many cases, is created by preparing the surface to be white.  A black pattern is then 
applied over the white base.  The pattern can be accomplished using airbrushes, artificial 
patterned stamps, stencils, or, in many cases, a large number of circular dots applied at random.  
For the dot technique, each dot typically must be on the order of five to seven pixels in diameter. 
Using these criteria for the established field of view established a nominal dot diameter from 
0.34 to 0.48 inches.  The dot patterns were applied using a precut stencil.  As can be seen in 
Figure 7.2.3.1-1, the vessel surface paint was in poor condition and required significant 
preparation to ensure an optimal pattern for Aramis.  The vessel was striped, cleaned, and 
repainted entirely white in preparation for a black dot pattern application, as shown in  
Figure 7.2.3.3-1. 
Figure 7.2.3.3-1.  Test Pressure Vessel Cleaned and Painted White (black squares on the vessel are 
unpainted areas to accommodate AE sensors) 
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For application of the black dots, 60-inch-wide vinyl stencils, cut on a Graphtec vinyl cutter, 
were adhered to the vessel.  The large size of the stencils required multiple individuals to assist 
with the application process.  The vinyl adhesive enabled easy removal and reuse on another 
section of the vessel.  With the stencils in place, the vessel was spray painted.  Figure 7.2.3.3-2 
depicts the stencil application and spray painting of the vessel in progress; Figure 7.2.3.3-3 
shows the tank with the completed dot pattern. 
Figure 7.2.3.3-2.  Application of Vinyl Stencil (left) and Spray-painting Process (right) on Vessel 
Figure 7.2.3.3-3.  Pressure Vessel with Completed Dot Pattern 
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As mentioned in the earlier discussion on Tritop, digital or coded targets, printed on adhesive 
paper, are used to establish unique point locations on a test article between two states.  Prior to 
running the final pressure cycle, the coded targets were adhered to the vessel at various locations.  
Particular locations of interest were the end caps of the pressure vessel and several 
circumferential lines along the axis of the vessel.  Target size required for any given test was 
established in a similar manner as dot size was for Aramis.  In order for Tritop to generate an 
accurate point cloud from the targets, an adequate number of targets must be common in 
overlapping images, which can be used to “stitch” the points together from image to image.  This 
requirement can sometimes result in a greater number of targets being affixed to the test article 
than needed for successful or desired data capture on a test, which was the case with this 
investigation.  The primary interest with Tritop was to identify circumferential and axial 
deformation of the vessel between the 0- and 4,200-psi endpoints, resulting in targets applied in 
concentrations on the end caps and on circumferential lines.  The length of the vessel created the 
need for many “nonessential” targets to be added to the vessel to ensure proper stitching from 
end to end.  Figure 7.2.3.3-4 shows two images depicting digital target placement on the pressure 
vessel.  In both images, the carbon fiber calibration artifact is visible.  Figure 7.2.3.3-5 shows the 
Aramis camera pair in testing configuration on beam for the first pressure cycle. 
Figure 7.2.3.3-4.  Two Views Depicting Placement of Digital Targets on Pressure Vessel 
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Figure 7.2.3.3-5.  Aramis Camera Pair in Test Configuration (note acoustic sensors on vessel) 
7.2.3.4 Experimental Results 
Three pressure cycles were documented with Aramis, and one was documented using Tritop.  
The scope of this exercise was to verify whether Aramis and Tritop could capture deformations 
of the pressure vessel at levels of fidelity that would be useful in future engineering assessments 
of pressure vessels throughout the Agency. 
Aramis Results 
Aramis offers a wide variety of techniques for post-processing the image correlation data.  Color 
contour overlays of deformations and strains in user-defined coordinate systems can be 
generated, as well as X-Y plots of the data as a function of any desired variables, such as time, 
load, etc. 
Upon completing the image correlation process, Aramis provides a numerical indicator called an 
intersection deviation, which establishes a level of confidence that the cameras remained 
calibrated throughout the entire image capture sequence.  In all three of the pressurization cycles, 
the Aramis intersection deviations indicated that the cameras remained calibrated.  The 
correlated data sets yield a spatial, three-dimensional representation of the pressure vessel.  An 
example is shown in Figure 7.2.3.4-1, which shows the computed surface radius value (from the 
computed centroidal axis of the vessel) at every location of the pattern.  A close inspection of the 
figure reveals the weld lines on the saddle strap and where the axial shell meets the end cap. 
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Figure 7.2.3.4-1.  Aramis Three-Dimensional Fringe Plot of Computed  
Radial Values on Pressure Vessel 
A useful feature provided by Aramis is the ability to generate a variety of geometric primitives 
from the computed three-dimensional shapes, including cylinders, which enables users to 
conduct further comparisons, define coordinate systems, and check Aramis data against known 
physical quantities.  One item that was investigated using the Aramis data was analysis of the 
overall radius of the vessel.  This was completed by creating a best-fit cylinder averaged from 
the Aramis data.  From this cylinder, a Cartesian coordinate system was defined along the  
X-axis, representing the axial centroid of the vessel.  In addition, the diameter of the cylinder 
created represented an average measured diameter of the vessel surface.  These values yielded an 
average radius of 28.131 inches, or a diameter of 56.263 inches.  From Table 7.2.3.2-1, adding 
the nominal thickness of the vessel wall of 2.188 inches to the nominal 52-inch ID results in a 
vessel OD of 56.375 inches, nominally within about one-tenth of an inch of the measured data.  
With the stated vessel measurements not accounting for layers of paint on the vessel and 
manufacturing irregularities (which can be seen on the vessel with the naked eye), it is fair to 
assume that Aramis is accurately capturing the spatial dimensions of the vessel.   
During all of the tests, five sets of images were taken at each pressure level of interest.  This was 
done for two reasons:  it helped identify the true “noise floor,” or the amount of uncertainty in 
the data throughout the test, and at the same time enabled averaging of the data afterward to 
obtain more representative plots of the physical deformation.  Aramis saves the images as time 
histories, called “stages,” such that the number of stages in the data file is the number of image 
pairs recorded during that particular test.  Graphically, data sets are presented below using stages 
for the X-axis to enable a broader visualization of the data.  Table 7.2.3.4-1 is for reference in 
NESC Request No.: TI-13-00852 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report
Document #: 
NESCP-RP-
13-00852 
Version: 
1.1 
Title:
Evaluation of Agency Non-code LPVs 
Page #: 
133 of 193 
interpreting these figures.  Single stages were recorded at 100-psi increments as the vessel was 
vented back to 0 psi.  These stages were not included in the table to optimize space for this 
report. 
Table 7.2.3.4-1.  Data-indicated Pressure Values Associated with Stages Recorded in Aramis 
After detailed analysis of the data, it was discovered that the camera system was potentially 
compromised because its view had slightly shifted multiple times during the first and third 
pressure tests.  Several factors may have contributed to this, but it is believed that the wind and 
saturated ground may have played a primary role in these induced motions.  The large, 8-foot 
camera beam may have been susceptible to the moderate gusts that were experienced during the 
first excursion.  Although the camera pair remained calibrated (as determined from the 
intersection deviation), shifted camera view angles created somewhat nonsensical deformation 
results.  Aramis does employ algorithms that are able to remove some of the nonsensical motion; 
however, without tracking a fixed reference system (i.e., the background fence or the ground) the 
motion only due to the physical shifts of the cameras could not be decoupled from potential 
vessel motion due to the pressurization.  Consequently, results from the first and third pressure 
tests were not presented in this report. 
Note that the boundary conditions on this vessel were not completely understood.  Both saddle 
bands were stitch-welded to the vessel, and the saddle supports sat, unconstrained, on the 
concrete support pad.  As a consequence, drawing conclusions from displacement measurements 
on just one-half of the vessel was much more difficult without knowledge of how the saddle 
supports were displacing on the concrete pad throughout the test.  During the development of the 
photogrammetry test plan, inadequate focus was placed on this subject, which will be examined 
in our conclusions.  The surface strain analysis below, however, compensates for some of the 
ambiguity in the deformation data. 
NESC Request No.: TI-13-00852 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report
Document #: 
NESCP-RP-
13-00852 
Version: 
1.1 
Title:
Evaluation of Agency Non-code LPVs 
Page #: 
134 of 193 
Predicted axial deformations and hoop strain will be the primary values used for comparative 
purposes with Aramis measurements.  In post analysis, measured data can be taken from any 
desired point location within the data field.  The left-hand image in Figure 7.2.3.4-2 depicts an 
Aramis image for the second excursion with the relative locations on the vessel where 
displacement data were taken, along with the positive direction of the vessel cylindrical axis.  
The graph on the right-hand side of the figure plots the axial deformation of those points as a 
function of stage number.  Refer to Table 7.2.3.4-1 for correlation of pressure to stages.  From 
the graph in Figure 7.2.3.4-2, the relative noise can be estimated to have an average on the order 
of 2.5- to 3.0-thousandths of an inch, which is in line with the expected 2.3 × 10–3-inch system 
capability.  
Figure 7.2.3.4-2.  Vessel Point Locations and Respective Displacement Plotted versus Stage Number 
The displacement curves in the graph show a somewhat intuitive deformation profile.  The 
largest magnitude displacements are at the “vessel end” point, with the other points deforming 
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less as their locations move in the positive axial direction of the vessel.  Note that the “vessel 
middle” point actually begins to deform in the positive axial direction, indicating it to be near the 
“midpoint,” at which point the vessel expands away in both axial directions.  The maximum 
displacement at the vessel end was measured to be on the order of 0.05 inches.  The prediction 
from Table 7.2.3.2-1 calls for a total axial shell displacement of 0.185 inches at 4,200 psi.  At 
this point in the analysis, no conclusions can be drawn between Aramis and predicted 
displacements, as data do not exist to indicate how the other half of the vessel is deforming.  This 
would be required for a meaningful comparison to the predicted value.  The Tritop survey did, 
however, include the entire vessel; those results are presented below. 
As stated earlier, Aramis provides the ability to overlay color fringe plots onto the actual test 
images.  Figure 7.2.3.4-3 shows the axial deformation overlay at the maximum 4,200-psi 
pressure load, providing validation of a uniform continuous expansion of the vessel.  Note that 
the bottom of the vessel expands slightly more than the top, which may possibly be due to 
interaction with the saddle bands or manufacturing irregularity.  The large gap in the data in the 
lower right corner of the vessel results from data being disregarded because of coverage issues 
during the start of the test. 
Figure 7.2.3.4-3.  Color Fringe Overlay of Axial Displacement (X-direction) at 4,200 psi 
In addition to axial displacements, axial strains were also of interest for comparison to expected 
values.  Section lines are created in Aramis at several selected locations and directions on the 
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Aramis data field to obtain the strains along that line.  Aramis measures the difference in 
displacement between the two endpoints of the section line, effectively creating an optical 
extensometer over its length.  Three section lines were selected along the axial direction of the 
vessel to generate strain data.  Figure 7.2.3.4-4 shows the vessel location of two “medium” and 
one “large” length section lines, with their respective strain plots as a function of stage number.  
Note that the longer section line is slightly less noisy due to the greater averaging that results 
over a longer physical length on the vessel.  This longer section line is more representative of the 
overall growth of the vessel during pressurization. 
Figure 7.2.3.4-4.  Selected Axial Section Lines on Color Overlay of Axial Displacement  
(X-direction) at 4,200 psi 
The strain-stage plot in Figure 7.2.3.4-4 shows a nominal range of vessel strain from 380 to 
500 microstrain.  Assuming a uniform expansion of the vessel and applying these strains to the 
initial axial shell length of 223 inches yields a resultant expansion of 0.085 to 0.111 inches 
computed by Aramis.  Referring to Table 7.2.3.2-1, the predicted expansion of the vessel can be 
seen to be 0.185 inches, about 67% greater than the Aramis measurement. 
A final measurement to be computed was the hoop strain of the vessel.  This was accomplished 
by computing the average outside diameter of a best-fit cylinder calculated from the Aramis data 
at both the 0 and 4,200 psig states.  Figure 7.2.3.4-5 shows a graph depicting the growth of the 
best-fit cylinder radius as a function of stage number.  From the Aramis data, the average outside 
vessel radius was 28.1313 and 28.1986 inches at 0 and 4,200 psig, respectively.  Calculating the 
circumferential strain from this value ((28.1986 – 28.1313)/28.1313) yields 2,392 microstrain.  
This value is about 40% higher than the calculated value taken from Table 7.2.3.2-1, presuming 
all shell layers were intact and uncompromised. 
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Figure 7.2.3.4-5.  Average Computed Radius of a Best Fit Cylinder from Aramis Data Results from 
Second Pressure Test 
Tritop Results 
A Tritop survey of the vessel was conducted at 0 and 4,200 psig pressure conditions in an 
attempt to identify the differences in vessel deformations between those two states.  The effort 
was successful in obtaining Tritop measurements at several locations on the vessel but was 
limited in terms of the number of data points from which measurements could be taken.  This 
was largely due to operator inexperience with understanding the software requirements for 
adequate digital target coverage on a large structure such as the pressure vessel.  Figure 7.2.3.4-6 
depicts a snapshot from the Tritop GUI depicting the generated point cloud from targets on the 
pressure vessel with a best-fit cylinder created from the data points.   
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Figure 7.2.3.4-6.  Screenshot of Tritop Graphical User Interface Showing Pressure Vessel Point 
Cloud with Best-fit Cylinder 
Tritop computes vector displacements between the two pressure states and represents their 
magnitude and direction at each point in the cloud where the data were considered valid.  In 
addition, color assignment representing displacement magnitude is included in this figure.  Note 
that there are many points in this plot that do not have associated vectors placed upon them.  The 
lack of data at these points is a due to a combination of an inadequate density of digital targets 
placed on the vessel and an inadequate number of photographs taken to get a complete data 
analysis of all points on the vessel.   
Displacement results can be plotted virtually on any photograph included in the Tritop data set in 
any coordinate system the user chooses to define.  Figures 7.2.3.4-7 and 7.2.3.4-8 are examples 
showing vector displacements of targets at both ends of the pressure vessel.  Note that not all of 
the coded targets in these photographs have associated displacement vectors, again due to the 
lack of targets/photographs required in this survey.  In both figures, the leftmost photograph 
shows the resultant displacement vector directions and magnitudes, which are coordinate-system 
independent.  The rightmost photos depict the axial deformation vectors of the vessel plotted 
along the axis of the best-fit cylinder computed from the data targets. 
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Figure 7.2.3.4-7.  Displacement Vectors Overlaid on Coded Target Locations at Pressurized End of 
Vessel 
Figure 7.2.3.4-8.  Displacement Vectors Overlaid on Coded Target Locations  
at Sealed End of Vessel 
As intuitively expected, the vessel expands outward at both ends.  Close inspection of the data in 
the Tritop database showed that targets placed on the flanges on each end of the vessel expanded 
outward about 0.05 inches on the feed line end and about 0.04 inches on the sealed end.  
Comparing the Aramis and Tritop deformations of points on the endcap weld lines showed 
general agreement.  To get a direct comparison to the axial shell growth prediction, deformations 
were taken from two targets placed near the endcap welds at each end of the vessel along  
the same relative axial location.  The straight-line distance calculated was 221.4734 and 
221.5536 inches at respective vessel pressures of 0 psi and 4,200 psig, yielding a difference of 
0.082 inches axial shell growth.  This is less than half of the 0.185-inch growth prediction but 
closer to the predictions made from measurements with the Aramis system of 0.111 inches.  An 
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adequate number of data points were not available in the Tritop survey at the 4,200-psig pressure 
state to compute a reliable best-fit cylinder.  Consequently, we were unable to extract a reliable 
value for hoop strain to compare with the Aramis results and the predicted values.  The Tritop 
survey was of limited success due to a less-than-comprehensive data point set from which to 
analyze.  This was confirmed by a Tritop error-predictor function, which indicated a less-
accurate survey.  Lessons learned outlined in the conclusion will ensure better results with 
potential future investigations using this tool. 
7.2.3.5 Conclusions and Future Efforts 
Results from the photogrammetry surveys produced measurement data that, in part, agreed with 
predictions and with one another.  Due the lack of understanding of the true structural 
configuration of the vessel, along with manufacturing irregularities, it was impossible to 
conclude the true accuracy of either the predictions or the photogrammetry measurements.  
Regrettably, resources were not available to allow physical strain or displacement measurements 
to be made for this test to provide further validation of the predictions and photogrammetry.  
Lessons learned and conclusions are presented below. 
Aramis Results 
The quality Aramis data taken from the second pressure cycle excursion were considered 
acceptable and accurate to about 0.003 inches, based on both data analysis and the fact that 
internal Aramis error parameters were within acceptable limits for the data set.  
• The strain and displacements in the region of known flaws were examined.  No
significant variations beyond the background noise of the systems were observed at these
locations.  However, it was anticipated that Aramis would not be effective in identifying
such with the field of view used for this test series.  Strain gages may provide the
necessary sensitivity for detecting deformation response to small internal cracks or
defects; however, a cost-benefit analysis and practicality assessment would have to be
made.
• Environmental factors played a more significant role than anticipated in the stability of
the Aramis camera system; wind, saturated soil, thermal shifts, and changes in lighting all
presented challenges.  These factors should be carefully considered and anticipated prior
to future testing efforts.
• Including stationary points on the concrete pad to account for rigid body motion of the
camera system may have salvaged the data from the first and third excursions.  This
should be a mandatory practice in future test efforts.
• Inadequate time was spent considering the potential deformation and translation
behaviors of the vessel during a pressure cycle.  Consequently, certain conclusions could
not be drawn from the Aramis data, which were limited to a field of view of only half of
the vessel during any particular excursion.
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• A second Aramis system would have been of high value for this effort in order to capture
the complete behavior of one side of the vessel.  This would be of particular value for
future testing efforts since Aramis facilitates the merging of data sets taken from multiple
camera systems.  Additional systems would enable capturing deformation of both sides of
a pressure vessel.
• Aramis has the potential for detecting other types of potentially dangerous flaws:  layer
gaps, long cracks propagating within intermediate layers, etc.  However, this was not
demonstrated in this testing, and further analysis and testing is required to establish this
capability.
Tritop Results 
• The quality of the Tritop data was inadequate to conclusively assess its potential for
evaluating deformations on large pressure vessels.  This was due to the inexperience of
the operators in using this technique, as well as time/schedule constraints associated with
the survey.
• Careful advance consideration of the application of targets to the test article, along with
the photo-capture strategy, is mandatory to acquiring a comprehensive, accurate
deformation survey.
• Tritop is a substantially easier and more forgiving photogrammetry technique to use than
Aramis to identify accurate quasi-static deformations at discrete points on a structure.
Based on known commercial successes and use of both the Tritop and Aramis products, it is fair 
to assume that both could have valuable applicability for quick and cost-effective deformation of 
LPVs during pressurization.  Such data could have application for validating LPV deformation 
analysis techniques under development.  Further, if it can be demonstrated that subsurface flaws 
generate measurable surface deformation disturbances, then these techniques might also have 
applicability for screening LPVs for flaws.   
7.2.4 AE Testing of a Multilayer Pressure Vessel 
In addition to the photogrammetry measurements performed during the pressurization of the 
LPV at GRC, AE testing was also performed during the first pressurization cycle.  The MSFC 
Certification Team provided AE test support for this activity.  As described previously, cracks in 
or near the head-to-shell welds on this vessel were previously identified using radiography; thus, 
the vessel afforded an excellent opportunity to acquire AE data from a vessel with known flaws.  
An excerpt of the A. O. Smith construction drawing for this vessel (PV0236) is shown in  
Figure 7.2.4-1. 
The MAWP of PV0236 is 2,800 psig, and the hydrostatic test was conducted at 4,200 psig  
(2,800 psig × 1.5).  A pressurization plan was developed and implemented based on this test 
pressure.  A chart of the pressurization plan is shown in Figure 7.2.4-2. 
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Figure 7.2.4-1.  Drawing Detail of A. O. Smith Vessel PV0236 
Figure 7.2.4-2.  Pressurization Plan 
The AE equipment used for this test was a 56-channel DISP56 AE workstation manufactured by 
Physical Acoustics Corporation.  The vessel was instrumented with 19 AE R151 sensors having 
a resonant frequency of 150 kHz, per an AE sensor layout plan developed by the MSFC 
Certification Team.  Three sensors were placed evenly on each circumferential weld, and the 
sensors on adjacent welds were installed 120° apart.  Two additional sensors were installed on 
each head.  The sensor layout plan is shown in Figure 7.2.4-3, and the AE system parameters are 
provided in Table 7.2.4-1. 
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Figure 7.2.4-3.  Sensor Placement 
Table 7.2.4-1.  AE System Parameters 
AE Parameters Peak definition time (PDT) 200 µs 
Hit definition time (HDT) 800 µs 
Hit lockout time (HLT) 1,000 µs 
Pre-amp gain 40 dB 
Threshold 45 dB 
External Parameters Parametric multiplier None 
Location Parameters Wave speed 200,000 inch/sec 
Event definition value 200 inches 
Event lockout value 400 inches 
Hits/events Min = 6 
Max = 8 
Max Iteration = 256 
Evaluation threshold (dB) 70 
Three cracks were known to exist in the vessel at the locations shown in Figures 7.2.4-4 and  
7.2.4-5.  Crack growth was not measured following the test.  Worst-case expected crack growth 
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was estimated to be on the order 0.0001 inches by GRC Engineering (based on API 579, part 9, 
analysis over four overpressure excursions [ref. 32]).  The locations of these cracks were not 
revealed to the MSFC AE test team until after the test was completed. 
Figure 7.2.4-4.  Crack Locations 
Figure 7.2.4-5.  Crack Locations (continued) 
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General Analysis 
During the AE test of PV0236, the extraneous noise levels were very high, and under normal 
circumstances, the test would have been terminated no later than 2 minutes into the first hold 
period.  Using the criteria found in ASTM E569/E569M-13 [ref. 88], paragraph 5.5.6, 
background noise must be fully investigated and minimized before any AE monitoring can 
begin.  However, since photogrammetry testing was being performed in parallel and this test was 
not intended to assess the structural integrity of the vessel, pressurization was continued.  A 
major limitation for using AE testing for crack extension detection is extraneous noise.  
Extraneous noise levels must be controlled and minimized, when possible, to increase the 
probability for a crack extension to be detected. 
It is believed but not confirmed that the extraneous noise was due to corrosion between the 
layers.  PV0236 was stored unprotected from weather for more than 20 years.  Similar AE 
background noise was also observed during a recent test of MSFC multilayered vessel V-32, 
which also was stored outside and unprotected for over 20 years prior to the test.  
The pictures in Figure 7.2.4-6 are coupons cut from V-32 that reveal corrosion between the 
layers.  During pressurization, it is presumed that the corrosion, in combination with the layer 
expansion and movement (layer rubbing), resulted in intense extraneous noise.  V-32 was 
manufactured by A. O. Smith and has a ½-inch-thick inner shell and five ¼-inch-thick layers. 
Figure 7.2.4-6.  Corrosion between Layers on MSFC LPV V-32 
The AE sensor locations on PV0236 were based on earlier investigations at MSFC related to 
overall detection sensitivity versus sensor spacing.  This earlier work was performed using 
multilayered MSFC vessel V0343 with lead breaks performed on the inner wall of the vessel and 
the sensors located on the outer wall.  A sensor spacing of 4.54 feet was used on PV0236.  It is 
estimated that a 0.3-mm lead break at any point on the vessel inner wall would result in at least a 
75-dB signal at one of the AE sensors. 
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Location Analysis 
The location algorithm was calibrated by means of a single set of five center-punch events 
located near sensor 7, performed pre- and post-test.  Figure 7.2.4-7 shows a plot of amplitude 
versus time for each calibration run.  The main strike can be clearly seen for each event, along 
with the subsequent ringing in the structure from that event.  Also, note the high degree of noise 
between the center-punch events when there should be low levels of acoustic activity.  Figure 
7.2.4-8 locates the events on the vessel above sensor 7, where the punches took place.  Utilizing 
the location calibration and applying the data from the pressure test, it can be seen that there is 
no significant clustering near known defect locations and the located events appear to be 
somewhat random across the acreage (reference Figure 7.2.4-9).  There was no significant 
correlation with emissions from the saddle or nozzle areas.   
Figure 7.2.4-7.  Location Event Amplitudes versus Time 
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Figure 7.2.4-8.  Location Calibration Plots 
Figure 7.2.4-9.  Location Plot 
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Trending Analysis 
As can be seen in the amplitude-versus-time plot (Figure 7.2.4-10A), there were many significant 
(>80 dB) signals during ramp, as well as during hold periods.  The amplitudes drop in magnitude 
during the hold, indicating some drop in AE severity, but were still very high.  If these were 
inter-laminar rubbing noises, then they would mask any real crack-growth activity.  Overall, 
there was significant low-level activity (<70 dB) during most of test. 
The pressure data recorded for this test were logged manually from a calibrated pressure gage.  
It is difficult to obtain any quantitative data from the hits versus time plots in Figure 7.2.4-10  
(B and D) without more accurate “real time” pressure data from a transducer.  Here, only a 
qualitative assessment can be made from the data.  The graphs show significant activity during 
each of the holds, approaching but not reaching a point where the activity stops.  Ideally, the 
system should become completely quiet after 2 minutes of hold time.  The activity, however, 
continued at about the same rate during each hold (parallel purple lines with approximately the 
same slope) and increased with each pressure ramp, as given by the increase in slope (green 
lines), which indicates that the vessel was becoming more acoustically active. 
A measure of the “goodness” of the AE timing parameters can be obtained using the counts 
versus duration plot, shown in Figure 7.2.4-10C.  For resonant sensors, it should be a single line, 
following the resonant frequency of the sensors.   
In general, the activity is so numerous and covers such a large dynamic range that if these were 
inter-laminar rubbing noises, as assumed, they would mask any real crack-growth activity. 
Figure 7.2.4-10.  Trending Plots 
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Conclusions 
The amplitude-versus-time and hits-versus-time plots reveal that there was significant low- and 
high-level activity throughout the test and that during hold periods the acoustic activity never 
returned to zero.  This, coupled with the random nature of the location plots, tends to indicate 
that the activity resulted from inter-laminar rubbing.  Also, considering that theoretical crack 
growth was estimated by GRC engineers to be only 0.0001 of an inch, the emissions from the 
inter-laminar rubbing and corrosion would likely mask any true crack-growth activity.  
Therefore, the results of the AE test results are inconclusive.   
Further consideration will be given to the use of broadband sensors and a more rigorous pre-test 
location calibration procedure to determine if improvements can be made in differentiating flaw 
growth from elevated levels of background noise on multilayered vessels.  MSFC is also 
preparing to perform lab-scale AE testing, which should help to answer questions related to 
sensor density and predicted energy levels from flaw extension in multilayered vessels.  
7.2.5 Feasibility of using Phased Array Ultrasound to Inspect the Shell-to-Head 
Circumferential Welds in NASA Pressure Vessels 
Due to the age and operating history of LPVs, it is possible that cracks have developed over time 
and could provide a potential failure mechanism during future operation.  Of particular interest 
are the circumferential shell-to-head welds, as one such weld has already failed catastrophically 
in Kansas.  The shell-to-head weld joins the domed head of the vessel to a cylindrical body that 
is composed of concentric plate layers that have been welded together.  To ensure the safe future 
operation of these vessels, it is necessary to develop an inspection procedure to detect potential 
crack-like defects in the shell-to-head weld regions. 
In a prior investigation conducted at SwRI®, the feasibility of conducting ultrasonic inspection of 
the shell-to-head weld was investigated using standard single element transducers.  In this 
preliminary investigation, SwRI® found that ultrasonic waves entering through the multi-layered 
body of the vessel tended to remain trapped within the outermost layer and could not effectively 
propagate to the shell-to-head weld.  Alternatively, SwRI® attempted to direct sound into the 
shell-to-head weld via an ultrasonic beam entering the vessel through the head at an angle.  The 
results of this work indicated that an angle beam inspection from the head side merited further 
investigation. 
Given the relatively complex geometry of the part and the thickness of the weld, an effective 
inspection of the weld using conventional single element ultrasonic probes would require two-
axis scanning of the part to sweep the beam through the area of interest.  Furthermore, inspection 
may require several probe angles to provide full coverage of the weld.  These factors would lead 
to an involved inspection and analysis procedure.  Instead, a phased array probe may be used to 
provide more extensive coverage of the weld using a limited number of line scans around the 
vessel’s circumference.  In the interest of developing a relatively straightforward inspection 
method for the shell-to-head welds, SwRI® conducted several phased array exams on shell-to-
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head weld samples with machined flaws to determine the feasibility of developing an ultrasonic 
phased array inspection procedure. 
7.2.5.1 PAUT Background 
UT phased array is based on electronically controlling the excitation and reception characteristics 
of a multi-element probe.  Although there are several different phased array probe 
configurations, the most common phased array probe is a linear array composed of several 
narrow ultrasonic transducers that are spaced at some regular interval.  During ultrasonic 
transmission, each element of the probe is excited with a phase delay relative to the other 
elements, where the phase delays of all elements are calculated to produce an ultrasonic beam 
with the desired directivity and focal characteristics.  If a feature is present at the desired focal 
point, then the feature reflects a portion of the transmitted wave and the reflection returns to the 
probe.  The received signal is captured and recorded by each element.  Calculated phase shifts 
and gains are applied to each waveform, and then all waveforms are summed to produce an  
A-scan.  The gains and phase delays for each element are calculated to enhance signals captured 
at the desired focal point and suppress signals originating from other locations within the part.  
By rapidly adjusting the firing sequence, gain, and phase delay of each element within the probe, 
the ultrasonic beam can be made to dynamically sweep or shift through the inspected part.   
Figure 7.2.5.1-1 shows the some common operating modes of a phased array probe in which 
varying the timing of the excitation of the individual elements according to different focal laws 
results in different effects on the resulting ultrasonic beam, such as focusing and scanning.  
Figure 7.2.5.1-1.  Examples of Common Operating Modes using a Phased Array Probe  
(used by permission from Olympus) 
Phased array ultrasound inspection has several potential advantages over conventional ultrasound 
inspection.  To test or interrogate a large volume of material, a conventional probe must be 
physically scanned over the area of interest.  In contrast, the beam from a phased array probe can 
be moved electronically along one inspection axis without having to move the probe, effectively 
eliminating one scan axis in an inspection.  
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Another key advantage of phased array is the data visualization.  In a conventional ultrasonic 
exam, the probe must be scanned over some area of the part (often in an X-Y grid), and an  
A-scan, or a time-amplitude plot of the reflected ultrasound, must be recorded at each probe 
location.  These A-scans must then be post-processed to present the data in a visualization of the 
inspected part.  This task can be time consuming and often requires off-site manipulation of the 
exam data.  In a phased array system, the data from a scan can be immediately processed and 
displayed.  
7.2.5.2 Inspection Feasibility Study 
SwRI® conducted a series of ultrasonic tests to evaluate the feasibility of detecting several flaws 
distributed throughout the weld.  The study was conducted using an Omniscan MX2, a 
commercially available instrument produced by Olympus NDT.  Inspections were conducted 
with two 60-element 1-mm-pitch linear array phased array probes with frequencies of 3.5 and 
7.5 MHz. 
Test Blocks 
Two test blocks were manufactured from samples cut out of a multi-layer, A. O. Smith pressure 
vessel MV-50466-8, the same vessel that was tested in references 40 through 42.  Each test block 
measured 6 inches in width.  They included roughly a 7-inch span of the vessel head and a  
2.75-inch span of the multi-layer plate structure joined together by the shell-to-head weld.  In the 
first block, a total of nine flat-bottom holes (FBHs) were drilled into the weld at varying depths 
and locations.  An illustration of the six side-drilled holes (SDHs) in the test block is shown in 
Figure 7.2.5.2-1, and an illustration of the three radially drilled holes (RDHs) is shown in  
Figure 7.2.5.2-2. 
Figure 7.2.5.2-1.  View from either Side of Calibration Block Showing SDHs 
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Figure 7.2.5.2-2.  View from Underside of Calibration Block Showing the Three RDHs in the Weld 
No flaws were added to the second block.  At a later point, electronic discharge machine (EDM) 
notches that behave similar to crack-like flaws will be added to the second block.  In the work to 
date, the second block was used to compare the phased array response to a specific location 
within the block with and without a known flaw. 
Ultrasonic Velocity Measurements 
Prior to conducting phased array inspections, the longitudinal wave and shear wave velocities 
were measured in the part at various frequencies.  In addition to velocity, the relative signal level 
at each frequency and location was compared against a baseline signal level taken at 1 MHz 
through the width of the block.  These measurements were taken in three locations in the first test 
block, as shown in Figure 7.2.5.2-3, and the measurement results are provided in Table 7.2.5.2-1. 
Figure 7.2.5.2-3.  Ultrasonic Velocity Measurement Locations in First Test Block 
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Table 7.2.5.2-1.  Wave Velocity and Relative Signal Loss Measurements taken from Test Block 
Shear Wave Longitudinal Wave 
Measurement 
location 
Frequency 
(MHz) 
Velocity at 
0° (mm/µs) 
Velocity at 
90° (mm/µs) 
Velocity 
(mm/µs) 
Signal loss relative 
to 1 MHz at 
location A (dB) 
A 1 5.92 0.0 
A 2.25 5.91 –1.7
A 5 3.24 3.25 5.92 –3.8
A 10 5.92 –5.3
B 1 5.89 –2.7
B 2.25 5.87 –1.3
B 5 3.21 3.21 5.88 –1.5
B 10 5.87 –3.1
C 1 5.99 –0.1
C 2.25 5.99 –0.8
C 5 3.28 3.29 5.99 –3.2
C 10 5.98 –7.4
Based on the relative signal strength measured at each frequency, there does not appear to be a 
significant difference in attenuation over the tested frequency range that would encourage the use 
of one inspection frequency over another.  For the purpose of the phased array investigation, the 
average longitudinal velocity is assumed to be 5.90 mm/µs and the average shear velocity is 
assumed to be 3.23 mm/µs. 
Initial Observations 
The first phased array tests were conducted using the 3.5-MHz and 7.5-MHz probes with a 0° 
Lucite® wedge that was machined to have a concave contact surface that matched the vessel 
head’s radius of curvature.  In addition to serving as a coupling surface between the probe and 
the part, the wedge serves as a medium for the ultrasonic beam to develop before entering the 
part, which improves the focusing performance of the probe.  Initial tests were conducted both as 
sectorial exams and as fixed angle linear electronic scans.  
The initial exams showed that at both frequencies, significant signal loss was observed within the 
part, and high gains were needed to resolve the drilled holes.  Although the attenuation at the two 
frequencies is not significant, the overall signal loss at both frequencies will be a limiting factor 
to detection sensitivity.  At high gains, background noise caused by the part became significant 
enough to interfere with the flaw signal responses, and the lower frequencies tended to have 
much higher sensitivity to background noise.  Based on this observation, the majority of later 
testing was conducted with the 7.5-MHz probe.  
Many of the flaws were detectable in both the linear exams and the sectorial exams, but the 
linear exams tended to exhibit a greater number of extraneous signals and focal law artifacts.  
Furthermore, the sectorial exams were capable of covering a greater extent of the weld (from cap 
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to root) from one fixed location.  Therefore, later tests tended to focus on the development of 
sectorial exams.  Finally, the 0° curved surface wedge proved less effective than originally 
anticipated.  In later exams, this wedge was replaced with a wedge with a flat coupling surface 
and an 18° incidence angle. 
7.2.5.3 Exams Using Half-V Path 
Testing demonstrated that eight of the nine drilled holes in the first test block could be detected 
with sectorial exams using a half-V path, which is illustrated in Figure 7.2.5.3-1.  The only hole 
not seen was the uppermost SDH (SDH#4) on the multi-layered plate side the weld.  This hole 
was located above the uppermost coverage of the sectorial beam sweep and, therefore, could not 
be detected with the half-V sectorial exam. 
Figure 7.2.5.3-1 shows an image of the probe and wedge setup on the test block for the half-V 
sectorial exam.  The exam coverage across the weld is highlighted in green on the side of the 
block.  Due to the radius of curvature of the vessel head, the weld appears slightly canted toward 
the probe position.  In the half-V exam, the leading edge of the wedge is allowed to ride flush 
along the shell-to-head weld.  As the probe and wedge is pulled back from the weld, the effective 
orientation of the weld with respect to the probe changes.  This is important because the 
estimated depths of the detected flaws are dependent on the assumed position of the weld.  The 
acquisition software of the Omniscan MX2 assumes that the weld is always normal to the beam 
entry surface, as indicated by the white lines in Figure 7.2.5.3-1. 
Figure 7.2.5.3-1.  View of the Probe and Wedge used to Conduct Phased Array  
Half-V Sectorial Exams 
Figure 7.2.5.3-2 shows the sectorial exam views (S-scan) of the three SDHs located on the head 
side of the weld.  The uppermost flaw (SDH#1) was detected with a peak response of 78% full 
screen height (FSH) at a depth of 1.20 inches below the sound entry surface.  SDH#2 was 
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detected with a peak response of 80% FSH at a depth of 1.90 inches, and SDH#3 was detected 
with a peak response of 74% at a depth of 2.55 inches.  All flaws were detected within 0.2 inches 
of their true locations.  Faint echoes from several of the plate layers (labeled C) can be seen in  
Figure 7.2.5.3-2.  Signal artifacts caused by interactions between the wedge and the part (labeled 
A and B in the figure) are also observable in the S-scans.  Each SDH echo is also accompanied 
by a second reverberation, which appears slightly below and behind the main echo. 
Figure 7.2.5.3-2.  S-scans of Three SDHs on Head Side of Weld and  
A-scan of Each Hole at Angle of Peak Response 
Figure 7.2.5.3-3 shows the S-scans of the lower two SDHs located on the multilayered plate side 
of the weld.  SDH#5 was detected with a peak response of 26% FSH at a depth of  
1.35 inches, and SDH#6 was detected with a peak response of 28% at a depth of 2.10 inches.  
Signal artifacts caused by interactions between the wedge and the part (labeled A and B) are also 
observable in the S-scans.  At low angles, a reverberation (labeled D) is observable.  This 
reverberation is produced by an abrupt change in thickness in the vessel head at the inner surface 
of the part.  Both flaw signals are preceded by one or more signals that have not been identified 
(labeled E and F).  These signals are noted to be unrelated to the flaw signals because their 
circumferential extents across the part do not coincide with the circumferential extents of the 
SDH signals. 
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Figure 7.2.5.3-3.  S-scans Showing Lower Two SDHs on Multilayered Side of Weld and  
A-scan of Each Hole at Angle of Peak Response 
Due to their orientation, the RDHs exhibited a fainter response than the side drilled holes.  
Furthermore, due to their location within the part, signals from the RDHs tended to interfere with 
signals from the plate layers and with other extraneous signals detected throughout the test block, 
making detection of these holes difficult.  As a result, exams for the RDHs were conducted both 
with the probe flush with the weld as in the previous exams, and with the probe skewed by some 
angle (usually 30° to 40°).  Figure 7.2.5.3-4 shows S-scans of RDH#2 detected using both probe 
orientations.  As the probe is skewed, the metal path to the hole increases, causing its apparent 
depth to increase.  This can be corrected by updating the position of the probe on the part within 
the instrument.  Unfortunately, there is no convenient way to notate the probe skew angle within 
the instrument. 
By skewing the probe, fewer signals from the plate layers were detected, but the gain required to 
detect the holes increased, making the exam more sensitive to background noise.  As a result, the 
S-scans tend to appear more cluttered with extraneous signals, but the extraneous signals appear 
over much shorter circumferential spans and are easier to discern from the flaws.  Given the 
number of interfering signals detected when scanning flush with the weld and the amount of 
background noise detected when scanning at some angle, it may be necessary to conduct 
inspections around the weld using two probe orientations. 
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Figure 7.2.5.3-4.  S-scans of RDH#2 Detected with Probe Flush with Weld (left) and  
Skewed at 30° (right) 
Figure 7.2.5.3-5 shows the S-scans of the RDHs acquired with the probe skewed at a 30° angle.  
RDH#1 was detected with a peak response of 10% FSH and a depth of 2.34 inches 
(2.70 cos(30)), RDH#2 was detected with a peak response of 9% FSH and a depth of 1.73 inches 
(2.00 cos(30)), and RDH#3 was detected with a peak response of 10% FSH and a depth of 
1.26 inches (1.45 cos(30)).  A 4-dB increase in the instrument gain was required to capture these 
signals. 
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Figure 7.2.5.3-5.  Sectorial Exam View of Three Radially Drilled Holes in Weld Root and  
A-scan of Each Hole at Angle of Peak Response 
Although the half-V sectorial exam was effective at detecting most of the included holes within 
the test block, it also detected several extraneous signals within the part that cannot be associated 
with the part geometry or with the included flaws.  Figure 7.2.5.3-6 shows two S-scans with 
example extraneous signals.  In the left view, a low-amplitude indication (labeled G) is detected 
close to the weld root.  This S-scan also shows a clear presentation of the echoes originating 
from the various layered plates (labeled C).  In the right view, two relatively high amplitude 
indications (labeled H and I) are detected close to the weld cap.  Both of these S-scans were 
captured in supposedly defect-free regions of the block.  Throughout both test blocks, several of 
these indications have been identified.  An attempt to correlate the unidentified indications in one 
block with those in the other block showed that the unidentified indications were not present at 
the same positions in both blocks.  The presence of these unidentified indications in both blocks 
and the fact that these indications appear in different locations in each block imply that they are 
not artifacts of the exam settings and that they are not secondary indications of the included 
flaws within the first test block.  Evaluation with other NDE methods and/or destructive analysis 
will be required to determine whether these indications correlate to real flaws.  Until further 
work is conducted to determine the source of these unknown indications, it will be difficult to 
develop this exam approach into an inspection procedure. 
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Figure 7.2.5.3-6.  Two S-scans Showing Unidentified Indications Not Associated with Known Flaws 
or Part Geometry 
7.2.5.4 Full-V Inspection 
Attempts were made to develop a full-V sectorial exam that would provide inspection coverage 
over the upper portion of the weld that cannot be inspected using the half-V exam.  The full-V 
inspection approach relies upon reflecting the ultrasonic beam off the inner surface of the vessel 
so that the beam can insonify the part material that is located above the area that can be directly 
interrogated by the transmitted wave.  To focus the beam at the correct location within the part, 
the phased array instrument attempts to calculate a focal point at some virtual depth that is 
greater than the thickness of the part.  An illustration of this approach showing the full-V beam 
path to SDH#2 is shown in Figure 7.2.5.4-1. 
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Figure 7.2.5.4-1.  Illustration of Full-V Beam Path to SDH#2 
The full-V beam path from the probe to SDH#2 is shown in green.  An idealization of the beam 
focus is shown as yellow rays.  A unique characteristic of this exam is that each indication can be 
potentially observed twice.  It appears at lower apparent depth but at greater inspection angle 
along the half-V path (shown in blue) and then at greater apparent depth but lower inspection 
angle in the full-V path.  The obvious disadvantage to this exam approach is that the probe must 
be further offset from the weld, meaning the metal path to the inspected region must be greater.  
The increased metal path results in greater attenuation, lower position accuracy, and greater 
difficulty in correctly focusing the transmitted beam at the intended location.  
Unfortunately, while the full-V exam was demonstrated to work in principle, it was shown to be 
highly inconsistent and difficult to repeat.  In addition to the added challenges related to the 
increased metal path, the irregular curvature of the cap inner surface tended to scatter the 
reflected beam, resulting in unreliable focusing.  As a result, inspection using a full-V sectorial 
exam is not recommended.  It is possible that the performance of the full-V exam can be 
improved by converting the exam from a sectorial exam to a linear electronic exam.  A linear 
exam could be made to produce a wider focal spot that would be less sensitive to scattering after 
reflection from the inner surface.  At present, this exam has not been attempted.  
7.2.5.5 Conclusion 
Based on the investigative work conducted to date, it appears that all but the uppermost 
0.6 inches (as measured from the shell head side) of the shell-to-head weld can be inspected with 
phased array half-V sectorial exams.  The remaining portion of this weld configuration (extreme 
taper) cannot be insonified with a half-V sectorial sweep, so flaws close to the weld cap must be 
detected with another inspection approach.  Attempts were made to insonify the uppermost 
NESC Request No.: TI-13-00852 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report
Document #: 
NESCP-RP-
13-00852 
Version: 
1.1 
Title:
Evaluation of Agency Non-code LPVs 
Page #: 
161 of 193 
region of the weld using a full-V sectorial sweep exam, but this approach has not proven 
successful.  In future work, SwRI® plans to attempt full-V linear electronic exams to inspect this 
region of the weld.  It is believed that the larger focal spot produced by linear electronic exams 
will be less susceptible to the issues encountered in full-V sectorial exams.  
All of the FBHs located within the region of the weld that can be interrogated with the half-V 
sectorial exam have been demonstrated to be reliably and repeatedly detected, although not 
without some difficulty.  Due to the signal loss within the part, the background noise is often 
comparable to the signal response of the included flaws.  Additional investigation into 
appropriate instrumentation, including the probe, the wedge, and the driving electronics, may be 
needed to improve flaw signal-to-noise ratio.  Furthermore, several extraneous indications have 
been detected throughout both test blocks.  Because these indications are present regardless of 
the presence of the flaws and because the locations of these indications do not coincide between 
the two blocks, it is believed that these indications are not related to either the weld geometry or 
the flaws included in the first test block.  Until the causes of these extraneous indications are 
better understood (perhaps through destructive testing of a test weld sample), it will be difficult 
to use PAUT as an inspection procedure for LPVs.  
In the remaining period of performance, SwRI® will add several EDM notches to the second test 
block.  The successful phased array examination approach developed previously will be tested on 
these notches to verify the method’s capability to detect crack-like flaws within the weld.  SwRI® 
will also continue to pursue methods to detect flaws in the uppermost portion of the weld.  
7.2.6 AE Laboratory Test Specimen Design 
Based on the results from the ARC validation activities, where smaller than expected AE signals 
were detected from known crack growth, it was decided by the assessment team that laboratory 
scale testing of AE from crack growth in LPV materials was preferred as the next step, prior to 
further full-scale validation efforts.  Such testing could be performed at lower expense and under 
more controlled conditions, with better documentation of actual crack growth to correlate with 
observed AE signals.  Further, tests could easily be performed on different material components 
of these vessels (i.e., head parent material, shell parent material, and weld and HAZ materials) to 
assess whether these different material components more preferentially generated AE.  Results 
from such tests might define the applicability of AE across the different vessel regions and target 
regions where it might be more successfully validated and applied. 
As such, a low-level Task 2 activity was defined to develop designs for laboratory test coupons.  
The design effort was based on a plan to utilize materials from the MSFC sacrificed vessel 
V0032, which has been used for ongoing materials characterization activities.  Considerations for 
the design of the AE laboratory specimens included maximizing the specimen lateral dimensions 
to minimize the influence of AE signal reflections from the lateral boundaries against a number 
of constraints that limited the specimen size.  These constraints included the curvature of the 
vessel, thickness of the layers, load capabilities of test load frames to be used, and fracture 
mechanics considerations for predicting and measuring crack growth.  The resulting planned 
specimen size was defined to be a dog bone specimen 18 inches in length by 3.5 inches wide in 
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the gage section.  This sample is shown in Figure 7.2.6-1.  Curvature was retained in the 
specimen to be as representative as possible of the LPV, which requires custom backing plates.  
A large center crack 2a of 0.75 inches is designed to produce failure in the gage section.  Even 
with this compromise in specimen dimensions, reflections of AE signals generated by crack 
growth will quickly reflect and superimpose on the original AE signal.  Hamstad [ref. 89] 
modeled this effect, showing the resultant increase in measured signal amplitude for a particular 
finite-dimensioned laboratory specimen.  This is a low-constraint sample, which will need to be 
taken into account when applying these data to the structure, but the purpose of this test is to 
assess AE detection capability and not to directly determine fracture properties.  It is planned to 
run a simple finite element analysis model of this test first to estimate the stress state at tearing 
and evaluate the feasibility of the sample for the test.  The sample will be loaded monotonically 
at room temperature until crack tearing is observed.  While performing the test at cold 
temperatures with expected cleavage failure would be more distinct and more easily measured by 
AE, the purpose of this test is to be representative of a proof test on an actual vessel. 
Figure 7.2.6-1.  AE Laboratory Specimen to be Tested from V0032 1146a Material 
To understand the amplitude enhancement factor that might also occur for the specimens 
designed for this testing, an additional laboratory investigation of signals from simulated AE 
signals (generated by pencil-lead breaks) was performed.  Specimens of the same crack-growth 
specimen design were compared with increasingly large plate specimens, and the relative 
amplitudes of simulated AE signals were compared.  Efforts will be made to simulate the same 
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AE signal mode of propagation as might be expected for cracks to better replicate the observed 
effect.  
The additional laboratory investigation involved testing on three steel plates, ¼-inch-thick, with 
different dimensions: 3 by 6 inches, 4 by 8 inches, and 6 by 12 inches.  In addition, a ¼-inch-
thick aluminum plate, 36 by 72 inches, was used as a reference for a plate because reflections 
would be more spread out due to the larger lateral dimensions.  Pencil-lead breaks were 
performed on the surface of each plate, using a Hsu-Nielsen source (0.3-mm leads).  Pencil-lead 
breaks have been demonstrated to provide a good simulation of the time and frequency response 
of cracks in metals.  However, they provide a much more energetic source and, thus, result in 
much larger detected amplitude signals than are typical for small increments of fatigue crack 
propagation.  However, as this study was only to detect the relative amplitude differences for 
different geometries and not the absolute amplitude for a real crack source, the use of pencil-lead 
breaks as a simulated source was deemed appropriate. 
For the steel plates, a wide-band AE sensor (DWC model B225.5 (bandwidth 40–330 Khz)) was 
placed at each plate’s center, and the lead breaks were located midway on the long edge at the 
edge.  For the aluminum plate, the transducer was placed 6 inches from the long edge and  
18 inches from the short side.  The pencil-lead breaks were performed 6 inches from the sensor 
at the long edge of the plate.  The signals were recorded with a 16-channel DWC model FM1 
signal conditioner and a dedicated signal acquisition system/computer, also from DWC.  The 
signals were amplified with 42 dB of gain.  The data were band pass filtered from 20 to  
750 KHz.  The system was set to digitize at 2 MSamples/sec and recorded 16,438 data points  
(8.219 ms), with 1,024 points before the trigger.  Triggering was accomplished by utilizing a 
second transducer (B1025) located at the pencil-lead break site with a simple threshold trigger.  
The signal energy (SE) of each recorded waveform was then computed with the following 
formula: 
tVSE
N
i
i ∆= ∑ 2
where Vi is the voltage at time i and Δt is the time between measurement samples.  Since pencil-
lead breaks are manually done, the lead break signals can vary slightly from test to test, so the 
triggering sensor signal was used to select equivalent signals. 
For the four different plates, Figure 7.2.6-2 shows the signal energies (gain corrected) that were 
measured. 
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Figure 7.2.6-2.  Bar Graph Comparing Measured Signal Energies from  
Different-sized ¼-inch-thick Plates 
Logically, the smaller plate should suffer more reflections per unit time, which in this example 
generated the greatest signal energy, followed by the 4- by 8-inch, then the 6- by 12-inch, and 
then the 36- by 72-inch plate.  The smallest plate recorded more than an order of magnitude 
greater signal energy that the largest plate.  Figure 7.2.6-3 shows the initial waveform for the 
large plate.  In the figure, the trigger signal is at about 510 µs.  The first arrival signal at the 
sensors is a symmetric plate wave that arrives at about 535 µs and has an initial amplitude of 
about 30 to 40 mV.  A second plate wave, a flexural wave, follows at about 550 µs.  Its 
amplitude is about 10 times greater.  The echoes from the nearest plate edge do not show up until 
after 800 µs.  For contrast, Figure 7.2.6-4 shows the waveform from a similar pencil-lead break 
on the smallest plate.  In that figure, the trigger again occurs at about 510 µs.  Because of the 
small plate size, the first arrivals of the symmetric and flexural plate modes arrive almost 
simultaneously just after 510 µs.  In this specific case, the waveform seems to indicate a phase 
reversal from the largest plate as the echoes rapidly interfere.  In Figures 7.2.6-5 and 7.2.6-6, one 
can see this progression of echo interference moving to earlier and earlier times as the echoes are 
arriving earlier and earlier.  The results of the echoes are constructive interferences that will 
increase and make the waveform appear more energetic. 
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Figure 7.2.6-3.  Early Waveform from Pencil-Lead Break on  
36- by 72-inch Aluminum Plate 
Figure 7.2.6-4.  Early Waveform from Pencil-Lead Break on 3- by 6-inch Steel Plate 
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Figure 7.2.6-5.  Early Waveform from Pencil-Lead Break on 4- by 8-inch Steel Plate 
Figure 7.2.6-6.  Early Waveform from Pencil-Lead Break on 6- by 12-inch Steel Plate 
By comparing the full 8 ms of data from the smallest and the largest samples, one can understand 
the extent of the impact of this phenomenon on the signal energy measurement.  Figure 7.2.6-7 
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shows the full waveform for the largest plate tested.  After about 900 µs, a small echo is evident, 
and then the signal settles down to a relatively constant level of noise.  In contrast, Figure 7.2.6-8 
shows the signal immediately interfering and growing in magnitude.  It is not until after 4 ms that 
the amplitude of that signal declines to less than the largest plate’s signal. 
Figure 7.2.6-7.  Full Waveform from Pencil-Lead Break on 36- by 72-inch Aluminum Plate 
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Figure 7.2.6-8.  Full Waveform from Pencil-Lead Break on 3- by 6-inch Steel Plate 
Based on this testing, we can expect that the crack-growth signals measured in a modest-sized 
load frame sample will be 5 to 10 times greater than the signals that might be detected near a 
crack site on a larger-sized LPV. 
The crack-growth plan for the specimens is to insert a starter notch and then grow the starter 
notch in fatigue to produce a sharp crack that well represents an actual crack.  The load will 
monotonically increase until crack growth occurs while monitoring with AE.  The driving force 
for crack growth is the stress-intensity factor which is a function of the load, crack length, and 
specimen geometry.  Accordingly, an overload cycle representative of the overload pressure 
applied during AE monitoring of an LPV in the field is not directly relevant, since the 0.75-inch 
crack will not produce an equivalent K at a given load as a 0.75-inch crack would in a given 
layer (such as the outer shell) of an LPV.  This difference is an issue since the two processes can 
be easily reconciled by fracture mechanics keeping in mind that the goal of this laboratory-scale 
AE effort is to determine the efficacy of AE for measuring structurally significant crack growth 
in LPV materials.  Both resonant and broadband sensors that are employed by the different AE 
approaches commonly used for LPV testing (i.e., MONPAC™ and MAE) will be used in this 
testing to provide additional data relative to comparison of the two techniques.  Crack growth 
will be verified with standard materials testing NDE (potential difference) and post-test 
measurements after the sample is broken open.  Again, tests are planned on the different material 
components of these vessels including head and shell parent materials, as well as weld and HAZ 
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materials.  The expected results are an indication of the signal amplitude as a function of the 
amount of crack growth under the given stress intensity conditions.  Results from the signal 
amplification study will be used to remove the effect of lateral boundaries on the measured 
signal amplitudes.  These results will provide a basis for evaluating the potential for AE for 
detecting crack growth in the various materials and regions of LPVs and a basis for decisions on 
further validation efforts on larger subscale and, eventually, full-scale vessels.   
To date, the specimen designs have been completed and are undergoing evaluation by the MSFC 
materials community and are awaiting specimen fabrication.  A block of the V0032 vessel has 
been designated for this purpose.  AE instrumentation and personnel at MSFC and LaRC have 
been identified to support this testing effort.   
7.3 Assessment Team Comments on Proof Testing of LPVs 
Proof testing of pressure vessels (i.e., pressurizing a vessel to a level higher than the intended 
operating pressure) is a long-standing acceptance test procedure following vessel fabrication.  
Proof testing subsequent to fabrication is expected to ensure the quality and safety of the vessel 
for its design use and carries additional benefits, such as reducing weld or shell-section residual 
stresses through cyclic shakedown.  The objectives of the proof test procedure commonly fall 
into two categories:  (1) to provide a general screen on the quality of materials and workmanship 
present in the vessel (most common) and (2) to provide a quantifiable engineering rationale for 
safe operation of the vessel over a number of pressure cycles based on the stress in the vessel at 
proof pressure, serving as a sieve to identify flaws greater than a critical size, whereby fracture 
mechanics principles may be used to evaluate a minimum remaining cyclic life beginning at that 
proof-critical flaw size (uncommon).  The first approach is often referred to as a “workmanship” 
proof test, and the second, as a “fracture mechanics” based proof test.  Both share the goal of 
providing rationale for the safety of the vessel; the difference is in the quantifiable nature of the 
latter, which leads to a much clearer understanding of the vessel and its associated structural 
risks. 
All known proof testing performed to date on LPVs has been of the workmanship variety.  The 
acceptance proof test (or “hydrotest”) to 1.5× MAWP performed at vessel fabrication or 
following certain vessel repair activity provides an unquantified confidence in the integrity of the 
vessel.  This concept fits with the general ASME code approach of establishing rigorous design, 
fabrication, and inspection quality requirements, which result in a code-approved vessel in an 
assumed “undamaged” state.  This approach has served the industry well for decades.  For older 
vessels, those with known defects that violate the assumed “undamaged” state, or in the subject 
case, vessels of non-code construction, rationale for the FFS of the vessel is required.  In simple 
cases, this may involve repair of the vessel to an equivalent undamaged state or, in the case of 
non-code vessels, may require an alternative engineering rationale.  The proof test, either 
workmanship or fracture-mechanics-based, often plays a key role in this alternative logic.  For 
cases such as the LPVs, the geometric limitations of layered construction reduce the 
effectiveness of quantifiable NDE throughout the vessel, making the standard NDE-based 
analytical methods of FFS less practical.  The lack of comprehensive quantifiable data from the 
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LPV NDE process emphasizes the benefits of quantifiable results from a proof test by enabling a 
FFS rationale that moves beyond mere risk assessment toward a more anchored and quantified 
engineering rationale.  While the layered construction should not hinder the physics behind the 
proof logic, as with NDE the layered construction makes quantification of the proof test efficacy 
considerably more complicated. 
Figure 7.3-1 illustrates the basic idea of a fracture-mechanics-based proof test to provide a 
quantifiable expectation of reliable cyclic life.  The curve in the axes reflects the general 
relationship between critical crack size and pressure in the vessel, showing increasing critical 
crack size as pressure decreases.  The position and shape of the critical crack size curve is a 
function of the crack geometry (e.g., through crack, surface crack, or embedded crack) and the 
material toughness, which will vary by material (head, shell, nozzle, or weld) and temperature.  
The most important aspect to quantifying the cyclic life assured by proof test is the ability to 
assess accurately the critical flaw size in the vessel at the proof pressure condition and at the 
maximum operating pressure condition.  The ratio of these stress states (σproof/σoper) defines the 
proof factor.  For most common pressure vessels, this ratio of stress states is equivalent to the 
ratio of internal pressures at these conditions because pressure is the primary source of stress.  
The higher pressure at the proof test condition makes the critical crack size at proof smaller than 
the critical crack size in operation (acrit.pr < acrit.op); therefore, following a successful proof test, 
there is a range of crack growth of length ∆a = acrit.op – acrit.pr reserved for cyclic growth in 
operation.  The number of operational pressure cycles available within Δa may be determined 
through fracture mechanics methods for fatigue crack growth, such as predicted by crack growth 
relations like such that ( )nda C K
dN
= ∆  such that 1
( )
op
pr
a
n
a
N da
C K
=
∆∫ , where N is the number of 
cycles and ΔK is the cyclic range of the crack’s stress intensity factor.  While simple in concept, 
an accurate assessment of the Δa (or cycle life N) assured by the proof test is complicated.  As 
illustrated in Figure 7.3-1, the value of the proof factor will be the most direct influence, but the 
shape and consistency of the critical crack size curve is also extremely crucial. 
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Figure 7.3-1.  Proof Test Concept 
Considering the concept illustration of Figure 7.3-1, an accurate definition of the critical crack 
size curve is fundamental to the proof test logic.  In this figure, a single critical crack size curve 
is shown for simplicity.  In reality, the two critical events in the proof logic (i.e., proof test and 
reaching the operational critical crack size) are well separated in time, perhaps by years.  The key 
aspects that define the curve (i.e., crack geometry and material performance) may not be the 
same over time.  For example, as a crack grows over the operational service life, the shape of the 
flaw may evolve from an embedded crack to through-wall crack, or the temperature of the vessel 
in operation may differ from that during proof test.  Considering this, it is more appropriate to 
consider a version of the conceptual figure that has a critical crack size curve for both the proof 
condition and the operational condition, as illustrated in Figure 7.3-2.  In this context, the life 
assured through the proof test, Δa, can appropriately consider the limitations imposed by the 
proof and operational conditions of the vessel.  The life assured through proof is maximized by 
maximizing Δa.  This implies screening for the smallest possible acrit.pr and allowing the largest 
operational crack size acrit.op.  However, from a safety perspective, the proof test must be 
assessed based on the minimum Δa that may exist between proof and operational failure.  This 
requires considering the largest crack that may escape proof test and the smallest that may cause 
failure, which minimizes Δa.  To do this, the toughness of the material during proof must be 
considered at its upper bound, and worst-case performance must be assumed regarding toughness 
and material variability during operation.  For materials with consistent ductile fracture 
properties (always upper shelf), the upper bound toughness assumed in proof can often 
reasonably be assumed to be present in operation as well.  This reduces some of the pessimism in 
the assessment.  However, for these LPV ferritic steels, which cleave through a stochastic 
sampling of crack front cleavage initiators such as carbide particles, the assumption of consistent 
upper bound toughness values being present for the operational condition are not justified 
because the crack will have advanced through the material during operational cycles and will not 
be sampling the same crack front material later in the operational life.  At this point for the crack, 
it is a new draw from the random deck. 
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Figure 7.3-2.  Proof Test Concept with Proof and Operational Critical Crack Size Curves 
For more detail on proof test considerations, see the thorough review of the fundamentals of 
proof testing provided in reference 90. 
7.3.1 Methods of Proof Test Assessment 
The efficacy of a proof test may be quantified analytically, experimentally, or through a 
combination of these.  Proper analytical assessments of proof test efficacy are difficult.  The use 
of linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) to determine acrit.pr and acrit.op with the desired 
accuracy is generally not feasible and could likely lead to nonconservative results.  LEFM is 
generally more robust in evaluating cyclic life in fatigue than in accurately predicting true 
fracture failure, particularly for ductile materials like the LPV steels.  An analytical assessment 
of the bounding crack sizes for proof and operation may be performed more robustly with a  
J-integral based failure assessment diagram, such as described in API-579 [ref. 32].  In this case, 
the main variables affecting the outcome of the Δa assessment will be the material toughness 
values chosen to represent the two conditions and the choice of assumed crack geometries.  For 
the case of the LPV problem, the latter represents the larger challenge.  The material toughness 
and its expected variability can be assessed and reasonably understood through evaluations, such 
as those described elsewhere in this report (e.g., Section 7.2.1).  Choosing representative and 
appropriate hypothetical crack geometries to assess the proof test is complicated somewhat by 
the layered construction relative to traditional solid-wall vessels.  There are more potential 
scenarios to consider, and the load cases are more complicated to assess.  The prediction of 
crack-shape evolution during the operational life is also more complicated.  This does not imply 
that the problem is intractable, but the time required to assess an LPV for proof will be longer 
than for a typical solid-wall vessel.  Fortunately, for structural assessment considerations, an 
analysis that is reasonably suited to provide a conservative estimate of proof stress conditions at 
a location in an LVP can generally also be used for the assessment of the operational stress state 
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given that most aspects of the problem governing stress states remain consistent between the two 
conditions.  The only changes from the proof assessment to the operational assessment are 
typically the applied pressure, the evolved crack shape, and the material properties. 
Though more costly, the experimental approach to assessing proof test efficacy is, in principal, 
more robust, although its practicality for application to NASA’s LPV fleet has not been assessed.  
The issues of elastic-plastic fracture mechanics, material property changes, crack-shape 
evolution, and fatigue-crack-growth predictions can be rolled into a single test result that requires 
less specific knowledge about the contributions and interactions of all these complicated 
behaviors.  The experimental methodology commonly used for such an assessment is referred to 
as an “imminent failure simulated service test.”  In this method, a crack is fatigued into a 
representative test specimen.  The specimen may simply be a section of the LVP base material or 
the specimen may be a more complicated, configurational analog of the LPV structure, including 
layers or welds.  The specimen and crack are sized such that the crack will be near failure at a 
stress level representative of the LPV proof stress.  Under environmental conditions 
representative of the proof test, the specimen is loaded in a test frame to a point of “imminent 
failure” (i.e., a point where it is anticipated that any additional load would cause failure).  The 
proof load is then removed and the specimen cycled under environmental conditions 
representative of the operational stress level (i.e., peak load is reduced by the proof factor ratio) 
and the specimen cycled to failure.  This experiment provides a direct measure of the cyclic 
capability of a crack that barely survives the proof test.  Much of the complicated physics that 
confound the analytical assessment is handled cleanly in the experiment, such as plasticity, crack 
extension by tearing during proof, fatigue crack-shape evolution, and final failure.  A larger 
number of tests would be needed for cleavage-prone materials such as appear to exist in NASA’s 
LPV fleet than for other more consistently ductile fracture materials due to the stochastic nature 
of the cleavage mechanism.  The variability this may impose on the experimental assessment of 
proof test efficacy is not clear at this time.  The issues of geometric differences between vessels, 
material property and toughness variations, different manufacturers and manufacturing 
processes, etc., of NASA’s LPV fleet are factors that would further complicate development of 
an experimental approach.  Reference 91 provides a wealth of information regarding proof test 
assessment. 
There are numerous other influences that require investigation related to the proof test 
assessment in LPV systems.  Some effects may be negligible, some helpful, others detrimental. 
Each should be studied to ensure it does not present an unreasonable limitation or reduction in 
confidence in the proof test assessment and its influence on perceived vessel reliability.  The 
following are a few items for future consideration: 
• Choice of proof factor:  To be effective as a screen for additional safe operating cyclic
life, the proof factor must be sufficient to overcome the variability present in the system.
As previously described, the material behavior with respect to cleavage failure has a
considerable stochastic nature.  The need to be conservative in material properties for
both acrit.pr (upper bound) and acrit.op (lower bound) can greatly reduce the actual
“effective” proof factor.  This material variability alone may drive the need for
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substantial proof factors.  The proof factor level should be an integral part of the vessel 
proof assessment, taking into account system variability and the desired proof-assured 
life.  
• Proof test temperature:  The need to utilize upper bound toughness properties for the
proof evaluation of acrit.pr makes it particularly appealing to mitigate that effect by
minimizing the material toughness during proof.  This is accomplished by lowering the
proof test temperature to the lowest practical degree.  It is preferable that the proof test
temperature at least bound the allowable minimum operational temperature.  Methods to
effectively implement such a test in field conditions may require special development.
• Residual stress state:  Residual stress in and around welds may have a significant effect
on the driving force for cracks and failure due to cleavage.  Changes in residual stress due
to cyclic shakedown of the materials may also influence the material response.  An
understanding of how these stresses likely evolved from the original vendor proof test to
those currently present or following additional proof cycles may be important.
• Crack-shape evolution:  As previously discussed, the larger the difference between
acrit.pr and acrit.op, the longer the proof-assured life will be; however, large Δa also means
an increased likelihood that the fundamental crack shape will change between the time of
proof testing and operational failure.  The layered structure offers additional
complications.  Experiments or simulations may be used to determine likely crack-shape
evolution paths.  Fracture mechanics tools, most notably LEFM boundary element
methods, have matured sufficiently to provide good first-order estimates of this crack-
shape evolution behavior.  An understanding of these trends in LPVs will be important to
an accurate general assessment of LPV proof efficacy.
• Tearing, sharpening, retardation, (i.e., nonlinear effects):  Tearing and sharpening of
defects may be aspects of vessel behavior that limit the effectiveness, or reduce the
reliability, of the proof test.  Stable crack tearing is most likely to occur during or at the
peak of the proof loading cycle.  Unless reasonably represented in the analytical or
experimental assessment of the proof loading cycle, the tearing adds to the length of
acrit.pr, reducing the available Δa for operation.  If tearing occurs and is undetected or
unanticipated, the proof test may not be effective.  Unanticipated crack tearing may be
mitigated by understanding toughness R-curve behavior, representing the tearing in the
simulated service tests, listening for it during proof with acoustic emission, or conducting
more robust screening via multi-cycle proof testing.  Sharpening of defects in proof is
also a concern.  In this case, initial defects that are not fully crack-like, such as a welding
lack of fusion or chain of porosity, is torn to a crack-like condition and then sharpened
during the unloading cycle of the proof test.  The most effective screen for this
consideration is the multi-cycle proof test.  A third likely influence of proof test
assessment is retardation of fatigue-crack-growth.  Unlike tearing and sharpening,
retardation effects may tend toward enhancing the realized proof life by increasing the
number of cycles required to grow the crack by Δa.  This effect is a strong function of the
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applied proof factor and occurs due to well-characterized crack closure effects following 
an overload cycle, where the crack opening is suppressed in subsequent loading cycles by 
the residual compression caused plastic wake following the overload.  Each of these 
phenomena can complicate the proof test assessment by adding what are essentially 
nonlinear effects to the crack behavior. 
• Multi-cycle proof testing:  The multi-cycle proof test concept involves cycling the
vessel to the proof condition a number of times (five is common) to improve the
reliability of the proof screen.  This does not provide a smaller value of acrit.pr and, thus,
does not alter the assured Δa, but rather improves the likelihood that any defects close to
the acrit.pr size or evolving to that size through tearing or sharpening mechanisms will be
screened.  Probabilistically, the effectiveness of the proof test in assuring vessel
reliability is improved.  The additional cycles at proof stress levels are a cost in
accumulated damage, but are not likely significant in the overall cyclic life of such
vessels.  Details can be found in reference 92.
• Other effects, for example, costs and facility threats:  A reliance on proof testing of
the LPV fleet to provide service life reliability may overcome many of the inspection and
analytical challenges inherent to these vessels, but such testing comes with significant
costs and presents potential hazards.  The direct costs of implementing a proof test on any
given vessel may be significant, especially if there are infrastructure developments
needed to provide a cold, hydrostatic condition for proof testing, or vessel cleaning costs
post-proof are substantial.  Additionally, there will often be costs associated with either
moving a vessel to a safe location or providing some other form of protection from
collateral damage should a vessel fail in proof.  The potential energy release from large
vessels can be significant, even in hydrostatic testing, and hazard assessment and
mitigation must be taken seriously.  Though expensive, these costs are a small fraction of
typical replacement costs.  Though the loss of a vessel by failure in proof can be
considered a substantial cost, a preferred point of view is that the proof test was
successful at removing a dangerous vessel from the fleet under controlled circumstances.
While undesirable, vessel failure in proof is vastly preferable to failure in service,
provided the potential hazards due to such failure have been adequately mitigated.
7.3.2 Proof Test Conclusions 
Systematic use of proof testing for FFS assurance in the LPV fleet will require the issues 
discussed in this section be investigated such that the benefits and risks of proof testing these 
vessels are better understood.  When proof testing is performed, it must be assumed that, 
although highly unlikely, sudden catastrophic failure could occur, and hazard mitigations must 
be implemented to protect personnel and, if appropriate, facilities, from such failures. 
7.4 Assessment Team Comments on LPV Replacement Strategy 
In light of the elevated and indeterminate risks associated with the continued use of aging, non-
code LPVs, the assessment team had considerable discussions as to whether to include any 
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recommendations regarding replacement of these vessels.  In the end, such a recommendation 
was not included for the following reasons:   
• The defined scope of the assessment was to identify work that was required to continue to
use these vessels safely.  Thus, recommending replacement, although it would eliminate
the additional risk associated with these LPVs, is inconsistent with the assessment scope.
It is noted that even the likely replacement (i.e., single-walled ASME vessels) are not risk
free but have a lower risk that is acceptable based on ASME BPVC and OSHA
regulations.
• Although this report must not be taken out of context to indicate that these vessels are
entirely safe to operate or will continue to be so for any future period, there were no
findings that warranted a recommendation to begin immediate planning for replacement
of these vessels.
• The report instead identifies that there is a lack of information with which to adequately
assess the immediate risks associated with these vessels or to determine the remaining
safe life of any particular vessel in its specific service.  Characterization of those risks
will be critical information needed to guide replacement decisions.  Thus, the
recommended longer-term activities are necessary not only to develop a process to ensure
continued safe operations but also to provide essential information to support eventual,
orderly replacement decisions.
• Further, as replacement of these vessels is an expensive option (i.e., an estimated average
cost of around $2 M per vessel), such decisions regarding replacement should be driven
by a risk analysis that incorporates an understanding of costs and benefits associated with
available options.  Obviously, replacing these vessels with single-walled ASME code
vessels eliminates the additional risks associated with non-code LPVs, but at a substantial
cost.  Analysis of costs and benefits in terms of risk reduction for other options needs to
be considered as part of the replacement decisions.  The risks of thick-walled single-layer
ASME code vessels are generally better understood and more manageable through a
variety of validated analysis and NDE methods, but these risks are not zero.  Estimates of
costs will need to include costs for the recommended efforts that are identified in this
report to support continued use, as well as costs that might occur from additional
inspections, operational constraints, etc., that will likely originate as a consequence of the
results of this work.  Thus, again, it is highlighted that the activities recommended in this
final report are critical not only for assurance of continued safe operations but also for
input into decisions on eventual replacement of these vessels.
• Lastly, as the costs of wholesale replacement of all NASA LPVs is not affordable to the
Agency under current budget constraints, such decisions will need to be made on a case-
by-case basis, driven by the individual circumstances for specific vessels.
However, all assessment team members were in agreement with the obvious fact that 
replacement of these vessels eliminates the risks associated with their continued use, albeit 
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substituting for that risk the better understood risks of thick-walled single-layer vessels.  Thus, 
where there are opportunities and funding available to allow replacement of LPVs, this action 
could be advisable, although an assessment of the particular circumstances would still be 
required.  Further, while a general recommendation for replacement is not being made, 
identification of certain defects may require removal from service of individual vessels. 
8.0 Findings, Observations, and NESC Recommendations 
8.1 Findings 
General 
F-1. Non-code LPVs are in use at nine NASA Centers and facilities, with 376 vessels 
reported, 302 of which are in active service. 
F-2. Operation of NASA non-code LPVs presents an elevated level of risk compared with 
conventional code vessels. 
• Non-code materials, process controls, and inspection methods used during original
vessel fabrication.
• Uncertain minimum safe-operating temperatures, with indications of likely operation
within the transition region to brittle fracture behavior.
• Inability to currently perform adequate inspections or assessments to ascertain
remaining safe life, with no specific LPV guidance provided in the principal
post-construction pressure-vessel codes NB-23 and ASME FFS-1/API-579.
• Potential aging effects that could include fatigue, corrosion, and embrittlement.
o Noncatastrophic cracks documented in industry and NASA vessels, including
those found recently in LaRC high-pressure methane and KSC nitrogen LPVs.
o Internal corrosion of NASA LPVs not known to be an issue due to operation
with noncorrosive gases at ambient temperatures.
o Some NASA LPVs subject to external corrosion due to proximity to ocean.
o No known data on embrittlement of NASA LPV materials, although some
vessels used for gaseous hydrogen service.
• At least nine catastrophic LPV failures in industry.
o Occurred under different usage conditions than NASA LPVs (elevated
temperatures with corrosive products).
o Two occurred after evidence of inner shell failure was observed through
product loss at vent holes.
F-3. The level of increased risk associated with non-code LPVs and the overall reliability of 
these vessels cannot be quantitatively estimated. 
NESC Request No.: TI-13-00852 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report
Document #: 
NESCP-RP-
13-00852 
Version: 
1.1 
Title:
Evaluation of Agency Non-code LPVs 
Page #: 
178 of 193 
• Lack of historical data associated with design, fabrication, operation, inspection,
maintenance, and repair.
• Available data in disparate formats and locations and difficult to retrieve.
• Original materials property data in some cases acquired with methods not consistent
with current code; cannot be correlated with current methods.
• Recently acquired materials property data from NASA sacrificed vessels are limited,
do not provide sufficient sampling to adequately represent potential fleet variability
(material lot to lot and within lot), and in some cases show lower than expected
property values or possible undocumented material substitutions.
• Currently available structural analysis approaches for LPVs are idealized and
simplistic and do not accurately reflect some of the key details of construction.
• Uncertainty in the identification of probable failure modes and associated critical
initial and final flaw sizes currently precludes the identification of NDE detection
requirements.
• Currently no validated NDE methods available to inspect certain critical regions of
LPVs (e.g., full penetration circumferential welds, shell longitudinal welds, and
interior shell layers).
F-4. The Agency lacks a consensus approach to addressing the risks associated with these 
vessels. 
• Center PSMs have not reached consensus on certification, recertification, inspection,
maintenance, or usage of LPVs.
• Frequency and methods of reporting LPV risks to Center management, and their
awareness of the risks presented by continued use of these vessels, varies from Center
to Center.
• Previous and ongoing efforts at specific Centers to develop data and methods to
mitigate risks associated with LPVs have not always been effectively communicated
across the Agency.
• No consistent methodology identified in industry survey.
F-5. Near-term actions (identified in R-1 through R-7) are available to reduce the risk of or 
consequences from catastrophic failure of LPVs.  However, for many of these actions, the 
associated degree of risk reduction cannot be quantified. 
F-6. Longer-term efforts will be required to characterize and mitigate risks for LPVs. 
Emphasis should be placed on vessel features and operating conditions that pose the 
highest risks, accompanied by a focus on the most promising technologies to mitigate 
these risks. 
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• Load sharing, interlayer friction, and other interactions from the layered construction
complicate the application of the traditional fracture mechanics approach for LPVs in
their entirety.
• Proof test methodologies may be able to address risk in regions where NDE is
inadequate, provided that bounding material properties are available and appropriate
analysis methods are developed and validated.
• Operation of NASA LPVs at ambient temperatures in cold weather is a significant
concern.
o MDMT stamped on the nameplate or shown on the design drawings for
non-code LPVs was determined via methods seen as inadequate today and
does not account for brittle fracture potential at temperatures below the NDT.
o During recent record cold temperatures (i.e., January through March 2014), an
attempt was made to gather pressure and temperature data for a number of
NASA LPVs at some Centers.
• Identified high-risk regions of NASA LPVs include circumferential full penetration
welds, shell sections near full penetration welds and along longitudinal welds, and
welds for drain nozzles through shell sections.
• NDE methodologies that have the potential to detect relevant defects have not been
satisfactorily validated.
Specific Discipline Findings 
Materials 
F-7. Strength evaluations of LPV steels and associated welds reflect properties mostly 
consistent with material records from the time of fabrication.  In some cases, strength 
values have been nearer to assumed design values than typically would be expected.  One 
vessel material tested (i.e., inner layer of MSFC vessel V0032) was of significantly lower 
strength than the certification records indicate.  Uncertainty in the pedigree and 
consistency of materials in the LPV fleet is recognized as a risk associated with these 
vessels. 
F-8. Inconsistencies are present in the historical material specifications from the various LPV 
manufacturers, including the requirements for chemistry and strength. 
F-9. Material anisotropy is relatively mild for strength properties but significant with respect 
to fracture toughness across the head and shell materials evaluated.  Anisotropy is not 
always readily apparent in metallographic evaluations; therefore, toughness or Charpy 
testing is best used to identify the material orientation of minimum toughness.  Materials 
may not be oriented favorably in vessels with respect to material anisotropy in fracture 
toughness, so bounding values are necessary. 
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F-10. Initial single-lot measurements of toughness in the transition regime have been made for 
two-shell-layer materials (i.e., alloys 1143 and 1146) from sacrificed vessels.  The 
toughness measurements were developed in terms of the T0 parameter per  
ASTM E1921-13, providing the fracture toughness versus temperature relationship in the 
transition toughness regime.  Once fully developed, the T0 values for the steels will 
provide rationale for the allowable service temperatures for the LPV fleet. 
F-11. The LPV steels tested are less tough than the more modern pressure vessel steels used in 
the development of the Master Curve method prescribed by ASTM E1921-13.  The LPV 
material toughness presents difficulties in meeting the current requirements and 
assumptions of the test standard; however, the temperature-dependent material toughness 
generated by the method is expected to be directly applicable to FFS assessments.  
F-12. Radiographic comparison of selected sections of longitudinal layer welds for two 
sacrificial vessels revealed markedly different internal weld qualities between the two 
vessels, an indicator of potential quality variations that exist within the LPV fleet. 
Structural Analysis 
F-13. The diversity of pressure vessels across the Agency will require unique assessments 
based on individual vessels or vessel types. 
F-14. Preliminary models have been developed to estimate residual stresses in LPV full 
penetration circumferential welds, which were not stress relieved in the fabrication 
process.  The initial results show high residual stresses, which could negatively affect 
safe life calculations. 
Nondestructive Evaluation 
F-15. Preliminary testing of PAUT methods has demonstrated some potential for volumetric 
inspection of full-penetration circumferential welds. 
F-16. Photogrammetric techniques were used to provide LPV full-field surface deformation 
measurements, which could be useful for validating analysis models.  The capability of 
photogrammetry to detect subsurface flaws will be a function of the magnitude of the 
change in surface deformation produced by those flaws.  It will also require an 
understanding of the surface deformation produced by other LPV features (e.g., layer 
gaps, welds, support structure, etc.). 
F-17. AE has potential for detecting crack growth in internal layered shell sections and welds if 
cracks can be shown to produce detectable AE in the presence of high background noise 
associated with layer rubbing. 
F-18. The capabilities for RT as applied to crack detection in LPVs have not been established. 
• The presence of multiple shell layers adds non-relevant indications (i.e., layer wash)
to radiographic images that make detection of flaws more difficult.
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• The flaw detection capability for RT is a function of the overall thickness being
inspected, while the critical flaw size for a layer will be based on the layer thickness.
F-19. Low-frequency electromagnetic inspection methods have been developed to detect wall 
thinning in thick carbon steel pipes.  These methods may also have applicability to the 
detection of flaws in LPVs. 
8.2 Observations 
O-1. The Center PSMs have demonstrated understanding of the technical issues and concerns 
associated with non-code LPVs and a willingness to engage across Centers to develop 
improved approaches to mitigating risks associated with the continued use of these 
vessels.  
O-2. A significant amount of pertinent, valuable testing and development that directly relates 
to the understanding of and continued safe use of LPVs at NASA is being performed by 
NASA Centers outside this NESC assessment.   
8.3 NESC Recommendations 
Near-term Recommendations  
In drafting recommendations to the Agency and Centers that operate and maintain LPVs, an 
attempt was made to provide some near-term recommendations that could, if enacted, reduce the 
risk of or consequences from catastrophic LPV failure resulting from their continued use.  It was 
recognized that due to the lack of adequate materials property data, inspection methodologies, 
and analyses methods, the risks associated with the continued use of these vessels and the degree 
to which these recommendations would reduce that risk cannot be accurately estimated.  It was 
also recognized that these recommendations cannot be uniformly adapted or applied across the 
Agency because of the unique applications/requirements and local site conditions for specific 
vessels.  These recommendations are as follows: 
R-1. Agency ensure continued-use rationale is documented for all in service LPVs.  
(F-2, F-3) 
R-2. Centers inspect LPV vent holes to ensure that they are not corroded, blocked, or plugged, 
and periodically monitor vent holes for product loss that may indicate inner shell failure.  
(F-2, F-5) 
R-3. Centers consider imposing service restrictions (e.g., reduced operating pressures or 
operation at temperatures where material toughness is in the upper shelf region) to reduce 
the risk of catastrophic failure.  (F-2, F-5, F-6) 
• When data necessary to establish appropriate MDMT are not available, set minimum
allowable usage temperature at conservative levels above historical cold usage
temperatures where such data are available.
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R-4. Centers consider the implementation of physical barriers (e.g., berms) or operational 
controls (e.g., minimized personnel access) where practical to mitigate the consequences 
of vessel failure.  (F-2, F-5) 
R-5. Agency develop and implement a consistent program of minimum maintenance and 
vessel inspection requirements.  (F-2, F-4, F-5) 
R-6. Centers remove from service any LPV with crack-like indications in critical areas until 
acceptance rationale (e.g., repair, proof testing, periodic inspection, physical barriers, 
operational constraints, and/or analysis) and safety/risk assessment are approved by 
Center management.  (F-2, F-3) 
R-7. Agency formulate and support an Agency-wide team to continue efforts to assess and 
reduce risks associated with LPVs, with the goal of developing a standard Agency 
process for their continued usage.   
• Team regularly report to Agency and Center management baseline LPV risks and
results to reduce risk.  (F-2, F-4, F-5)
R-8. Agency develop a centralized database that documents, to the extent practical, LPV 
design, fabrication, materials, operation, inspection, maintenance, and repair data.  
(F-3, F-5) 
Longer-Term Recommendations 
The following are discipline-specific recommendations to develop improved understanding of 
the risks associated with the continued use of LPVs and to lead to the development of Agency 
processes to mitigate these risks. 
R-9. Agency expand efforts to gather LPV weld and parent materials property data. 
• Perform statistical analysis to determine number of LPVs and associated materials
testing specimens needed to provide adequate bounding materials property data.
(F-2, F-3, F-6)
• Provide for a complete characterization of fracture toughness as a function of
temperature for each of the steels used in LPV construction, including welds.  The
expected variability in fracture toughness across the LPV fleet should be sufficiently
characterized to enable developing meaningful MDMT values.  Studied influences
should include variables such as the steel producer, vessel vendor, manufacturing
time period, steel product size, and other known manufacturing process dependencies.
(F-2, F-3, F-6, F-10)
• Perform failure analysis to include metallurgical examination and materials property
characterization for specimens collected from cracked LPVs.  (F-2, F-3, F-6)
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• Collect available and future material property data into a central and complete
database sufficient to support all forms of LPV FFS evaluations, proof testing
methodology and efficacy evaluations, and critical crack size determinations for NDE
detection criteria.  Establish and maintain this database in an openly accessible
location, such as maptis.nasa.gov.  (F-2, F-3, F-6)
R-10. Agency expand efforts to develop and validate analysis methods to address identified 
highest risk conditions and regions of LPVs. 
• Assess sensitivity of results to uncertainties in input variables (e.g., material property
values, structural configurations, and weld residual stress states).  (F-3)
• Complete development of analytical models that incorporate key structural details of
LPVs.  Validate models where possible against deformation measurements from
pressurized LPVs.  (F-3)
• Complete analytical predictions of residual stresses in LPV circumferential full-
penetration welds and obtain a sample of WRS measurements to validate predictions.
(F-14)
• Establish an analytical framework to evaluate proof test logic.  (F-6)
• In cases where proof testing cannot be applied, establish an analytical framework to
evaluate the LBB capability of the system.  (F-3)
• To aid in NDE development and validation, establish an analytical framework to
evaluate critical initial flaw sizes.  (F-3)
• Predict surface deformations associated with critical flaw sizes to assess the
capability of photogrammetry methods for flaw detection in shell sections.  (F-16)
• Evaluate friction effects between intermediate layers of shell sections.  (F-3)
R-11. Agency develop and validate the following NDE techniques to address the highest risk 
conditions and regions of LPVs. 
• PAUT for inspection of LPV full-penetration circumferential welds.  (F-15)
• Photogrammetric techniques for validating analysis methods and assess capability for
detecting flaws in shell sections.  (F-16)
• AE techniques for application to LPVs.  (F-17)
• RT methods for detecting cracks in shell sections and welds.  (F-18)
• Low-frequency electromagnetic methods for the detection of flaws in shell sections of
LPVs.  (F-19)
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9.0 Alternate Viewpoint 
There were no alternate viewpoints identified during the course of this assessment by the NESC 
team or the NESC Review Board quorum. 
10.0 Other Deliverables 
No unique hardware, software, or data packages, outside those contained in this report, were 
disseminated to other parties outside this assessment. 
11.0 Lessons Learned 
No applicable lessons learned were identified for entry into the NASA Lessons Learned 
Information System as a result of this assessment. 
12.0 Recommendations for NASA Standards and Specifications 
No recommendations for NASA standards and specifications were identified as a result of this 
assessment. 
13.0 Definition of Terms 
Corrective Actions Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship practices, 
training, inspections, tests, procedures, specifications, drawings, tools, 
equipment, facilities, resources, or material that result in preventing, 
minimizing, or limiting the potential for recurrence of a problem.  
Finding A relevant factual conclusion and/or issue that is within the assessment 
scope and that the team has rigorously based on data from their 
independent analyses, tests, inspections, and/or reviews of technical 
documentation. 
Lessons Learned Knowledge, understanding, or conclusive insight gained by experience 
that may benefit other current or future NASA programs and projects.  
The experience may be positive, as in a successful test or mission, or 
negative, as in a mishap or failure. 
Observation A noteworthy fact, issue, and/or risk, which may not be directly within the 
assessment scope, but could generate a separate issue or concern if not 
addressed.  Alternatively, an observation can be a positive 
acknowledgement of a Center/Program/Project/Organization’s operational 
structure, tools, and/or support provided. 
Problem The subject of the independent technical assessment. 
Proximate Cause The event(s) that occurred, including any condition(s) that existed 
immediately before the undesired outcome, directly resulted in its 
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occurrence and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the 
undesired outcome. 
Recommendation A proposed measurable stakeholder action directly supported by specific 
Finding(s) and/or Observation(s) that will correct or mitigate an identified 
issue or risk. 
Root Cause One of multiple factors (events, conditions, or organizational factors) that 
contributed to or created the proximate cause and subsequent undesired 
outcome and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the 
undesired outcome.  Typically, multiple root causes contribute to an 
undesired outcome. 
Supporting Narrative A paragraph, or section, in an NESC final report that provides the detailed 
explanation of a succinctly worded finding or observation.  For example, 
the logical deduction that led to a finding or observation; descriptions of 
assumptions, exceptions, clarifications, and boundary conditions.  Avoid 
squeezing all of this information into a finding or observation 
14.0 Acronym List 
AE Acoustic Emission 
AFRC Armstrong Flight Research Center (formerly Dryden Flight Research Center) 
AMA Analytical Mechanics Associates, Inc. 
ARC Ames Research Center 
ASME America Society of Mechanical Engineers 
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials 
B&W Babcock and Wilcox 
BPVC Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code 
C Circumferential (structural orientation) 
C(T) Compact Tension 
CB&I Chicago Bridge & Iron Company 
dB Decibel 
DOD Department of Defense 
DOT Department of Transportation 
DP Dye Penetrant 
DWC Digital Wave Corporation 
EDM Electronic Discharge Machine 
FBH Flat-bottom Hole 
FEAM Finite Element Alternating Method 
FFS Fitness for Service 
FS Factor of Safety 
FSH Full Screen Height 
FY Fiscal Year 
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GRC Glenn Research Center 
GSE Ground Support Equipment 
GUI Graphical User Interface 
HAZ Heat-Affected Zone 
HDT Hit Definition Time 
HLT Hit Lockout Time 
Hz Hertz 
ICP Inductively Coupled Plasma 
ID Inner Diameter 
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
KAPL Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory 
KSC Kennedy Space Center 
L Longitudinal (material or structural orientation) 
LAPVAT Layered Pressure Vessel Analysis Tool 
LaRC Langley Research Center 
LBB Leak before Burst 
LEFM Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics 
LPV Layered Pressure Vessel 
M Meridional, spherical head (structural orientation) 
MAE Modal AE (Acoustic Emission) 
MAF Michoud Assembly Facility 
MAWP Maximum Allowable Working Pressure 
MDMT Minimum Design Metal Temperature 
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center 
MT Magnetic Particle Testing 
MTSO Management and Technical Support Office 
NBIC National Board Inspection Code 
NDE Nondestructive Evaluation 
NDT Nil Ductility Temperature 
NESC NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NG Northrop Grumman Corporation 
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
OD Outer Diameter 
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
OSMA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance 
PAUT Phased Array Ultrasonic Technique 
PDT Peak Definition Time 
PSM Pressure Systems Manager 
PT Penetrant Testing 
PWHT Post-Weld Heat Treated 
R Radial (structural orientation) 
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RDH Radially Drilled Hole 
RFI Request for Information 
RT Radiographic Testing 
S Short-transverse (material orientation) 
SCC Stress Corrosion Cracking 
SDH Side-drilled Hole 
SE Signal Energy 
SE(B) Single-edge Notch Bend 
SLOFEC™ Saturated Low Frequency Eddy Current 
SOW Statement of Work 
SSC Stennis Space Center 
SwRI Southwest Research Institute 
T Transverse (material orientation) 
TIM Technical Interchange Meeting 
U.S. United States 
UT Ultrasonic Testing 
VFT Virtual Fabrication Technology 
VT Visual Testing 
WFF Wallops Flight Facility 
WRS Weld Residual Stress 
WSTF White Sands Test Facility 
XRF X-ray Fluorescence 
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